

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

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ELIZABETH & HENRY IV.

BEING A

SHORT STUDY IN ANGLO-FRENCH RELATIONS, 1589-1603

(ARNOLD PRIZE ESSAY, 1914)

BY

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TO

MY FRIEND AND SOMETIME TEACHER

D. J. MEDLEY

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APPENDICES

"SOME say I am a hunter, others that I make love, but I wake when they sleepe." (Henry IV. to Sir Ralph Winwood. *Memorials of State*, vol. iv., p. 409.)

PREFACE

I HAVE ventured to publish this Prize Essay very much in the form in which it was first written. It was completed before the appearance of Professor Cheney's important volume on the later years of Elizabeth's reign. And, although I have since availed myself in one place of the conclusions of Professor Cheney, my object throughout has been slightly different. I have concerned myself less with military detail, and have sought rather to focus attention on the diplomatic aspect of the Anglo-French relations: to analyze the causes which undermined the stability of the Treaty of Blois, on which our Foreign policy rested from 1572, and to explain how the way was prepared for the "reversal" of Elizabeth's statecraft by James VI. and I.

The essay is mainly based on State Papers and Instructions to Ambassadors, which are accessible in the Record Office, London, the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, and the Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris. But I have also been greatly helped by the

monumental work of Laffleur de Kermaingant on Jean de Thuméry, to whom I trust I have shown my indebtedness in the References. I desire to thank Mr. C. H. Jenkinson, of the Record Office, for his kind help in deciphering some difficult passages in the documents which came under my notice; M. le Sous-Directeur des Archives at the Ministère, Paris, and the officers of the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, for facilitating my access to French sources of information.

I must also tender my thanks to the Carnegie Trustees, without whose generous aid this work would have been impossible.

J. B. B.

August, 1914.

ELIZABETH AND HENRY IV

A SHORT STUDY IN ANGLO-FRENCH RELATIONS, 1589-1603

I

INTRODUCTORY

§ 1. THE source of the unrest which characterized European politics in the second half of the Sixteenth Century was undoubtedly the collapse of France as a first-class Power. In the early part of the century the French Monarchy had been the counterpoise to the vaulting ambition of Charles V., and had provided the States of Europe with a bulwark against the menace of a general absorption in the dominions of the Hapsburgs. But after 1562, when France, by a somewhat sinister fate, became the veritable cockpit of the Counter-Reformation, the rôle of liberator of Europe was impossible. A capital domestic crisis, such as the Huguenot Wars, in which the economic stability of the country and the ordinary sources of wealth were shaken and destroyed, was bound to be accompanied by a profound and disastrous repercussion in the foreign field. For a Government like Henry III.'s, which could with difficulty pay its way or maintain the ordinary public services at home, could not be

expected to finance adequately its diplomatic and foreign service.[1] Hence from 1562 onward the influence of France in the Chancelleries of Europe gradually withered away. Alliances which had formerly been the corner-stones of French diplomacy—for instance, the Protectorate over Scotland with the prescription of eight hundred years behind it, and the German Alliance, which in the earlier period had been the main bridle on the Hapsburgs—were severally allowed to fall away and perish.[2] And by consequence French statesmen lost all hold on the international situation.

These disasters which overtook France were of world-wide importance, for they cleared the path for the aggressive designs of the Escorial, and in point of fact Europe was threatened in a new and alarming way with the peril of becoming a mere conscript appendage of Spain—a "seed-plot of soldiers"[3] for Philip II. The Spanish monarch, it is true, larded his political schemes with many a pious formula regarding the good of religion, but by 1589 it was generally held that it was not the extinction of heresy so much as the extension of his frontiers that moved him. "The King," says Bacon,[4] "did

[1] The Public Debt at the end of Henry III.'s reign amounted to 245,000,000 livres (*vide* Poirson, *Histoire de Henri IV.*, vol. i., p. xi).

[2] Hubault, *Ambassade de Michel de Castelnau*, chap. v.; also pp. 49, 50, and 52; and notes, pp. 99-101.

[3] Bacon, *Life and Letters*, ed. Spedding, 1862, vol. i., p. 169.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 137: "Discourse in Praise of his Sovereign."

always mask and veil his appetite with a demonstration of a devout and holy intention to the advancement of the Church and the public good. Many a *cruzada* hath the Bishop of Rome granted to him and his predecessors upon that colour which all have been spent upon the effusion of Christian blood." No obstacle was permitted by the Spaniard to stand in the way of satisfying "his appetite." He depopulated and ruined Flanders, he "racked the poor Indians," bringing them from freedom to be slaves of the most miserable condition. He destroyed, or sought to destroy, the public law of France on which the Monarchy had rested for hundreds of years in order to foist a stranger on the French throne. He undermined the bases of international agreements by acting on the principle that faith should not be kept with heretics. He would create social anarchy by countenancing the doctrine of political assassination. In fact, Spanish policy at this time involved nothing less than the reversion of Europe to the methods of barbarism—a state of affairs in which the appeal to the sword and the right of the stronger were the only grounds of international polity.[1] And to make matters worse, the one authority who in ordinary circumstances would have intervened to check this ugly trend of affairs, was gagged and bound to the Spanish interest. The Papal See was, in Bacon's expressive phrase, a donative cell of the King of Spain.[2]

[1] Poirson, *Histoire de Henri IV.*, vol. i., pp. ii-vi.

[2] Bacon, ed. Spedding, vol. i., p. 136.

To this pass, then, had Europe been brought by the Collapse of France and the aggression of the Escorial. And doubtless had Spain been a free agent European liberty and nationality must have perished. As France, however, became bankrupt, England prospered, and when the French grasp on the international situation slackened the English strengthened. Thus England rapidly became the leading "Reformed" Power in Europe, engrossed much of the prestige which France had lost, and was able to reconstruct from the débris of French alliances a new system which balanced the aggression of Philip II. Soon the pressure of the English Council was felt throughout the whole State system of Europe, from Poland to Portugal, from Gibraltar to the Bosphorus, and beyond.[1] And this unique and unheard-of prestige was solidly built on a material prosperity equally prodigious. "C'est chose magnifique," said the French Ambassador, speaking of the Thames, "de veoir la quantité de vaisseaux qui sont à l'ancre tellement que deux lieues durant vous ne voyez autre chose que vaisseaux qui servent à la guerre aussy bien qu'à la marchandise."[2] The wealth of the country was indeed a by-word. But the treasure of the Queen was no less a source of wonder to strangers.[3] With-

[1] Meyer, *England und die Katholische Kirche*, Rome, 1911, p. 313.

[2] "Ambassade de Hurault de Maisse en Angleterre," MS. Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris.

[3] Hubault, *Ambassade de Michel de Castelnau*, p. 58.

out unduly burdening her subjects she was able to discharge all the necessary Government services, counteract the designs of the Spanish King, and at the same time act as paymaster-general of Protestantism and broker-in-chief to half the needy Princes of Europe.

In this way, as the defence of European liberty slipped from the French grasp it was undertaken by Elizabeth. "Vous avez ceste faveur du ciel," remarked Beauvoir la Nocle, "d'avoir esté jusques à ceste heure la conservation en général de la Chrestienté." And Bacon could remark with truth:[1] "It is Elizabeth's government and her government alone which hath *let* this proud nation from overrunning all. If any State be yet free from his factions erected in the bowels thereof; if there be any State wherein his faction is erected that is not yet fired with civil troubles; if there be any subject to him that enjoyeth moderate liberty upon whom he tyrannizeth not, let them all know it is by the mercy of this renowned Queen that standeth between them and their misfortune."

There could be no better indictment of Spanish policy or truer defence of Elizabeth. They were approved and condemned by their fruits. As the Catholic cause under Philip lent itself to the degradation and enslavement of Europe, so the Protestant cause under the ægis of Elizabeth became identified with its liberation and the defence of its public liberties.

[1] Bacon, *Life and Letters*, vol. i., p. 137.

It may be objected, perhaps, that this was a rôle too heroic for the English Queen, and that her interference in European affairs was not conceived on any such gigantic and altruistic plan. If the result was beneficent, it was the outcome of accident rather than design, and she interfered in the Continent because the defence of England compelled her to do so. There is, of course, considerable truth in this view of the matter. English policy was narrow-minded, and unscrupulously concentrated on the defence and protection of English interests. But having respect to its broad issues—and we are concerned only with objective results—it was a policy which, not only did not make against the interests of Europe as a whole, but favoured them in no small degree. The one seeming exception—viz., the support given by the Queen to the " rebel " Huguenots against the French Crown—only proves the rule. Undertaken, as it was, to prevent the House of Guise which controlled the King, from prosecuting the claims of Mary Stuart in England, it did not lead to the dismemberment of France or the disturbance of the constitutional law of the Kingdom, such as Spanish policy undoubtedly aimed at. On the other hand, the establishment of an English Protectorate over the Netherlands clearly aided the growth of Dutch freedom, and helped to lay the foundations of that commercial prosperity which made Holland our great rival in the next century. While the interference in Scotland confirmed the Reformation in that country, and prevented it from

becoming an instrument in the hands of a militant Papacy and the Catholic Princes abroad. In no case can it be said that the policy of Elizabeth was aggressive; everywhere it was on the defensive, acting as a bracing and provocative influence, stimulating Europe against the loss of its liberty and nationality before the onslaught of an aggressive Spain supported by a militant Papacy.

§ 2. How far the designs of Philip II. had suffered by the victory of England in 1588 it would be difficult to say. At all events it did not mean a permanent dislocation of the diplomacy of the Escorial. The King of Spain weathered the period of humiliation, and when he picked up the threads once more it was found that Spanish prestige was still a mighty thing in Europe. If the wheels turned more slowly because of the Atlantean load it was believed they moved surely. "Je dis seulement," said Beauvoir la Nocle to the English Council in the Autumn of 1589—"que le désir de vengeance n'aveugle point tant ce vieux et consideré monarque qu'il n'ayme allonger son desseing pour jouir plus seurement que de se mettre en hazard de doubler la perte en la voulant repartir trop precipitamment."[1]

So far as England was concerned, it is true, another Spanish "Armada" was at the moment scarcely a serious question. We held Brille and Flushing; and if France could be kept from sinking and the Continental littoral thus maintained in friendly hands,

[1] State Papers, France, vol. xx., ff. 222-224.

the narrow seas were safe and our shores inviolable. Philip's failure in 1588 had proved that. On the other hand, the disaster of that year had taught the Spaniard a lesson in naval strategy; he had failed partly, at all events, because he lacked a suitable base. Consequently after 1588 it is noticeable that Spanish efforts are directed towards securing a base of operations against England on the French littoral. And this alteration of the *terminus ad quem* had peculiar dangers for Elizabeth, because any lodgment of the Spaniard on the opposite shore of the Channel, particularly in Brittany, would not only bring him into uncomfortable proximity to England, but also to Ireland, which was now the Achilles' heel of Elizabeth's dominion, and mightily perplexing to the English Government. Much, of course, depended on the strength and integrity of the French Monarchy as to what precisely would happen in the period 1588-1603, just as much had depended on it in the previous period. In this respect at least the international situation was unchanged. And the stupendous event of 1588 must not blind us to the importance of the problems and dangers of the years subsequent to the Armada, nor to the fact that the long-sustained *duellum* between England and Spain continued without abatement. There were those in England, for example, who averred that they had not thought it possible for Spain to make so great an effort; and we know that a feverish attention was being paid in the years after the defeat of

Philip's great fleet to the military defence of England. Italian military treatises were read with avidity, and Sir Thomas Knyvett[1] proposed a scheme for the training in arms of all the male population between the ages of eighteen and fifty. Our navy had been tried, says Mr. Meyer, but not our army, and now the country was growing anxious regarding the second line of defence.[2] But the reason for the military activity would appear to be that the danger of invasion was really believed to be much greater in these years than we ordinarily suppose. After 1589, as will be seen, Spanish armies threatened to annex the greater part of Brittany and captured Calais, thus making a descent on England or a flank attack on Ireland more than ever feasible. The reason why the Spaniard failed to make good his threat of invasion was, first of all, because the first Armada, when he prepared to effectuate it in 1596, was wrecked off Finisterre; secondly, because he miscalculated the nature and the amount of assistance he would obtain from the Irish rebels, this being the main reason for the ineffectiveness of the second expedition which landed at Kinsale in 1601; and, finally, because Spain was much weakened through prolonged exhaustion in men and money. But these causes, two of them of the nature of accidents, and the third a pathological condition of the Spanish nation, were not an "open book" to Elizabeth. Consequently the

[1] Sir Henry Knyvett, *Defence of the Realm*, Oxford, 1906. Tudor and Stuart Library.

[2] Meyer, *England und die Katholische Kirche*, pp. 297, 298.

period is not one in which England is struggling against a nerveless enemy or a wrangling neighbour, as Bacon too contemptuously perhaps remarked,[1] but a continuation of the life and death struggle inaugurated by the Armada, and much bitterer, because it was a *guerre de revanche.*

[1] Bacon, *Life and Letters*, vol. i., p. 170.

II

BRITTANY AND NORMANDY

§ 1. In the Summer of 1589 the French King, Henry III., was assassinated. This miserable deed was a profound misfortune to France, because there were signs that a better day was at hand. The King had just become reconciled to the Prince of Navarre, and their reconciliation had resulted in a mutual acknowledgment of a Politique programme, a common campaign against the League, and a common effort to pacify religious rancour and civil strife. The removal, however, of the last Valois King, before the foundations of the new order had been laid, left the Bourbon Navarre with a grave situation on his hands. His title was doubtless incontestable, indefeasible, and hereditary. His religion, on the other hand, was objectionable to the great majority of his subjects. But though a Calvinist by persuasion he was pre-eminently a politique statesmen, and accordingly made every concession to the Catholic party consistent with the dignity of the Crown, and gave ample guarantees that his rule would not mean the triumph of the Reformed religion or the destruction of the old. Nor would any vested interests in Church or State be allowed to suffer. Unfortunately these pronouncements

were largely a dead letter. The time was not yet ripe, even after a generation of religious wars, for the politique doctrine of toleration. Publicists urged that more bleeding of the cephalic veins was necessary before the heady religionists could be brought to admit the advisability of a common-sense settlement.[1] The sense of mutual distrust between the two religious parties in France may be felt in the words which Beauvoir, the French Ambassador in London, addressed to the Queen: " Tenez, Madame, pour une maxime qu'il n'y a guères papiste qui n'ait quelque parti de l'ame capable à recevoir des impressions ligueuses."[2] In any case it is clear that the Catholic leaders who threw in their lot with Henry IV. did so more because of their patriotic feelings and natural grief at the foul murder of their late King, and their hope that the new monarch, Calvinist though he was, might be converted to Catholicism, than from any endorsement of his politique proclivities; while the Huguenot leaders clung to him because of personal loyalty and their faith in his staunch Protestantism. How far these varying and somewhat contradictory grounds of attachment to the King might be made to bear the stress and strain of a great war against Spain remained to be seen. For the moment the prospect was dark enough. Considerable defections took place from the Royal Standard, and the fine composite army of which the King found himself the

[1] Poirson, *Histoire de Henri IV.*, vol. i., book i., chap. i.
[2] S.P.F., vol. xix.: Beauvoir to Queen, July 29, 1589.

leader on the death of Henry III., began rapidly to dwindle. In such circumstances it was impossible for him to think of recovering his capital or of exterminating the League, both of which designs had been, on the eve of the assassination, on the verge of achievement. He therefore retreated in September (1589) to Dieppe to await eventualities and to be near England if Elizabeth might be induced to send help.[1]

He had a grand scheme on hand for the revival of his drooping fortunes, nothing less, in fact, than a *contre-ligue,* or Protestant alliance, of England, France, Holland, Germany, Scotland, offensive and defensive, against both foreign and domestic foes. It was, moreover, the King's intention that this League should be one of unlimited liabilities, each signatory being expected not only to engage himself to contribute a scheduled and stipulated succour, but to hold himself liable in accordance with his security and stability for additional succours so long as the war should last.[2] But French credit was unfortunately too low in Europe to give the scheme the necessary recommendation it required, France being in the public eye a doomed and sinking ship. A grand Protestant alliance could only be initiated by

[1] Poirson, *Histoire de Henri IV.*, chap. i.

[2] Rymer, *Fœdera*, vol. xvi., pp. 23, 25, 26: " Instructions de M. de Fresnes envoyé par le Roy vers la Royne d'Angleterre," etc., Bibliothèque Nationale, Fonds Français, Nouvelles Acquisitions, 1,265; also " Instructions au Sieur Vicomte de Turenne," Fonds Français, 3,956, ff. 45-53.

the accredited head of Protestantism—viz., England. In the fervid language of the French Ambassador, Elizabeth was "le vray medicin de nos misères," and her Council "les pères communs du salut de la Chrestienté."[1] Beauvoir went further in his panegyric of the Queen: "L'honneur de conclurre et mener à chef un si grand ouvrage est deue entièrement à la Maiesté d'Angleterre laquelle pour cest effect Dieu a doué de tant de prudence et de prosperité tout ensemble qu'il n y a prince Evangelique qui ne s'estime heureux d'estre conduict par son exemple et receu en la communaulté de son bonheur."[2] Only English credit could give the enterprise the backbone it needed, and engage the sympathies of the Reformed States in its prosecution. And there was another reason why Elizabeth should take the initiative. The success of the undertaking rested, in the last resort, on the amount of pecuniary support England could be brought to give. Commercial reciprocity and the possible union of the Reformed Churches, which Henry IV. offered to the members of the proposed League, were of little importance when the one thing needful was money. English gold was the *nervus rerum;* it alone could counteract the bullion of Spain, finance the Swiss and German mercenaries on whose help Henry IV. mainly calculated, and keep the French King in the field.

[1] Rymer, *Fœdera*, vol. xvi., p. 26.

[2] Discours de l'Ambassadeur Français au Conseil. S.P.F., vol. xx., ff. 222-224.

It is true no great Protestant League was inaugurated, either at this time or subsequently, but Elizabeth answered handsomely to the solicitations of the French. Horatio Pallavicino, her financial agent, was despatched to Germany with £10,000 to provide the sinews of war to the Protestant Princes.[1] In September victuals and munitions were sent to the King at Dieppe,[2] and these arriving at the critical moment, liberated the Royalists from immediate danger. While the arrival of Peregrine Bertie, Lord Willoughby, with 4,000 English troops at the end of September,[3] together with a loan of £15,000 contracted by the agents of the French King in London in the course of October,[4] gave the King the wherewithal to pay his men and recover his hold on the country.

Few English troops ever underwent so continuous and severe campaigning as did the army of Willoughby. They served, it is true, only three months, but these were winter months, and although the King fought no pitched battles, desiring rather to pacify than to conquer his country, there were sieges galore, long marches and counter-marches in the heart of France amid hardships innumerable.

[1] S.P.F., vol. xx., f. 194; Rymer, *Fœdera*, vol. xvi., pp. 25, 26: Fonds Français, 15,980.

[2] Thirteen vessels, with powder, bullets, money, corn, biscuits, wine, and beer (*Recueil des Lettres Missives*, ed. Xivry, vol. iii., p. 54.)

[3] S.P.F., vol. xx., f. 61 Instructions to Lord Willoughby.

[4] *Ibid.*, f. 154.

Yet the English gave an excellent account of themselves. Their exploits in the field drew forth the unfeigned admiration of even the veteran and seasoned Generals of Henry IV.,[1] and reports of their doughty deeds reaching Elizabeth moved her to an unwonted degree of pleasure. At the head of a letter from Burghley to Willoughby stand the words, inscribed personally by the Queen: " My good Peregrine, I bless God that your old prosperous success followith your valiant acte and joy not a little that safety accompanyethe your luck."[2]

In three months' time the North-West portion of France, or at least so much of it as is comprised within a line passing from Rennes in Brittany to Tours and Caen in Normandy,[3] was reduced to the King's obedience, and undoubtedly a fair part of this success was due to the help afforded by the English auxiliaries.

Yet at what a price these honours and victories were purchased ! Of the 4,000 men who set out for Dieppe at the end of September scarcely 1,000 returned to Dover in December. Few of them had perished in actual fighting, the bulk had died like dogs by the wayside, of penury, cold, and starvation, for the King was too poor to pay or feed them properly. He awarded them a share of the spoils—the lion's share, if his own words are to be taken as true—but for the most part they had to

[1] S.P.F., vol. xx., f. 160: La Noue to Walsingham.
[2] *Ibid.*, f. 230.
[3] *Ibid.*, ff. 218, 219: Lyllie to Walsingham.

find their food by the sword and the spoliation of the countryside, and not a few had their throats cut by an irate peasantry. Others were decimated by disease and the ailments incident upon a severe campaign in winter without a place of recuperation or retreat. Willoughby, hardened soldier as he was, wrung his hands in despair at the untold misery of his men: "In my life," he writes, "nothing ever grieved me more, but I must endure God's will."[1]

It is easy, of course, to censure Elizabeth for the sufferings of the troops and to draw the conclusion that they should not have been sent to France unless for a clearly defined period, during which they would be furnished with all the necessaries from home. But no Government was rich enough to do so, and Elizabeth's was like most in this respect. Even Philip's armies fared no better, though he had much greater resources at his disposal. Yet there is one point on which some amelioration might have been possible, and it is mainly because of its bearing on the subsequent history that it is worthy of mention. The establishment of a military base in France would have obviated many difficulties. Willoughby's men suffered so terribly because they were on the move all the time, and under canvas or in the open field with no proper accommodation for their sick and wounded. The Queen noted this, and we shall find that the demand for a suitable base on French soil

[1] S.P.F., vol. xx., f. 174: Willoughby to Burghley; f. 241: Leveson to Walsingham; f. 245: Willoughby to Burghley; f. 274: Willoughby to Burghley.

entered into all the negotiations between the two Governments that followed.

A further fact emerges from an analysis of the campaign. Henry IV. had used his English auxiliaries as if he had a *carte blanche* as to where and how he might employ them. That is why we find them engaged in sieges so far inland as Etampes and Corbeil. But in reality no such concession was intended by the Queen. When Beauvoir and De Fresnes contracted the loan in October, which has been referred to, a promise was exacted from them that the King would concentrate his efforts on the maritime parts, and not leave them unless to capture Paris and Rouen. The stipulation was reasonable enough, since the point of greatest danger, so far as England was concerned, was the Channel coast. But the King could not be expected to show the same anxiety for these parts. They were the gateways into France for English succours, and in that respect important, but there was great work to be done in the pacification and assimilation of the Central Provinces, and of the two policies he was inclined to lay stress on the latter.

This difference of opinion between the two Governments on a point of strategy did not materially influence the campaign conducted by Willoughby, but it soon became a serious matter, and exerted a fateful influence on their subsequent relations. First it led to a careful delimitation of the area within which the English auxiliaries would be allowed to operate. Then it prevented all hearty co-operation

between the two armies. And finally it caused Henry IV., despairful of ever winning his crown by the aid of his Protestant allies, to lean more and more on his Catholic subjects, to abjure his Calvinism, and to make peace with Spain. On the other hand, it led Elizabeth to make undignified efforts to possess herself of French ports to serve either as military bases or as gages for the repayment of the various sums of money she disbursed from time to time on behalf of the French King. And, lastly, it helped to bring about a reversal of the principles on which our foreign policy had rested securely since 1572, for these differences with France roused all the old bitterness and hostility which the Treaty of Blois (1572) had put to sleep.

But to return to the course of events. Willoughby and his men returned to England at the close of the year—a mere simulacrum of the force which had set out three months before—battered, penniless, and in rags. Yet the good service they had rendered lived after them, and gave an impetus to the Royalist Cause which carried it forward in triumph to the great victory at Ivry in March, 1590. Had the King been permitted to gather all the fruits of this "crowning mercy," the civil war in France might rapidly have ended. Even as it was, the moral and material results of the Ivry campaign were great. To all appearance Henry IV. seemed likely to succeed single-handed in making good his title against the Leaguers, for by this battle he firmly consolidated his authority over eight Provinces—L'Île

de France, Picardy, Champagne, Normandy, Orleanais, Touraine, Maine, and Anjou. And besides this he incidentally acquired control of that part of the revenue for which these regions were responsible, thus relieving himself from the dire distress which had driven him in despair to Dieppe in the previous Autumn. He had also won the affection of the population wherever he had gone by the careful restraint of his troops from indiscriminate pillage, his protection of human life and property, and his desire to conciliate public opinion. Civil war, under his watchful eye, lost half evils and all its terrors, and even the Leaguers found that the King was prepared to treat them as good Frenchmen, albeit misled, and not to lord it over them as their conqueror. Nor was this all. For not only had he succeeded in establishing a Royalist party in practically all the Provinces, but he found himself supported by fully five-sixths of the higher clergy. The good sense of the Bishops led them to see that the Church could not subsist without the State, and that both Church and State ran the risk of complete subversion amid the anarchy of civil war.

Such, then, was the happy posture of the King's cause in the Spring of 1590. If he had not slain the hydra-headed League, at least he had scotched it.

But the successes which culminated in the victory of Ivry were misleading. While the King's star was in the ascendant important developments were taking place in France itself which shifted the whole basis of the struggle, and made it virtually impos-

sible for Henry IV. to make good his title to the Crown without the help of all the available forces of Protestantism.[1]

At first the positive policy of the League had been shaped by the moderate section known as the *Ligue française*. The policy of this group rested simply on the objection to being ruled by a Calvinist King. They respected monarchic institutions, and had no radical change to make in the public law or the Constitution of the kingdom. In other words, they were opposed not to a Bourbon King but to a Calvinist Bourbon. And the proof of this is seen in the fact that they had proceeded on the assassination of Henry III. to elect as King the aged Cardinal de Bourbon, whose orthodoxy was beyond dispute, and to crown him with the title of Charles X. But there was another section of the League, afterwards known as the "Spanish League," who objected that this policy did not provide a broad enough basis for effective opposition to Henry IV. And they had a strong case, because the King was showing himself uniformly successful in the field, and something would have to be done if his progress was to be checked. Thus the situation played into hands of the extremists of the Spanish faction who advanced revolutionary views. They urged, for example, that the only way effectually to exclude the "Prince of Bearn" was to introduce Philip of Spain to be Protector of France—that is, to make

[1] Poirson, vol. i., chap. iii., and vol. ii., chap. ii., from which the following details have been taken.

the whole strength of the Spanish Monarchy available to the League against Henry IV. In December and January (1589-90) an effort was made by the Jesuits and the Spanish agents in Paris to procure the overthrow of Mayenne, the Lieutenant-General of the League, and the puppet King Charles X., and to have Philip II. duly installed as Protector. On January 11 a Convention was drafted and concluded between the "Spanish" Leaguers and the agents of the Spanish King, which made over to Philip much the same power in France as he already possessed in Sicily and Naples; and in return for the help to be given, certain towns and territories were placed as pledges in his hands. By the terms of the Agreement the Spanish Government promised to assist the Leaguers with fully-equipped armies in Brittany, Languedoc, Lyonnais, and Picardy—in all 16,000 infantry and 3,500 cavalry—and to support them at its own cost as long as the war should last. The Leaguers themselves were to receive a loan of 500,000 crowns. In return for this military and financial support Cambrai, Abbeville, and other towns in Burgundy were to be placed in Philip's hands, and all maritime ports were to be open to Spanish ships of war. The completeness of the surrender may be judged from the stipulation that the League must not treat of peace or even of truce with "Navarre" unless in the Court of Spain or Savoy, the ally of Spain.[1]

Never was there perpetrated a greater outrage on

[1] Rymer, vol. xvi., p. 33.

French patriotism or a more preposterous betrayal of the Kingdom. For religion's sake, or rather under the cover of religion, the Leaguers were really contriving to sell the Crown and dismember the country. It is true this unpatriotic compact was cancelled by the *de facto* Government in Paris, headed by the Duke de Mayenne and the Moderates; but the bold and rigorous policy had been formulated, and events marched rapidly towards its consummation. The revolutionaries were supported by the Pope, who showed himself "Spanishly affected," and towards the end of January, when the Papal Legate Caetano appeared in the Capital to foment the feeling against Henry IV., his presence acted like a charm. Both the Parlement and the Sorbonne sang placebo to the expressed will of the Church, and the feelings of the populace were raised to fever heat. So strong was the hatred engendered against the King that he was declared incapable of reigning *even although he should become a Catholic*.[1]

The route of the League troops under Mayenne at Ivry in March, and the death of the soi-disant monarch Charles X. in May, helped to complete the discomfiture of the Moderates. From this point on, the ascendancy of the *Ligue Espagnole* was assured. The Moderate party either assimilated their position to that of the dominant faction or silently acquiesced in the revolution.

[1] Poirson, *Histoire de Henri IV.*, vol. i., chap. iii.; and vol. ii., chap. ii.

The significance of these events was momentous. They altered the whole bearings of the opposition to the King, and made France a shambles for a decade. Up to this point the question at stake had remained purely French. The King's religion was the sole barrier between him and his people, and great as this was, it was by no means insuperable. Henry IV. had avowed himself favourable to being instructed in the Catholic belief, and the French Cardinals were disposed to afford him the opportunity of conversion. Along such lines a settlement of French affairs might have been reached without any foreign interference, either by the Vatican or the Spanish Government.[1] But the ascendancy of the advocates of the Spanish Protectorate, and the declaration of the Parlement and the Sorbonne, destroyed for ever the hope that the question might be saved from foreign complications. An insurmountable barrier was placed between the King and the nation. His exclusion was to be enforced by Spanish armies, and indeed by all Catholic Europe, for all the Catholic countries were in the Spanish system of alliances.

The change was not, of course, felt at once. It was the Autumn of the year before the Spanish attack was delivered. Until then the position of the

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxi., f. 40: The Cardinals at Tours to the Legate Caetano; f. 65: the Parlement of Tours, against any negociation with the Cardinal Legate; also letter from Buzanval to Walsingham, April $\frac{2}{12}$: "Nous esperons que nous sortirons de cette meslee sans les bules de Rome," S.P.F., vol. xxi.

French King remained outwardly unchanged. He proceeded to pluck the fruits of his success at Ivry. All summer, Paris was blockaded by the Royal army, and it was generally felt that if the King could capture the Capital his troubles would be at an end. Humanly speaking, the only cloud on the horizon was the threatened Spanish invasion, and that was still a little way off.

Meantime Elizabeth's attitude was that of the interested spectator. Personally she remained on excellent terms with the French King. In recognition of his bravery, with which all Christendom was ringing, she nominated him to the Brotherhood of the Garter for election to the Order,[1] and to brace his finances, which were failing, she assisted his agent, D'Incarville, to raise a war loan from the London merchants.[2] But no succours were sent. Was "her good brother" not successfully besieging Paris—so successfully indeed that the inhabitants were comparing the siege to the siege of Jerusalem, and the poor were reduced to making their bread of the bones of the slain? Did not Stafford, the English Ambassador, write home that he had never seen so fine an army as that which was massed by the King under the walls of Paris, and that victory was certain if only it held together?[3] In any case the Queen's confidence in the ability of Henry IV. to cope with

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxi., f. 249: the Queen to Henry IV., July 17, 1590.

[2] *Ibid.*, f. 220.

[3] *Ibid.*, ff. 321, 322: Stafford to Burghley.

the situation was complete. She awaited with impatience the news of the fall of Paris. On one occasion only did she interfere, and that was to remonstrate with him for allowing the besieged townsmen to expel their "useless mouths." Beyond this her attitude was one of passivity.

The sinister reports which reached her from time to time as to the general situation she waived with placid forbearance. The King might write that the Spaniard had come to an understanding with the rebel Breton Noble, the Duke de Mercœur, and that 3,300 Spanish troops were actually on their way to Brittany.[1] Beauvoir in London might plead vehemently that the Royal army was worn out by a year's campaign, that the unpaid soldiers would mutiny, while the Spanish Government was spending its money like water on the equipment of his great army of invasion.[2] It was all in vain; the Queen was immovable. "Il est à craindre," wrote Beauvoir, "que Sagunte se perdre pendant qu'on delibere à Rome."[3] In August, when the siege of Paris was at its height, Elizabeth sent to the disappointed Ambassador to say that she hoped soon to hear of the capitulation of Paris, and that she was sending him the trophies of one of her frequent hunting expeditions! "Ce temps pendant je vous envoie partie du fruit de mes labeurs d'aujourd'hui ayant

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxi., f. 181.

[2] *Ibid.*, f. 292: Beauvoir to Council, August $\frac{5}{15}$.

[3] Rymer, vol. xvi., p. 40.

esté moy-mesme en la place ou la beste est tombée morte et en ay prins à premier essay."[1]

The disillusionment came swiftly. Even while the letter was being penned the great Parma was at the gates of Paris. At Philip's command he had set his Netherlands army in motion for the relief of the distressed Capital, and on August 30 the Royalists were compelled to raise the siege. After refusing to be drawn into a pitched battle, in which he might lose the support of his mercenaries who never cared for hard blows, and generally deserted when there was a prospect of them, Parma succeeded in capturing the village of Lagni (September 7) under the King's eyes.[2] And then a strange thing happened: the Royal army "broke." Stafford describes the incident in a letter to Burghley: ". . . ffor, my Lord, to see our armie, sutche a one as I thinke I shall never see againe (especiallie for horsemen and gentlemen) to take a mynde to disbande upon the taking of sutche a paltrie thing as Lagni—a town no better than Rochester ytt is a thing so strange unto me as seeinge of ytt I kanne scarse beleeve ytt."[3] So amazing was the result that it seemed a judgment of God. But the amazement with which the letter teems would suggest that the penetration of the English Ambassador was rather faulty.[4] What had happened had been

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxi., f. 308.
[2] Poirson, vol. i., chap. ii., pp. 80, 81.
[3] S.P.F., vol. xxii., f. 5: Stafford to Burghley, September 6.
[4] Compare Stafford's letter, ff. 321, 322.

feared by the King all the time, and Beauvoir had dunned the Queen's ears with it ever since the return of Willoughby.

In any case the "breaking" of the Royal army suddenly revealed the precarious state in which the French King stood. His followers would not fight a losing battle, and the majority only served him so long as he guaranteed them the spoil and plunder of sacked villages. Although he had asserted his authority over some eight Provinces, all the great towns were held by the League—Paris, Rouen, Amiens, Orleans, Lyons—and by consequence the vast bulk of the ordinary sources of the revenue, the movable wealth of the country, was beyond his control. On the other hand, the Provinces of the Loire, the strongholds of Protestantism, on which he mainly depended for his support, could not send a *liart* to the Exchequer, because the war was everywhere, and they had to provide for their own defence. If, moreover, the King were compelled to evacuate the northern parts and retreat to the Loire, a further diminution of his army might be looked for, because the patriotic Catholics who had cast in their lot with him and served him loyally so far, could not be expected to suffer with him if it meant a return to the "miserable retreats" of the Loire, which even the Huguenots, we are told, would rather violate their consciences than tolerate.[1]

In the meantime, however, English interests had

[1] S.P.F., vol. xx., f. 128: Beauvoir on the Condition of France.

become vitally affected, and a significant change had come over the complexion of affairs. A Spanish army of 2,000, under the command of Don Juan D'Aquila, had landed on the coast of Brittany at St. Nazaire, effected a junction with the Leaguers under Mercœur, and laid siege to Hennebon.[1] In November the Prince de Dombes, the Royalist General in the Province, found himself with only some 700 men face to face with a combined force of Spaniards and Leaguers of 4,400. In the circumstances he appealed directly to Elizabeth, stating that no help could be expected from Henry IV.[2]

Now the design of the Spaniards in Brittany was fairly clear. In the first place, it was nothing less than the preliminary step towards a conquest of France in the interests of the Infanta, who had a claim to the French Crown through her mother Elizabeth of Valois, daughter of Henry II.[3] This was Philip's use of his Protectorate. In the second place, if Parma and Don Juan joined hands, as was not improbable, for Parma was apparently saving his army for some such enterprise, it was conceivable that the whole littoral of the Channel might fall into Spanish hands. If this took place, what security was there for English coasting trade, to say nothing of possible filibustering expeditions from Spain to Ireland and invasions of England itself? At all

[1] *Recueil des Lettres Missives*, vol. iii., p. 331; and S.P.F., vol. xxiii., ff. 97-101.

[2] S.P.F., vol. xxii., f. 124.

[3] *Camden Annales.*

events, Sir Roger Williams was presumably no panic-monger when he reported to the English Council that "the enemy sweares yff their kyng sendz his navy into Brittanie they wilbe drowned, beaten, or enter our Cuntry." "It were better," wrote the same authority, "he hadd fyve other provinces then Brittanie ffor all the best portes of France is in that province."[1]

The Council was divided as to what attitude to take up towards the crisis. "It was suggested by some," remarks Camden, "that the Queen should put no trust in the French: their greed for English gold was bottomless, and they called those whom they proposed to fleece *les Anglais*. Others urged the Queen to take part in the general spoliation of France which the Leaguers had begun—seize Picardy and Normandy, and put in vogue the saying of Charles of Burgundy that neighbouring States would be in happy case when France was subject to not one but twenty petty Kings. Elizabeth replied to these various opinions with the statesmanlike remark," continues Camden, "that whenever the last day of France came, it would be the eve also of the destruction of England."[2]

In spite, however, of the peril in which Brittany stood, and the pressing messages for succour, no help was immediately sent. In all probability the Queen was waiting a more authoritative request before she actively interfered. It was officially explained

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxii., ff. 130, 131, and 223.

[2] *Camden Annales* (1627), vol. ii., pp. 24, 25.

that the season was too late to begin a campaign, that troops could not be landed without great danger on a coast patrolled by Spanish ships-of-war, and England could not be depleted of soldiers with any safety at a time when Spain had become aggressive. Besides, as the Queen pointed out, Parma had retired to Brussels, contrary to all expectation, and the King was free to defend the Province himself.[1]

But the King was thinking more of the centre of his Kingdom than the extremities. He was at Rouen with Sir Roger Williams and a thousand English volunteers who had enlisted with him, pondering the siege of the Norman Capital. Consequently the Spaniards, finding they had a free field in Brittany, proceeded to fortify the harbour of Blavet, which was reputed to be the best in all Brittany for vessels of burthen—"in a manner like Falmouth."[2]

Clearly no time was to be lost if the Province was to be saved from a Spanish conquest. In January, Burghley took pen and paper and jotted down in his usual way the pros and cons of an English expedition to the relief of the oppressed people. He was prepared to give help, he said, but not unconditionally. The defence of Brittany was important to England, but it was a French Province, and the Queen could not undertake to defend it unless the French King acknowledged his own

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxii., f. 194.

[2] *Ibid.*, vol. xxiii.: Roger Williams to Burghley, January 13, 1591.

responsibility in the matter, and proper precautions were taken to safeguard the English forces which might be sent. The conditions he proposed were, as may be imagined, somewhat stringent, and to this effect: that the King's troops in Brittany be equal in number to the Spaniards and rebels together —*i.e.*, 4,400,—that they be near the port where the English auxiliaries would disembark, that the English be properly paid, and that Brest be given up to Elizabeth as a place where her troops might land and where ships might enter with munitions and victuals. On January 30 the bulk of these instructions were definitely formulated in a paper of instructions to Edmund Yorke, and duly presented to the French King.[1]

The main point in these conditions was undoubtedly the demand for the fortress of Brest, then, as now, one of the strongest places in France. In this demand one may find an echo of the Willoughby expedition. The disaster which overtook that army was not to be repeated. But it is morally certain that there was more in the request than meets the eye. Was the English Government purposing to convert the ceded town, once in English hands, into a Brille, or did it hope to make it a *quid pro quo* for the lost Calais ?

The French, of course, imputed the worst motives to Elizabeth, and we find that in his reply Henry IV. was careful to avoid any such concession. In grant-

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxiii., f. 16; Rymer, vol. xvi., pp. 89-92; and S.P.F., vol. xxiii., ff. 57-61.

ing the other English demands he contented himself with the general remark that she might regard any port in Brittany as at her disposal, Brest if she so desired; and suggested that the English troops should land at Cherbourg, Granville, or Brest, and co-operate with the Prince de Dombes.[1] Elizabeth was apparently satisfied with this vague concession, for preparations were at once made to despatch the men.[2]

The French King had another request to make. He had provided against contingencies in Brittany by enlisting the Queen's support; but, as was natural, he was more interested in the possibilities of danger from the north-east and the Spanish army under Parma than the defence of the outlying and bare Province of Brittany, which the English might be left to defend in their own interest. Accordingly, he besought Elizabeth for 4,000 men to serve with him until the Germans arrived. These, he explained, were to be cantoned in Picardy at St. Quentins, Corby, and on both sides of the Somme. In the event of the Spaniards not coming, they were to be used for the recovery of Rouen and Newhaven (Havre de Grace).

Now of course the security of the littoral towards Picardy and Flanders was no less important to England than the Breton coast. And there were disquieting rumours in March that Dieppe was in

[1] Rymer, vol. xvi., pp. 92-94: Reply of Henry IV., March 4.

[2] S.P.F., vol. xxiv., f. 8.

danger from the Spaniards. As this seaport was the gateway for all English succours, it was necessary to take immediate steps to protect it. Hence Sir Roger Williams was despatched hot-foot with 600 men to strengthen the garrison.[1] And the French King was the recipient of a dictatorial letter urging him to devote all his attention to the maritime parts.[2] On the score of the general request which he had preferred, Elizabeth promised to send him the required aid.[3] She could not do less in view of the fact that the main body of the troops which were to be sent to Brittany was composed of 1,500 veterans from the Netherlands. To withdraw so formidable a force from the Low Countries would tend to liberate the Spaniards there for an aggressive campaign in Picardy, and perhaps lead to the annexation of the Picardian littoral.

But the main interest centres for the moment in Brittany. On April 3 the bond binding the French Government for the expenses of the levy and transport of the English auxiliaries was signed, and on the 5th of the month Sir John Norreys received his instructions. His army, all told, numbered 3,000, inclusive of the 600 " temporarily detached " for the defence of Dieppe, and the 1,500 veterans from Flushing. If he found himself strong enough[4] and well supported by the King's forces, he was to pro-

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxiii., ff. 226, 227; and vol. xxiv., f. 51.
[2] *Ibid.*, f. 171: Queen to Henry IV.
[3] *Ibid.*, vol. xxiv.: Beauvoir to Burghley, May 3, 1591.
[4] *Ibid.*, f. 35.

ceed to the expulsion of the Spaniard and the crushing of the League; if not, he was to act on the defensive till the King sent reinforcements. Above all, he was not to waste a man unnecessarily.[1] But, from the first Norreys disliked the Campaign he was to undertake. His army was too small to accomplish anything, and he was convinced, even before leaving England, that no help could be looked for from Henry IV. He might, he said, do three things, but all of these demanded a larger force than he had at his disposal. He might, for example, proceed to clear Hither Brittany—that is, the part held by the League, St. Malo, Dinan, Fougères—or he might attack the Spanish strongholds at Hennebon, Blavet, and Nantes; but this, again, would require not only a very strong force, but the co-operation of the fleet in addition; or, finally, he might march into Base Brittany towards Brest, and reduce these parts to the King's obedience. On the whole, after deliberation, he was inclined to think that Brittany should be left alone till better provision might be made for it, and that the stress of the English attack should be made in Normandy.[2] Burghley was of the same opinion. But in April more Spaniards arrived in Brittany, to the number, it was reported, of 2,800, and still more were coming. This settled the strategical problem for the moment; there could be no further talk of Normandy while there was a danger of Brittany being overrun. Williams was immediately ordered by Elizabeth to

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxiv., f. 35. [2] *Ibid.*, f. 68.

transport himself and his men from Dieppe to the help of Norreys,[1] while the French King was urgently solicited to co-operate. To the latter the Queen wrote that, whereas she had counselled the taking of Rouen and Havre de Grace, and had deliberated on sending 4,000 troops to aid in that enterprise, she now desired the King to send all his available forces into Brittany, with ships to prevent the access of the Spaniards by sea, stating that she would assist and land forces on the coast. Once the danger was over in Brittany she would command Norreys to take his army to Normandy and Rouen, and would hold 3,000 or 4,000 'foot' ready for this very object.[2] Unfortunately, however, Henry IV. was quite unable to assist, and Williams, despite his orders to the contrary, remained at Dieppe, complaining that he could not move without a convoy, that the land passage was dangerous, and that he had no ships to take his men round by sea. Moreover, he remarked that the enemy were "boasting like mountebanks in the market-places that England cannot send 5,000 men at once without transporting their troops by handfulls from place to place"[3]—a Parthian shaft at the Queen.

In the absence of help from Williams and the King, Norreys found himself confronted with a much greater force of Spaniards and Leaguers, and, although he managed to take Guingamp[4] with the

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxiv.: Elizabeth to Williams, May 2, 1591.
[2] *Ibid.*, f. 191: Elizabeth to Henry IV.
[3] *Ibid.*, f. 178.
[4] *Ibid.*, f. 167.

assistance of the Breton Royalists under the Prince de Dombes, no progress was possible. To reduce the fortified towns of the League was an impossibility, and to expel the Spaniards, out of the question. His duty became the uninspiring one of acting as a check on the enemy—a rôle which he fulfilled with considerable impatience.[1]

§ 4. The fact that Williams was permitted to disobey orders and remain at Dieppe seems to indicate a certain hesitation or indecision on the part of Elizabeth as to whether it were advisable after all to lay the weight on Brittany. But the veering of the interest from Brittany to Normandy was by no means accidental or sudden. Ever since his arrival in Dieppe Roger Williams had, consistently and with increasing emphasis, argued the claims of the campaign in Normandy. And doubtless on general grounds of strategy it might be said that more effective work could be done in Norman territory. If the King could not be relied upon to support the defence of an outlying and somewhat bare province like Brittany, he would certainly assist if English troops were concentrated to defend or win back the more central parts of his kingdom. But Williams probed much deeper into the strategy of the situation. To his mind the axe was not being laid to the root of the tree. "Beleeve me," he wrote, "unless we can give greate blowes either on the Indian Navy or in the countries where his Treasure comes, or on the disciplinde army, I mean

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxiv., f. 190.

the Duke of Parma, or on the Mayne of Spayne or Portingale, be assured all the rest is but consuming of little ffiers."[1] The criticism was reasonable. The Spaniard could not be effectively combated by mere handfulls of men in either Brittany or Normandy; and the consuming of these little fires meant a continuous drain on the Exchequer which in the long run could only profit the Spaniard. For, to begin with, the King on his part possessed no great towns, and consequently his financial resources were seriously crippled. With no grasp on the commercial wealth of the country he was certain to ruin his nobles, eat up his *plat pays*, and consume the Queen's treasure infinitely. And if it came to a struggle between England and Spain as to whose purse could hold out the longer, the prospect was gloomy for England; for the Spaniard's great means, to which all this was the merest fleabite, would be sure to drive Elizabeth to bankruptcy.[2] If, on the other hand, said Williams, the King possessed a town such as the capital of Normandy (Rouen), he would acquire control of a veritable fountain of wealth, and, in short, be able of his own resources to meet the Spaniard. He " would be upon his horseback and make all Spayne to shake with his means." From the English point of view, too, the siege and capture of Rouen by the King would be invaluable, because it would provide a solution for the deadlock in strategy by which the King desired to conquer the heart of his

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxiv., f. 55, ff. 79, 80. [2] *Ibid.*

dominions while Elizabeth desired to draw him to the maritime parts. With the capture of Rouen would go the clearance from the whole Norman coast of the Leaguers and their Spanish garrisons, and the main interest of England in France would be satisfied.[1]

On June 4, when the army in Brittany was still intact, Williams wrote to the Queen that the King had invested Rouen, and that with her help there was a good prospect of his taking it. If, however, she allowed him to be beaten, and the Spaniards entered into these parts, which the two League governors of Newhaven and Rouen planned to take place, then, wrote Williams, "be assured within seaxe months to feight for the English portes in suche sorte that I pray God I may never see yt."[2] These facts and arguments advanced by an experienced General may be taken as explaining the alteration in the Queen's attitude and the favour which she showed to the French Envoy, De Reau, who was despatched in June by Henry IV. to plead for new succours for the siege of Rouen.[3] But it does not explain the remarkable ease with which the English Government digested the heavy budget of requests which De Reau brought with him. Strategically the "Rouen Enterprise" was grounded on excellent arguments, but it was self-interest rather than strategy that moved the Queen. In order to obtain the help he wanted, De Reau was

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxiv., f. 55, and ff. 79, 80.
[2] *Ibid.*, ff. 218, 219, and 235.
[3] *Ibid.*, ff. 211-215: Instructions to De Reau.

led to concede that the profits of all taxes, customs, and other dues levied in the ports of Rouen and Havre de Grace and their neighbourhood should be made over by a script to Elizabeth, to enjoy until such time as she was reimbursed for all her outlay, past and present, on behalf of the King's cause! The collection of the taxes was to begin as soon as Rouen and Havre were taken.[1] The financial security of the Campaign thus being guaranteed, and ample provision made for the recovery of outstanding debts, a new army of 4,000[2] infantry was hurriedly levied and sent to the seat of war in July.[3]

The leadership was vested in Essex. Of late the Earl had been suffering the fate of a Royal favourite, for the Queen would not allow him to leave her presence. He was a veritable bond-slave of the Court. Yet he was not a man who could make a career of the courtier's profession. He was no politician or diplomatist like Leicester, and although brilliant and accomplished in many directions, he was far surpassed by the other capable men about the Queen. In fact, the only way of fame open to him was the way of arms. It alone would provide him with an outlet for his colossal ambition, and a chance of escape from the depressing predominance of the

[1] Articles accorded between MM. De Beauvoir and De Reau and the Lord Treasurer, Admiral, and Chamberlain, Greenwich, June 25, 1591 (Rymer, vol. xvi., pp. 102, 103).

[2] *I.e.*, inclusive of the 600 under Williams at Dieppe.

[3] S.P.F., vol. xxv., ff. 66-71, and f. 72: Instructions to Essex.

Burghley-Cecil faction in the Council. With a view to this, he had already taken a surreptitious part in the Expedition to Portugal in 1589, but the lamentable and abortive issue of that enterprise had dwarfed any individual achievements which might give him the reputation of being a great leader. Since his return, however, he had never ceased to urge the Queen to give him an opportunity to display his military talents. The French wars in particular exercised a peculiar spell over him; and the French King, battling for the Faith against overwhelming odds, was his beau idéal of knightly prowess. They were both men of romantic outlook on life, in whom the latter-day chivalry found its best expression. To Henry IV. Essex was *persona grata:* he confided in him, asked his advice, and regarded him as the one true friend of France in the English Council. In June, 1591, when the leadership of the new Campaign in Normandy was still in debate, the French King pled that the Queen would place her favourite in command. But, in the eyes of Elizabeth, the Earl was only a callow and inexperienced youth, and she feared, with some ground, as we shall see, that he might be led into dangerous enterprises. Twice already she had passed him by for lesser men like Willoughby and Norreys, veterans of the Low Country wars. It was hard, however, to hold out on this third occasion against his importunate supplications. Three times, he tells us, he knelt before her for two hours and more, with the petition that he might be allowed to go to France.

To refuse him again would have been to break his spirit, so keenly was he bent on obtaining the coveted honour. Accordingly he won his request. On June 20 he wrote in jubilation that he was "commanded into France for the establishment of the brave King in quiet possession of Normandy."[1]

On the whole, it was an excellent body of men that Essex took with him to France, though perhaps lacking in training. The Queen, at all events, was proud of it, and jealous lest its spirited leader, who needed "rather the bridle than the spur," might be led to expose both himself and it to unnecessary risks. She recommended the King to treat the men well, remembering that the concord now visible between the two nations was not of so long growth as to blot out the ancient enmities. ". . . Et pour salaire," she wrote, "de toutes ces compagnies, je vous demande ces deux requestes, la première que leur vie et leur sang vous soyent si à cœur que rien soit omis pour leur regard ains qu'ilz soyent cheris comme qui servent non comme mercenaires mais franchement de bonne affection. Aussi qu'ilz ne portent le faix de trop violent hazards."[2] Brave words these, but impossible of fulfilment, since the French King's finances were in so desperate a state, and he counted on the English to bear the brunt of the war.

[1] See Cheney, *A History of England from the Defeat of the Armada to the Death of Elizabeth*, vol. i., pp. 253-255.

[2] S.P.F., vol. xxv., f. 92: Elizabeth to Henry IV., July 27, 1591.

At the time of the landing of Essex at Dieppe Henry IV. was far off at the siege of Noyon, and, instead of coming to meet the English and their distinguished leader, who had created a veritable sensation in France by his arrival, he allowed Essex to make the hazardous journey to his presence without a proper convoy. He explained, of course, that his treasure was low, and that he must effect the capture of Noyon because its " composition " of 40,000 crowns were absolutely necessary to enable him to pay off the arrears of the Swiss, on whom he largely depended.[1] In other words, he intended no slight to the Queen. But Elizabeth was mortally offended at this cavalier treatment of her favourite and the delay of the English at Dieppe. Unfortunately, the delay was destined to last much longer, because the King was not yet ready, even after the capitulation of Noyon, to undertake the siege of Rouen. He had to go into Champagne to meet his German *reiters*, who were now at last on the way, and he also proposed to dispose of the field army of Parma before sitting down to the siege of the Norman capital. Marshal Biron, on the other hand, Henry IV.'s ablest leader, took in hand the conquest of several towns surrounding Rouen in order to prevent the approach of any relieving forces while the siege was in train. Essex himself, together with the other Englishmen who were in France with him, in the capacity of advisers—Sir Henry Killigrew,

[1] Essex's Report to the Council, S.P.F., vol. xxv., ff. 256-257.

Sir Thomas Leighton, Sir Roger Williams, and Sir Henry Unton—agreed that Biron's plan was sound, and gave him their support.[1] Elizabeth, however, was exasperated. It seemed to her as if the Norman Campaign would collapse like the previous one in Brittany, and for the same reason—the delays and prevarications of the French. Moreover, the two months for which the succours had been asked were almost over, and Rouen was still as accessible as ever to the Spaniard. She was inclined to think the French were playing her false. In point of fact, we are assured that Henry IV. was straining every nerve to bring together a mighty army for the siege. He had sold his private estates, and racked his fortune in the effort; and the result was an army which promised fair when assembled at Rouen to number 30,000, inclusive of the English contingent.[2] But Elizabeth was impatient and smarting under a sense of injured honour. And on September 13, while as yet the great army was still unassembled, she resolved to recall Essex and his men.[3] On the 21st, hearing of his foolhardy march inland to help Biron at the siege of Gournay—a march undertaken without consulting either her or her Council, though apparently with the consent and advice of all the responsible Englishmen in

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxv., f. 232: Grimeston to Burghley; ff. 256, 257: Essex's Report to the Council; f. 259: Biron to Essex; *Recueil*, vol. iii., p. 837.

[2] Poirson, vol. i., chap. ii., p. 115.

[3] S.P.F., vol. xxv., ff. 309-313: Answer of Council to Essex.

France[1]—she peremptorily ordered him to return. To explain this sudden resolution, a Royal Declaration[2] was issued, which was tantamount to a wholesale indictment of the French King for obtaining succours from England on false pretences.

For days Elizabeth chafed at the dishonour she had suffered: she refused to see the French Ambassador, and was on the verge of even recalling Sir Henry Unton.[3] Sharp reprimands were issued to all who had had to do with Essex's disobedience.[4] Unton was told to go to Rouen and there wait for the King, so that he might not "grace him for his disgracing us."[5] Orders were issued for the disbandment of the English army.[6] These were summary measures, but in the light of after events they were rather pointless and spiteful. However much the Queen might be moved by righteous anger at the misuse of her troops and a point of honour, she was at the moment an obstacle to the judicious handling of policy. Burghley, commenting on the situation, exclaimed: "God forbid that Private Respects should over-rule publyck." And Essex

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxv., f. 292: Leighton to Burghley; also f. 299: Unton to Burghley; ff. 301, 302: Essex to Burghley; ff. 303, 304: Edmund Yorke to Burghley.

[2] S.P.F., vol. xxv.: Declaration of the Causes.

[3] Rymer, vol. xvi., p. 123: Burghley to Unton (Unton was English Ambassador in France).

[4] S.P.F., vol. xxv., f. 354.

[5] Rymer, vol. xvi., p. 122: Elizabeth to Unton.

[6] S.P.F., vol. xxv., f. 376.

was undoubtedly right when he wrote:[1] "If Her Majesty revoke her succours . . . within twenty days after, the German army will vanish into smoke and the King will be driven to retire as far as Tours, and all Normandy and most of Picardy like to be lost. . . . I will lay my life on it that if Her Majesty do continue her purpose she shall see the greatest alteration in these parts of Christendom that hath been seen these hundred years." The withdrawal of the English would mean, in short, the complete ruin of the grand effort which Henry IV. was making, and the subjection of France to Parma.[2] No one knew this better than the Queen herself, and on October 3 the chafe was over. Contrary orders were issued. She had heard, she wrote, that the King was at last on his way to Rouen, that "Gurney" had been captured by Biron, and the siege of Rouen begun.[3] Therefore she would allow Essex to remain, not to pleasure the King, indeed, but to effect the capture of Rouen and Newhaven. The report that had reached the Queen, we now know, was scarcely true, but there was truth enough in it to afford Elizabeth a pretext for discarding her choler. From Gournay Biron had gone to besiege Caudebec preparatory to a descent on Rouen, and Henry IV. had just begun his march to Normandy from Sedan, where he had been delayed by some trouble with his German

[1] Cecil Manuscripts (H.M.C.), vol, iv., pp, 140-1.

[2] S.P.F., vol. xxv., f. 350: Beauvoir to Burghley.

[3] Cecil Manuscripts (H.M.C.), iv., 143-4: Elizabeth to Essex, October 4, 1591.

mercenaries.[1] He had not 500 crowns in his purse, he said to Unton, and was financially at the end of his tether, but he was resolved to be at Rouen and keep his bargain.

Hearing of the plight of the King, Elizabeth now flew to the other extreme. From blowing cold she blew hot, and did everything in her power to make the siege a success. To quieten the trouble with the Germans,[2] who on hearing of the death of the Duke of Saxony refused to continue with the colours, she wrote to Christian of Anhalt,[3] urging him to take up the glorious cause of the late Prince of Saxony, stating that the initiative was now hers; that her honour was at stake; that the French King would pay the Germans, because Rouen, if captured, would furnish him with the wherewithal to cancel all his debts. Finally, she said, Parma was still at Brussels with the gout, and if the siege were prosecuted at once there was hope that the capture might be effected. The investment of Rouen was therefore pushed forward with energy. But there was a lamentable lack of the necessaries for a siege. The artillery was inferior, and Essex's men suffered heavily in the artillery duel. And the Seine remained open because of the absence of a proper flotilla of flyboats and pinnaces to serve on the

[1] Letter from Unton to Essex, October 27, Cecil Manuscripts (H.M.C.); S.P.F., vol. xxvi., f. 52: Leighton to Burghley; *Ibid.*, f. 69: Essex to Burghley.

[2] S.P.F., vol. xxvi., ff. 85, 86: Unton to Queen; *Ibid.*, f. 88.

[3] Elizabeth to Christian of Anhalt, December 3, and October 23, 1591, Rymer, vol. xvi., pp. 130, 138.

river.[1] On November 28, therefore, the Queen wrote granting another 1,000 men from the Low Countries, with 400 pioneers and 50 miners, urging the King at the same time to take good care of the Germans for her sake.[2] Meantime the dreaded Parma appeared on the frontiers with a great army of between 20,000 and 30,000, and Unton wrote home that he feared an immediate "break" of the King's army.[3]

The dreaded disaster soon took place. "Frenchmen so trembled at the name of the Duke of Parma" that Henry IV. could not trust in any save the English and the Swiss. If he died in the coming battle, he said in an expansive moment, he would be "buried between an Englishman and a Swisser."[4] He solicited Elizabeth for more aid: instead of 1,000, he said he would need 5,000. The Queen, however, replied to this fresh request with a curt refusal. Essex received a letter to the effect that as nothing further could be done without the augmentation of the English troops, which would not be granted because they were drawn into every dangerous attempt, he had better come home straightway. When this melancholy news was conveyed to Henry IV. by Unton, "hee was weary of himself," writes the Ambassador, "now Her Majesty did

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxvi., ff. 114-116: Essex to Burghley, November 3, 1591; f. 124: D'Incarville to Burghley, November $\frac{5}{15}$; f. 126: Unton to Burghley, November 6.

[2] *Ibid.*, f. 143: Elizabeth to Henry IV.; f. 158: Elizabeth to Unton, November 9.

[3] *Ibid.*, f. 184: Unton to Burghley; f. 283.

[4] *Ibid.*, f. 284: Unton to Burghley.

abandoune him and wishede his death might end his miseries."[1] Du Plessis, who had come to London to plead the King's necessity, made no impression on the Queen's resolution. To his profound surprise, he was turned away empty-handed, and before leaving London he unbent his astonished mind to Burghley in these words: " Jugés monsieur de quelle bouche ie pourray prononcer au Conseil du Roy très Chrestien que ceste Princesse laisse périr ses affaires pour si peu de chose."[2] Essex left France on January 8, 1592.

What Elizabeth thought of the matter is to be seen in the caustic letter which she wrote to the King. She had been misled, she said, as to the numbers which he had at his disposal. It had been told her by the King himself that 24,000 men would take part in the siege of Rouen in addition to the other forces which were disposed so as to meet and oppose the Duke of Parma. In the light of this, the figures which Du Plessis now laid before her appeared ridiculous, and she refused to accept them. Finally, she wrote, with a characteristic touch of sarcasm, she was convinced that the King's troops, if not so numerous as before, would still suffice to maintain the blockade of Rouen, and, being invested at all points, *it would fall into his hands of its own weight.*[3]

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxvi., f. 297: Unton to Burghley; Rymer, vol. xvi., p. 142: Burghley to Unton, Elizabeth to King of France, and Elizabeth to Essex.

[2] *Ibid.*, vol. xxvii., f. 15: Du Plessis to Burghley.

[3] *Ibid.*, f. 17: Elizabeth to French King, January 4, 1592; Rymer, vol. xvi., p. 142.

But even this was not the last word of the "irresolute" Elizabeth. In February she again relented, and agreed to send part of the reinforcement of 5,000 which Henry IV. had asked. Orders were given for 1,600 men to be despatched under Sir Matthew Morgan and Sir Edmund Yorke.[1] This raised the King's spirits to an enthusiastic pitch. In April, just before he went to encounter Parma, he sent back the assurance to the Queen by Sir Thomas Wilks that he would wear Her Majesty's picture in the battle, "in the sight whereof he would fight with the more resolution against Elizabeth's enemies and his own." To Wilks he confided his intention after the battle "to make a step into England, and be glad to find the Queen in some port town near to the sea syde."[2]

But the battle was not to the brave. Parma, advancing into Picardy in April, first threw 600 Spaniards and Walloons into Rouen, and then accomplished what few expected—that is, he marched through the wasted country to Rouen, put in more companies, and, retreating by Paris, regarrisoned the capital[3] on the way with 1,200 seasoned soldiers. This achievement of Parma practically shattered the hopes of the King in regard to Rouen.

§ 5. In the meantime the affairs of Brittany had

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxvii.: Elizabeth to Unton, February 19, 1592.

[2] *Ibid.*, f. 298: Speeches of the French King on the leave-taking of Wilks.

[3] *Ibid.*, f. 189; f. 321: Unton to Burghley: April 12, 1592; f. 360: Unton to Burghley, May 5.

steadily gone from bad to worse. Elizabeth, it is true, did not forget the far-flung battle line of Norreys, for on June 7 the bands were refreshed with 600 men from Dorset and the West Country. But the French King's support was terribly defective. There were only 1,500 Frenchmen with the colours, and these, the English General wrote, were "the worst that ever I sawe, as themselves wyll confesse." In the Camp divided counsels prevailed, and rendered united action impossible. Dombes was for moving into Upper Brittany; Norreys for clinging to the coast. Most of the Bretons were peasants of Upper Province, and, as the summer wore on, naturally desired to be home for the harvest. And Dombes proposed to operate in the Higher Parts in order, partly, to keep his men together, and partly to get into touch with Rennes and the fortified Royalist places up country.[1] And there was this to be said for his view. "Base" Brittany, the part in whose defence the English were supremely concerned, was not only bare and bleak, but totally unprovided with walled and fortified towns in the King's allegiance, which might serve as places of retreat.[2]

Thus the French began to melt away. By July 13 the Normans were all gone, both horse and foot, and the Colonel of the Bretons with his contingent, so that only 300 "Franks" were left to aid Norreys in the defence of the Province.[3] In other

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxv., ff. 276, 277.
[2] *Ibid.*, f. 29.
[3] *Ibid.*, f. 26.

words, the English were now become Principals in the war,[1] and the burden of "impeaching" the Spaniard was thrown on them.

But Elizabeth, much as she disliked the idea of defending Base Brittany in her own strength, was averse to recalling Norreys. Sharp letters were despatched to Henry IV. and Dombes, demanding that the departure of the French to Upper Brittany be arrested, because of the danger in which Base Brittany stood of being conquered by the Spaniard.[2] If the coast was lost, it was pointed out, the inlet for English succours to the Province would be cut off. And Unton was instructed to urge the King either to succour Norreys or yield a port for retreat, which was indispensable if he was to continue the defence.[3]

Unfortunately Henry IV. was quite impotent to better the situation, "being unable," as he said, "absolutely to command his nobility."[4] He was, moreover, much too busy with Rouen to think of the fate of a mere fringe like Brittany. And his Council, to whom he deferred, told him not to send help, as the English could be depended on to defend the Province in their own interest.

Meanwhile Norreys was reduced to despair; his men were in penury. On the last day of July he

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxv., f. 97.

[2] *Ibid.*, ff. 114, 212.

[3] Rymer, vol. xvi.: Burghley to Unton, August 18.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 131: George Williams to Elizabeth, October, 1591.

wrote to Burghley: " I must also earnestly beseech your Lordship to have us in mynde for our full pay at the end of the syx moneths, for by reason of our contynuall incamppinge our soldiers are all naked and wyll not be able to endure the wynter servyce yf they have not somewhat to cover them."[1]

Clearly it was time for their recall; the King could not pay them. On August 3 Elizabeth wrote[2] that if the dangers were too great he—*i.e.*, Norreys—might withdraw to the coast, convenient to Jersey and Guernsey, and expect shipping; but if he saw fit to remain, he might communicate with Sourdeac, Governor of Brest, for shelter in the Castle.

This was not easy advice to follow. As Norreys pointed out, it was dangerous to think of embarkation without the protection of some walled or fortified town, under cover of which the difficult operation might be carried out safely. He " would be trapped at the shipping " by the field army of the Spaniards.[3] And as for retreating to Brest, Sourdeac refused—for obvious reasons—to admit him and his men to the garrison. On the other hand, to occupy the town outside the fort would be no advantage whatever. The only solution that appealed to Norreys was that he should have reinforcements from England to enable him to defeat the Spaniards,

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxv., f. 125: Norreys to Burghley; f. 214: Norreys to Burghley.

[2] *Ibid.*, f. 160: Queen to Norreys.

[3] *Ibid.*, f. 180: Norreys to Burghley, August 7, 1591.

and pioneers to construct an entrenchment on the coast.[1] But he knew this would never be granted by the close-fisted Queen. "I was ever of the opinion," he wrote to Burghley, "that yt was too much for Her Majesty to undertake Normandy and Brittany at ons; yf the army for both had been employed in one place ther myght have followed some good effect, but beinge devyded wyll not be able to do much in either place."[2]

In December, when no further immediate move on the part of the Spaniards was to be looked for, he contrived to ship his sick safely to the Channel Isles, and solved the difficulty about a place of retreat by marching up country and cantoning his men in secure winter quarters among the villages of Maine. He himself returned to England by the Queen's permission at the close of the year.

§ 6. If the Campaign in Brittany, so far as it had gone, had proved anything beyond the radical unreliability of the French King's promises, it had placed beyond all dispute the necessity of a safe place of retreat for the English troops.

Elizabeth could not be expected to maintain armies in France unless a fortified town were given her to serve as a magazine, hospital, and military base. Without some such base the wastage of men was intolerable. And the conceded town must

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxv., ff. 186, 187: Norreys to Burghley, August 10.

[2] *Ibid.*, f. 180: Norreys to Burghley, August 7, 1591.

necessarily be on the sea-coast, if possible in Lower Brittany, which was the part at once most vital to England and most accessible to English ships. Upper Brittany and Maine might furnish a refuge if the Coast were lost, but the interior had no strategical importance like the Coast from Brest to St. Malo.

This, then, is the main fact which emerges from an analysis of the situation. But it was unfortunately confused with another. Combined with the desire for a base against Spain was the necessity, incumbent on the Queen, of obtaining the concession of some seaport town as a gage or pledge for the ultimate reimbursement of the moneys spent by her in the King's cause. There is no doubt this operated strongly in all the transactions that followed. Of course to Henry IV. this complication of motive on the part of the English Government rendered the demand for a place of retreat suspect from the beginning. He feared, and perhaps rightly, that if he granted it for the ostensibly military and temporary reasons, it might be accepted and held like Brille and Flushing as a gage for the repayment of his debts, to which he did not desire to bind himself by other than parchment bonds. Hence the plea for a foothold on the French littoral was steadily repudiated by Henry IV. No inducement would lead him to take a step which threatened to dismember his kingdom and cost him the support of his nobles.

Accordingly, when Wilks went over to Paris in

March (1592),[1] with the express purpose of obtaining the concession of either Brest or St. Malo as a condition of any further assistance in Brittany, the King politely but firmly refused. All he would allow was that the first port town taken from the enemy should be tendered to the Queen—practically a valueless promise, as there was no prospect of any capture or capitulation of importance in the Province.

Nevertheless, when his great army "vanished into smoke" at Rouen in May, and the French and English forces in Brittany suffered a serious reverse at Craon[2] about the same time, he was compelled to think seriously of granting the demand of Elizabeth as a recompense for renewed succours. In June, therefore, he despatched the Sieur de Sancy to negotiate a new bargain, and with permission to yield on the all-important point if help could be had on no other grounds.[3]

The King's necessity was the Queen's opportunity,

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxvii.: Instructions to Wilks, March 12, 1592.

[2] *Ibid.*, f. 156: Norreys to Wilks, June 10, 1592.

[3] For Sancy's negotiations in England, see S.P.F., vol. xxviii., ff. 185, 186: Answer by Elizabeth to Memorial of Sancy, June 22; Record Office Transcripts, Second Series, vol. clxxiii*a*.; S.P.F., vol. xxviii., f. 205: Answer to Sancy by Admiral, Treasurer, and Chamberlain, June 26; *Ibid.*, f. 214: Answer of Sancy and Beauvoir, June 27; Rymer, vol xvi., pp. 130, 131: Agreement between the Councillors of England and France concerning the further Assistance to be given to the French King; S.P.F., vol. xxviii., f. 251. Bond of Beauvoir and Sancy.

and she drove a hard bargain—one of the hardest she ever drove. Sancy was commissioned to ask assistance for Normandy and Picardy, and did his best to keep the discussion off Brittany, "the Province being as good as lost." But Elizabeth explained that the only help she could give would be for the recovery of Brittany. And the agreement, when reached, was so worded. In return for an English auxiliary force of 4,000 to co-operate with a French and Dutch of 5,000, she procured the cession of a walled town, port, and harbour in that Province, with all its revenues and subsidies of whatsoever nature which belonged to the Crown of France. No specific town indeed was mentioned, but in all probability Brest was in the mind of the Queen, as there was no other available walled town save Brest in all Base Brittany owning the King's allegiance. There were, of course, other provisions in the agreement. To provide against the possible contingency of a peace in which Spain might figure to advantage —and there had been talk of a peace all the Summer —it was expressly stipulated that no peace should be made between the King and his rebel subjects, save on the understanding that they assist in the expulsion of the Spaniard. And in no case was the Spanish King to be included in any peace which might be reached between the King and the League.

It would be difficult to point to a greater triumph of English diplomacy; the treaty established a maximum advantage in favour of England. It

secured, or seemed at all events to secure, what the English Government had all along coveted—viz., a foothold in Brittany, whether as a military base and *point d'appui* against Spain or a gage for the extortion of the debt from the French King. It also procured that the English troops in Brittany should be properly and regularly paid, for that was the purpose of the clause regarding the control of the revenues and taxes. And above all it erected Elizabeth into the position of dictator of French foreign policy, for the war was to go on till the expulsion of the Spaniard was accomplished.

English policy at this time did not pass without criticism.

To Sir Roger Williams, who was still at Dieppe with the few English troops (who still served with the King in Normandy and Picardy), this stinting and maimed assistance was despicable, and he was not afraid to criticize the policy of the Queen.[1] In a letter of August 23 he writes: " It is strange to me to see how we entered into wars for the Netherlands defence, who traffick freely with the Spaniard (ourselves bard). By the which means Holland and Zeland growes riche and England greatly impoverished, and wil be farr greater dothe it continue any tyme. Holland and Zeland is riche and invinciple with reason, ffraunce ruined and poore, readie to be conquered by the one people and meanes that Holland and Zeland had byn, but for her Majesty's

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxix., f. 55: Roger Williams's letter, August 23, 1592.

succkors wherefore then shoulde not the one forces be emploied for the defence of ffraunce being the one cause and action. I speake it because I knowe no reason but that all her Majesty's forces in the lowe Countries savinge stronge garrisons in fflushing and Brill might be transported to ffraunce."

It was the obvious criticism of an observant soldier with sympathies towards the French King. But the Queen refused to see the wider question which he raised. The vital point in the defence was undoubtedly Brittany, for the French King had shown that he could not be relied upon to prevent its absorption by the Spaniard.

It remained to be seen, however, how far the agreement concerning help to the Province, just concluded by Sancy and Beauvoir, could be implemented.

In reality the vital parts of the Agreement were doomed to be a dead letter. Norreys,[1] who again took command, discovered that he was just as helpless as ever.[2] His army was never at the full stipulated fighting strength, for the men had " run away infinitely."[3] In fact, the Brittany service, like the Irish, was cordially detested. The people at home regarded it as a sepulchre of Englishmen, and were

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxix., f. 60: Instructions to Sir John Norreys, August, 1592; and Additional Instructions, f. 68; Record Office Transcripts, clxxiii*a*., October 1, 1592.

[2] Rymer, vol. xvi., p. 174: Norreys' Narration of the State of France, Autumn, 1592.

[3] S.P.F., vol. xxix., f. 296: Norreys to Burghley, November 8. Norreys had only 1,668 effective troops.

unwilling that any of their friends should have anything to do with it.[1] To avoid the danger of a defeat and destruction by the larger army of the Spaniards and Leaguers, who numbered thrice as many, as also to effect a junction with the French Royalists under the Marshal Daumont, who was operating south of the Loire, Norreys now proposed to march into Upper Brittany. This, however, would have sacrificed the main purpose of the expedition, which was the defence of the lower parts and the establishment of the English control over a seaport. Burghley and the Queen were peremptory.[2] He was to hold to the coast, and take over the port of Paimpol, with the Isle of Brehac which guarded its harbour, and fortify the place. Burghley argued that if he vacated the coast the Spaniards would come round Brest, and that only the entrenchment of the English in these places could prevent them doing so. The fortification of Paimpol and Brehac, he added, would be cheaper in the long run than the fortification of the Channel Isles and the South Coast of England, which the establishment of the Spaniards in Base Brittany would involve.

But the English Council unfortunately left the "Breton Gentlemen" out of their calculation, and no matter how necessary the places might be,

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxx., f. 110: Divers Causes to move Her Majesty to Mislike of her Employment of her Men in Brittany.

[2] *Ibid.*, f. 248: Burghley to Norreys, March, 1593; f. 272: Elizabeth to Norreys, April 16.

the Bretons would not surrender them unless on prohibitive and impossible terms. Meantime a sharp dispute and recrimination took place between the French leader Daumont and the English Government as to the reciprocal engagements regarding the numbers and dispositions of troops. Neither party had kept the strict letter of the bargain, and each blamed the other. If Daumont clung to Upper Brittany, Norreys' army was short of its size by almost a half, and was rendered totally ineffective by being harnessed to the coast.[1] These recriminations culminated in a sharp letter from Elizabeth to Daumont in July (1593). "And though," she writes,[2] "the consideration hereof mighte justlie move us to forbeare to be at any further charge or to suffer our people to be further wasted, and as it were to make the colour of service in Brittanie to be the sepulchre of our good subjects without any service donne to the ffrench Kinge, yett the very contents of your last letters doth most justlie cause us to resolve not only to forbeare the sending of any more thither but to revoke these which are there." On July 22, 1592, a truce was published in France calling a cessation to all hostilities in all parts, Brittany included, and thereupon there could be no further effort made to win over Brehac and Paimpol. The Campaign was once more at an end. For this reason, as well as to punish Daumont for his recalci-

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxxi., ff. 43, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133.

[2] *Ibid.*, f. 302: Elizabeth to French King, July 30.

trancy, Norreys was recalled.[1] He did not obey[2] that command, as will be seen shortly. But as the Truce marks an important development in French politics, it is necessary to analyze broadly the meaning of the events so far described, and the nature of the crisis at which we have arrived.

§ 7. From the beginning the French Councillors, who largely dictated the policy of the King, were inclined to tax the Queen as an unfaithful ally, only interested in bolstering up Henry IV. when his fortunes became desperate, and not at all in seeing him reinstated and triumphant over his difficulties.[3] And there can be no doubt that this was a perfectly fair if somewhat acrimonious criticism of Elizabeth's attitude. But the grasp of the situation by the English Council was none the less sound and praiseworthy, if insular. With the domestic maladies of France we had, strictly speaking, no real concern. So long as the Spaniard could be effectively prevented from conquering Base Brittany, and thus getting into close touch with the Channel Isles, Ireland, and the English coasting trade, or from capturing the littoral of Picardy and Normandy, our interest in France was satisfied. If the Spaniard came no nearer, the Channel would remain, to all

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxxii., f. 5: The Council to Norreys, August 1, 1593; f. 38: Elizabeth to Norreys; f. 42: Elizabeth to Norreys, August 17, 1593.

[2] *Ibid.*: Norreys to Burghley, August 6, 1593.

[3] *Ibid.*, vol. xxvii., f. 116: Unton to Burghley, February 1, 1592.

intents and purposes, a *Mare Clausum* to English, Dutch, and French Royalists, and no advance of the Spanish troops in the south and centre of France could be viewed with disquiet by England. To the French publicists and patriots, doubtless, the situation wore a different and much less satisfactory aspect. To them the so-called *Contre-ligue* on which Henry IV. had placed so much stress, had proved a rope of sand; he had not been saved by his Protestant allies. On the contrary, the effort to crush the League had driven the Leaguers to pledge themselves body and soul to the Spaniard, dismember the State, and sell the Crown. And now, after some three years' fighting, Spanish armies were entrenched in the bowels of the country, in Picardy, Brittany, and Provence. Not only so, but the English Queen appeared to be desirous of emulating the Spaniard by filching French territory. Yet, broadly speaking, the one serious point which emerges is that English and French interests did not coincide sufficiently to make English assistance of much real use towards the solution of the particular problems with which France was faced. There was no real deception on either side, but English diplomacy had been concentrated naturally on drawing the French King to the coast, while French statesmen had sought to deflect the succours sent over towards the inland parts, and to use them as if a *carte blanche* had been given them as to their movements. This divergence of view had been productive of some bitterness and not a little friction between the two Govern-

ments, and a good deal of wastage of men and treasure. On the other hand, the result was by no means negative. Norreys, Williams, and Essex had undoubtedly saved the littoral from Spanish annexation, and to that extent, if no further, the help given by Elizabeth had proved invaluable to Henry IV. It was unreasonable in French publicists to expect that the French King would be lifted out of his troubles by a disinterested English Queen. France could not, and would not, be saved by the foreigner any more than it would be enslaved by the foreigner; and if self-interest made Elizabeth unchivalrous and stinting in her support, French patriotism was sure in the long run to doom the Spanish encroachment. It was merely a matter of time, provided the King could be kept from absolute ruin.

In reality the solution of the problem lay in the hands of the King. His politique statesmanship did not command enough respect or trust to afford him a wide enough support among his subjects against Philip II. and the League. Yet the bulk of the nation was by this time sick to death of the war and the public brigandage which accompanied it, and in 1593 there was a large body in the country who identified themselves with peace and public order. "La grande majorité," says Poirson, "tant du côté de la ligue que du parti Royal, tous les citoyens honnêtes, étrangers à la cupidité et à l'ambition, amis de leur patrie et de son indépendence se portaient du côté de la paix et de la reconnaissance

du Roi."[1] The one requisite, the one indispensable chemical agent by which these floating principles of patriotism might be made to deposit loyalty, peace, and attachment to the King, was an abjuration of Protestantism by Henry IV. If he removed public distrust on the score of his religion, the pretext of civil war would be removed, and a solid phalanx of patriotism would spring up to oppose itself to the Spaniard.

This, then, is the explanation of the remarkable event which took place in July, 1593—viz., the abjuration of Calvinism by Henry IV., and the acceptance of the Catholic Dogma.[2] Protestant Europe affected to be astounded at the apostasy, particularly at the calculated deliberation of it. Elizabeth wrote in terms of the most wailing reproach.[3] "Ah! que doleurs, oh! quels regrets, oh! que gemissements je sentois en mon âme par le son de telles nouvelles que Morlains m'a compté! Mon Dieu! est-il possible que mondain respect aulcun deut effacer le terreur que la crainte divine nous menace? Pouvons-nous par raison mesme attendre bonne sequele d'acte si inique? Celuy qui vous ayt maintes années conservé par sa main, pouvez-vous imaginer qu'il vous permettât aller seul au plus grande besoign? Ah! c'est dangereux de mal faire pour en faire du bien! Encore j'espère que plus

[1] Poirson, *Histoire de Henri IV.*, I., p. 155.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 231, 232.
[3] Cecil Manuscripts (H.M.C.), vol. iv., p. 404.

saine inspiration vous adviendra. Cependant, je ne cesseray de vous mettre au premier reng de mes devotions à ce que les mains d'Esau ne gastent la benediction de Jacob." Yet it is hard to see how she could be surprised at it. Due warning had been sent by the King,[1] and his conversion had indeed been one of the Capital and most debated questions in French politics ever since his accession. In February, 1590, for instance, the Royalist Cardinals at Tours wrote to the Papal Legate Caetano, who had come breathing out fire and vengeance against Henry IV., that they knew the King only wanted to be instructed and gently led, to range himself on the Catholic side. "Il ne desire autre chose que d'estre instruict . . . il prie les prelats, les seigneurs, la noblesse et tout son peuple de luy en ouvrir les moyens."[2] In October and November, 1591, Sir Henry Unton warned Burghley to the same effect, saying that a deputation had come to the King to urge him to be instructed in the Faith.[3] In March, 1592, terms of the conversion were being discussed. In April, 1593, the Conference of Suresnes met to discuss the whole question,[4] and the effect of this meeting was that in July the King publicly declared himself a Catholic. The Truce was immediately

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxxi., ff. 7, 8: Edmondes to Burghley, May 6, 1593; f. 60: Edmondes to Burghley, May 18; ff.152-155: Edmondes to Burghley, June 20, 1593.

[2] *Ibid.*, vol. xxi., f. 40, February ($\frac{1}{11}$), 1590.

[3] *Ibid.*, vol. xxvi., f. 88: Unton to Burghley, October 28; f. 126: Unton to Burghley, November 6.

[4] Poirson, vol. i., p. 173.

proclaimed, and negotiations were instituted for a permanent peace.

How, then, did the conversion of the King affect the relations between France and England? Burghley analyzed the new situation in his usual way by setting down the pros and cons, and making his deductions. Elizabeth, he noted, could not countenance the conversion; it was rank apostasy defensible on no ground, least of all on that of political necessity. But there were peculiar dangers to England latent in the "abominable" act. If the Pope accepted the abjuration and gave absolution, the French King would have to obey the general behests of the Holy See, and thus be driven into hostility to Elizabeth, to whom the Pope was a "mortal enemy."[1] It would therefore mean, in all likelihood, a "Conjunction" between Pope and the French King against Elizabeth and the subjects of the Religion in France. If, on the other hand, the present Truce were followed by peace, the King was likely to have poor conditions because of his weakness; if no peace was made, then war would be serious for the same reason, and the King might be led to throw himself in despair into the arms of the Spaniard. A "Conjunction" of this latter nature would, of course, be a serious blow to English interests, however it came. Should it occur by

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxxi., ff. 222, 223: "A Discourse for Matters of France," etc., in Burghley's hand; ff. 228-231: Conjectural Discourse on the State of France (Burghley's hand).

means of a marriage of the King with the Infanta, the result would be the inordinate expansion of France, for the Prince of Spain was " full of diseases." If, again, Henry IV. were thrust aside altogether, and a member of the House of Guise should ascend the throne, the danger to England would be acute, for the Guises were not forgetful of their ancient enmities against the " murderess " of their kinswoman, Mary Stuart.[1] From every point of view, then, it was important to learn what Henry IV. proposed to do in the immediate future, how far the event of his conversion would be allowed to modify international relationships and accepted maxims of French statesmanship.

To discover the King's mind in the direction of Spain was the purpose of the mission of Wilks in August (1593).[2] Now, of course, Henry IV. had no hesitation whatever on the score of the war; he sincerely desired to expel the Spaniard and to secure the integrity of his Kingdom. He therefore drew up a bond—docketed and named by

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxxii.: Undated paper in Burghley's hand, entitled " The Dangers that may Insewe to Her Majesty and the Realme," etc.

[2] S.P.F., vol. xxxi., ff. 248-251. Instructions to Sir Thomas Wilks, July 14, 1593; Wilks was to delay the Conversion if possible; if he could not, then to be informed as to what to expect. He arrived at Caen, August 10, and found the Conversion an accomplished fact (*Ibid.*, vol. xxxii., f. 34). He also found that the step taken by Henry IV. had procured him much support among his people (*Ibid.*, ff. 51, 52).

Burghley as "The French King's bond of Amity"[1]—stating, on the faith and honour of a King, that he would continue the offensive and defensive league with Elizabeth against the King of Spain so long as he continued in war against the Queen, and never make peace nor accord with him without first advising her and making satisfactory provision for her inclusion in the settlement. Elizabeth had some hesitation in reciprocating this bond because of sinister rumours at the time that Henry IV. was negotiating with Philip behind her back. On these being officially contradicted she caused a similar bond to be drawn up in her name in October, and sent it over to France with Sir Robert Sidney in January, 1594.[2]

So far, then, as Spain was concerned, the conversion of the King had made little or no change in the common hostility of England and France to that Country. But there were other matters on which some assurance was equally necessary. What, for example, was to be the position of the Huguenot population under the new dispensation? The King's Catholic Councillors, it was argued in England, would likely endeavour to procure some restraint of the "Professors of the Reformed Religion," and such a policy, if successful, was certain to weaken the link between Henry IV. and the Huguenots, if it did not even lead to actual perse-

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxxii., f. 58. Camden calls this a treaty; it was only a "bond."

[2] *Ibid.*, f. 249, October 13, 1593.

cution and the driving of good Frenchmen abroad for conscience' sake. In any case it would deprive the King of his most reliable support, throw him more and more into the power of the Catholics, and undermine his resisting power against the Pope.[1] If, then, the rising tide of patriotic feeling in France, together with the natural desire of Henry IV. for a free Kingdom might be relied on to arrest the progress of the Spaniard, the legal security of the Reformed faith and the Huguenots was none the less essential to prevent the Papacy from assuming a dictatorship over the King, and forcing him to fall in with the designs of the Holy See.

Now, the assumption of the rôle of "advocate" of the Huguenots was no new thing for Elizabeth, but it was a course of action cordially detested by the French Government, inasmuch as it was an unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of the Kingdom. It had therefore to be done carefully and tactfully. The Queen selected Sir Robert Sidney for the task, and commissioned him to plead the Cause of the Protestants, to confer with the leaders as to ways and means for the obtaining of concessions, but to do all openly and with the consent of the French Government. Nevertheless, if Henry IV. was obstinate and slow in making concessions, he was to assure him that Elizabeth would never give over the Huguenots or the Cause of the

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxxii., ff. 259-262: Instructions to Sir Robert Sidney, October 26, 1593.

Religion in France.[1] Fortunately the threat was unnecessary. The King, though irritated at the English intervention, made it perfectly clear that no persecution would be allowed, and to give ample safeguards he reissued the Toleration Edicts of 1577 and 1591.

Thus the Queen had gained both her points and assured herself that the change of religion by the French King would carry with it no corresponding change in the policy of the Government either towards foreign affairs or towards religion at home.

But there is still another aspect of the situation which must be grasped if the relations of England and France after the Conversion of Henry IV. are to be rendered intelligible. That revolutionary event did not, as has been shown, affect the attitude of the French King to Elizabeth, nor the general diplomatic problem. The " Bond of Amity " preserved the continuity of the Foreign Policy of France. Yet, on the other hand, the most cursory examination of the events which follow shows that the attitude of Elizabeth to Henry IV. was profoundly affected. It will be observed, for example, that the English interest in France is more narrowed down than ever —in fact, is concentrated *entirely on Brittany*. In the main defence of France against the Spaniard, in the work of destroying the League, the Queen steadily refused to take any part at all. Embassy after embassy, sent by the King, during 1593 and

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxxii., ff. 259-262: Sidney's Instructions; also letter from Sidney to Burghley regarding his Mission, Dover, December 24, 1593, S.P.F., vol. xxxii.

1594, for succours for Picardy, was turned away empty-handed. Williams, with his small band—the remnant of the Essex army—was allowed to remain at Dieppe to keep an eye on the littoral, but only for a short time. He left in November with all his forces for the Low Countries.

This nonchalance of the Queen is susceptible of explanation, only on the ground that the Conversion of the King had fundamentally affected her point of view. The French Monarchy was now Catholic and in line with the wishes of the vast bulk of the nation. Patriotism was reviving. The great towns were certain to return to their allegiance. It was, in fact, a period of dawning hope.[1] And by this revolution in national sentiment the King might justly be expected to recover his hold on the wealth and resources of France. Besides, there could be no good purpose served by bolstering up a Monarch whose interests were certain to diverge more and more from those of the English Government—a monarch in Communion with Rome and presumably to become, sooner or later, subservient to the interests of the " mortal enemy " of England.

The defence and protection of Brittany stood, of course, on quite another plane of argument. If Henry IV. could not be relied upon to arrest the Spanish conquest of that Province, its defence would have to be undertaken willy-nilly by Elizabeth herself. And in the course of the next two years (1594-95) the Spanish King made it clear that he was

[1] See p. 79.

more eager than ever to incorporate Brittany in the Hapsburg Dominions. The Conversion of Henry IV. and the disintegration of the League, which followed hard upon it, effectually destroyed his greater hope of annexing the French Crown. But such a set-back only "pricked the sides of his intent" to complete his conquest of a Province which was already almost in his hands. Hence it is not surprising to find that Brittany absorbs all the attention of the English Government during the next two years. In fact, Elizabeth virtually defended the Province, and expelled the Spaniard in her own strength.

§ 8. But to resume the history. The Leaguers never intended that the Truce should be anything else than a breathing space. We know this from correspondence which passed between the Duke de Mayenne and the Archbishop of Liège. Writing to the Archbishop, Mayenne explained that his party had consented to the *Surceance* of arms because of the reproach which would otherwise be hurled at them as enemies of peace and their Country. "Ce que," he significantly adds, "nous eust peu faire tomber en la rage du populace." The striking part of the letter, however, is the following: "Cependant je vous prie de la croire pour certain que nous n'avons jamais pensé de faire quelque accord que ce soit au préjudice du Roy d'Espagne, ny avoir aucune intention de recognoistre un heretique relaps pour nostre Roy."[1]

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxxii., f. 166: Duke de Mayenne to Archbishop of Liège, $\frac{\text{Sept. } 24}{\text{Oct. } 4}$, 1593 (intercepted letter).

Henry IV. was under no delusion as to the probable nature of the Truce. While it lasted he prepared for emergencies, and only waited its conclusion in December openly to declare war against Spain. Accordingly, in the fall of the year when the Truce was expiring, he was again a suitor for new succours from England, and in accordance with the Bond of Amity, Elizabeth was in duty bound to assist. But the differences between the two Governments over Brittany was crucial. Despite the "bond," the Queen and Burghley were determined to make the cessions of Paimpol and the Isle of Brehac a *sine qua non* of any further English support. Norreys[1] during the Truce had inspected the places, but he had written that the French would not put him in possession, because the "Gentlemen of Brittany" thought Brehac too important to be given to a foreigner, and they were obstinate in their refusal because of the Truce and the possibility of peace. They offered Paimpol and another village, Lanvallon, with the proviso that the French should garrison the places, and that the customs and subsidies which would be levied there by the Queen, should be defalked out of

[1] Despite the Queen's resolution to recall him, Norreys entrenched his troops at Paimpol (S.P.F., vol. xxxii., ff. 78, 79). Elizabeth was at first against having anything more to do with the place, it being "unprofitable to her people," but was constrained by the Council to alter her opinion. *Cf.* S.P.F., vol. xxxii., ff. 82, 83: Burghley to Norreys, August 26, 1593; and f. 84: Burghley to Norreys, August 27, 1593.

the debt owed by the French King to Elizabeth.[1] This exasperated the English Government, and a threatening message was sent to Henry IV. that unless such articles of surrender were altered, and Brehac straightway ceded, all the troops in France would be recalled. This was on September 18.[2]

Meantime, while the Truce lasted, Burghley had instructed Edmondes, the English Agent at the French Court, to explain that the English forces in Normandy would also be revoked, unless they were given a place on the seacoast beneath St. Valery and Crotoy, called Hordell, where they might receive victuals, and send off their sick.[3] If this were granted, they might be allowed to remain. The French King was naturally aghast at the request.[4] He replied in cipher, on October 5, that he was not told to what end the sudden demand was made. Besides, Hordell was open to attack from the League strongholds of Amiens and Abbeville; and, above all, any such cession would break the Truce.[5] Burghley had doubtless calculated that Hordell might be transformed into a Brille or a Flushing, holding the Somme Valley. Roger Williams, at any rate, had given his opinion that he could make any such place impregnable on its landward side in a very short time.[6]

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxxii., f. 147. [2] *Ibid.*

[3] *Ibid.*, f. 111: Burghley to Edmondes, September 5, 1593.

[4] *Ibid.*, ff. 158, 159: Henry IV. to Beauvoir, October 5, 1593.

[5] *Recueil des Lettres Missives*, vol. iv., pp. 36-40.

[6] S.P.F., vol xxviii., ff. 54, 55: Williams to Burghley, May 18 and 27, 1592. Williams had suggested that as the

But the King was inexorable. He would not yield Hordell. On the other hand, he offered to place Harfleur in the Queen's possession if Williams were allowed to remain.[1] But this proposal was never taken up by the English. It was a hypothetical grant, the town being still under the League, and Elizabeth had had enough of such vague offers.

In regard to Brehac there was even less hope of a surrender. If the King *would not* yield Hordell, he *could not* yield Brehac. On October 29 he wrote Beauvoir to say that he had consulted with Sourdeac regarding Brehac, and that he had been answered by him that the whole province would revolt if the island were yielded.[2] Nevertheless, two days later, he wrote in cipher to the effect that he would yield Brehac, on condition that no new tax be placed on the traffic of the river which it commanded, and no new fortifications be raised.[3] Further than this he could not go. But a concession of this nature was still far from what the English Government wanted; and the place, with such restrictions on its occupation, would have been virtually useless. On December 10, Elizabeth, tired of negotiations,

French King had no place to offer in Brittany as a place of retreat, he might be approached for Quelbœuf or Crittowe (Crotoy) in Normandy and Picardy respectively. Either of these places, he said, he could transform into a Brille or Flushing in a few months' time.

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxxii., ff. 264, 280.

[2] *Ibid.*, f. 272, Special Points in the French King's Letter to his Ambassador.

[3] *Ibid.*, ff. 278, 279: Henry IV. to Beauvoir.

resolved to force the King into submission. Sir John Troughton was secretly sent with ships to Paimpol to bring Norreys and his troops to Jersey and Guernsey,[1] and Norreys was informed (December 11) that once his troops were safe in the Isles he was to come to London.

These orders would doubtless have taken effect, but for the fact that Norreys found the embarkation at Paimpol impossible because the tides were too low.[2] Apparently it was possible to embark at Paimpol only when the moon was full, and the tide was unusually high. Norreys, at all events, sent Troughton's ships away, with instructions to return at full moon. Meantime he had obtained information to the effect that the Spaniards had recommenced hostilities in Brittany. New forces had been landed at Blavet, a fleet was at Belle Isle, and steps were being taken to capture Brest. This news, alarming though it was, was a veritable windfall to Elizabeth. If Brehac could not be had, nor Hordell, it might be possible in Sourdeac's extremity to establish some hold over Brest, the most coveted fortress of Brittany. On December 27, therefore, Norreys' instructions were countermanded; he was now told not to help in the defence of Brest unless Sourdeac would agree to receive him and *all his men* into the garrison.[3] Further instructions followed next day,

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxxii., f. 367.

[2] *Ibid.*, vol. xxxiii., ff. 184-188: Instructions to Sir Henry Norreys (from his brother, Sir John Norreys), April 4, 1594.

[3] *Ibid.*, vol. xxxii., ff. 387, 393, 394: Queen to Norreys.

less stringent, to the effect that he might help if *part of his men* were received into the Castle. Accordingly Norreys negotiated with the Governor. But it was quite useless: Sourdeac would only allow some 300 or 400 into the town, and none into the fortress. In fact, he threatened to compound with the Leaguers rather than admit an Englishman into Brest Castle.[1] Meanwhile the Governor, seeing the gravity of his position, wrote urgently to Beauvoir to plead with Elizabeth for succours, to explain that the Spaniards were endeavouring to seal up Brest and dominate the fortress by two forts at the mouth of the harbour. To this end the Leaguers were gathering on the landward side; heavy guns were being sent up by the Spaniards from Blavet; and all the necessary preparations were being made for a siege.[2] These appeals, however, fell for the most part on deaf ears, for the Queen had made up her mind that she must establish a hold over Brest.

On February 27 Sidney, still with Henry IV. on his mission in connection with the Huguenots, was instructed to place the matter before the King.[3] He was to remind him that he had formerly promised to Edmund Yorke in 1590[4] that if Elizabeth could move the Governor to yield, she might have the place; that she had tried to do so, giving the most

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxxii.: Norreys to the Council, January 11, 1594; vol. xxxiii., f. 87: Norreys to Burghley, February 11, 1594.

[2] *Ibid.*, vol. xxxiii., f. 67.

[3] *Ibid.*, ff. 117, 118: Queen to Sidney, February 27, 1594.

[4] See p. 33 *supra*.

honourable assurances for the return of the Castle when there was no further need for her support, but that Sourdeac would not "condescend to any such particulars" until he heard the King's wish on the subject. Burghley added, by way of postscript to the foregoing points, that the matter was so important that no other offers would be entertained if English succours should be wanted.

But Henry IV. could not yield in face of the strong opposition of his Council and the dogged *non possumus* of Sourdeac and the gentlemen of Brittany. Besides, the Royal Cause was daily winning favour in France and the King's hopes rising. And doubtless the brightening outlook rendered him more obstinate and less willing than ever to listen to the proposals, arguments, and threats of the English Government. Sidney, who saw the political effects of the King's Conversion operating, at near hand, thought the Royal Cause never so hopeful. "The Court is wonderful great," he wrote in January: "nothing but dansing and triumphs":[1] "the time seems to be establishing his fortunes."[2] In February he noted that great towns were falling into the hands of the Royalists, "headlong one upon another." By March, Lyons, Orleans, Paris, Rouen, and Newhaven had returned to their allegiance, and the King had hopes of an army of 24,000 foot

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxxiii., f. 49: Sidney to Burghley, January 18, 1594.

[2] *Ibid.*, f. 63: Sidney to Burghley.

and 6,000 horse. He might even be able to spare 2,500 Swiss for Brittany.[1]

This wave of patriotism did not, of course, materially lessen the need for English support against the Spaniard. This was as necessary as ever in the unsettled state of the Kingdom, but it lent confidence to the French Government in its repudiation of the demands of Elizabeth on the score of Brest and the Isle of Brehac. And perhaps it affected the situation in a more subtle way. Sidney pointed out that if the Queen did not assist Henry IV., the great charges she had been at, would, in all probability, be lost for good; while if the King was victorious without her aid he might forget his obligations.[2] At all events, he raised the question on which Elizabeth was strongly sensitive, and placed it in a new light. For if things were so prosperous with Henry IV. coercion could evidently be pushed by England only to a certain length.

As a matter of fact, the proposals regarding Brest were not seriously entertained by Henry IV. But, on the other hand, in order not to break off all relations with Elizabeth, he had been negotiating with the Estates of Brittany for some further concession in connection with Paimpol and Brehac, which would make the possession of these places more acceptable to England. And in March the new conditions were divulged by deputies from Brittany, supported

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxxiii., ff. 84, 91-94, 138, 140: Sidney to Burghley, February 8 and 15, and March 12 and 15, 1594.

[2] *Ibid.*, f. 44: Sidney to Burghley, January 17, 1594.

by the French Ambassador in London. They were these: (1) That the English Government supply succours for Brittany to the number of 4,000; expenses of levy and transport to be defrayed by a bond on Henry IV.; (2) that, in return for this, Paimpol and Brehac will be yielded to England to be fortified *as shall be judged necessary;* (3) that the ancient taxes and subsidies of the port may be enjoyed, but *not the new impost on wines;* (4) and that the Catholic religion remain the religion of the inhabitants.[1] Now, of course, the second article embodied an important concession for which the English Government had all along contended. But the vital point on which the negotiation turned was the control of the taxation of the port (Art. 3). Elizabeth had demanded the revenues of the port in order to secure the due payment for the troops she might be led to send into the Province. But, in justice to the Bretons, it must be observed that the new custom on wine at Paimpol was the only valuable tax, not only of the port, but of the whole Royalist part of Brittany. It brought in 75,000 crowns annually, and maintained the Breton forces in the field. The other taxes on the country were scarcely able to maintain the garrisons. If, then, the Queen cut into this important tax, she would ruin the Breton army.[2] The case was sound enough both

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxxiii., f. 141: The Summary of the Offers of the Deputies of Brittany (Burghley's hand).

[2] *Ibid.*, ff. 99, 100: Norreys to Burghley, February 18; ff. 173, 174: Deputies of Brittany to Queen.

ways. If Elizabeth insisted on the inclusion of the "new" tax, she had not the welfare of Brittany at heart; if she accepted the offers as they were made, she would be led to embark on extraordinary expenses, or be guilty of despatching another body of Englishmen to the national "sepulchre." There was no way out of the dilemma. Every effort was made by the French Ambassador and deputies to move the Queen, but in vain; and the deputies on their side were just as obstinate against any further concession.

Beauvoir, who, as a Huguenot, was eager for the prosecution of the war, and impatient of this miserable dispute as delaying and thwarting the plans of the King, approached the Council with a novel suggestion which appears to have emanated from his own subtle brain. Let Elizabeth, he suggested, accept Paimpol and Brehac on the terms offered, and leave Brest alone. Once she had a secure foothold in these places and 4,000 men in garrison, better places like St. Malo, Dinan, Dol, and Cancalle, could easily be taken; for Paimpol was the key to Brittany. If, on the other hand, the Queen threw over Brehac and Paimpol, she would have no guarantee for repayment of the debt. He even went the length of submitting plans for the capture of St. Malo.[1]

But Beauvoir was as unsuccessful as the others. On March 20 and 21 word was sent to the Estates of Brittany and to Norreys embodying the last word

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxxiii., ff. 134, 135.

of the Queen on the subject of Paimpol. To the Estates it was intimated that the town could not be accepted on the terms offered, because, as the deputies themselves admitted, the place was untenable.[1] Yet to Norreys she wrote that he might wait at Paimpol if he saw that he could make the place defensible.[2] The statements were contradictory, but evidently the Queen was loth to evacuate Paimpol, even although she could not accept it on the conditions that were put forward by the Breton Estates.

Meantime the Spaniards, having erected their fort at Crozon, in spite of all Sourdeac could do to prevent it, bade fair to cut off Brest from all hope of succour by sea. The news was communicated to Elizabeth by Roger Williams, who had just returned from the Province. This threw the Queen into a state of alarm, and all talk of places of retreat or places "in gage" was suspended. On May 4 she wrote to Sourdeac to hold fast, as she was sending 1,000 men to land at Conquest, and more would follow, if necessary, with ships of war.[3] Burghley took notebook and pencil once more, and drew up a list of necessaries—hoys, victuals, powder, field-pieces, spades, shovels, ships, and a plan of campaign.[4] It was none too soon, for on May 18 Norreys wrote that Don Juan had brought up the

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxxiii., f. 154: Queen to the Estates of Brittany, March 20, 1594.

[2] *Ibid.*, ff. 150, 151: Queen to Norreys, March 20.

[3] *Ibid.*, f. 230: Queen to Sourdeac, May 4.

[4] *Ibid.*, ff. 224 and 227: Memorial for Brittany.

Spanish guns from Blavet to within three miles of Brest.[1] "I thinke," he wrote, "there never happened a more dangerous entreprise for the state of your Majesties Cuntry, then thys of the Spanish to possess Brittany which under Humble Correction I dare presume to say wyll prove as prejudiciall for Ingland as yf they had possessed Irland: yt is very late for your Majesty to help yt, but yt is truly sayd better late then never. We are lyke enough to run bad fortune, but nothinge shal be unwelkome that your Majesty's service shall draw upon us, I beynge desyrous to sacrifyse my lyfe to that purpos."[2] Elizabeth despatched Williams and Sir Thomas Edmondes to Henry IV. to urge him to help her to relieve Brest, and to that end to reinforce his troops in Brittany to the number of six or seven thousand. If possible, he was to send a distinguished person, by preference the Duke de Montpensier, to lead them. Edmondes was further instructed to say that she would supply a similar number to see the war carried to a conclusion and the Country reduced to the King's obedience. It was only a tentative suggestion. The numbers were afterwards whittled down considerably. On July 30 Burghley adjusted the totals as follows. There were to be 4,000 English "foot," inclusive of the troops already in the Province, and the Cannoniers and Cornish Miners; and on the sea a fleet of eight ships carrying 1,500 men, under the command of

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxxiii., ff. 247-250.

[2] *Ibid.*, f. 247: Norreys to Queen, May 18, 1594.

Frobisher.[1] The French figures were entered as 2,000 foot and 1,000 horse. On August 10 the formal contract and bond was drawn out between the two Governments, by which the total expenses of levy and transport were to be defrayed, as was customary in the Bonds, by the French King.[2] And on the same day Norreys received his instructions.[3]

As haste was necessary, the English General was commissioned to march on Crozon and disengage Brest with all possible speed, even although the French King's levies were not available. The command was a wise one, for, as it turned out, all that Henry IV. could spare was a contingent of 700 foot. The brunt of the campaign was thus borne once more by the English, supported by the Royalist Breton levies under the Marshall Daumont.

On September 1, then, Norreys arrived at Paimpol.[4] On the 12th he was at Morlaix, which had just been taken from the Leaguers by Sir Thomas Baskerville during the absence of his leader. With Morlaix as base,[5] he advanced to Crozon, leaving Daumont with part of the army to effect the capture of Quimper, a village near Brest, which could not safely be

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxxiii., f. 392: Sundry things to be done for Brittany and Brest (in Burghley's hand). The ships under Frobisher were scheduled as follows: *Vauntgarde*, 250 men; *Rainbowe*, 250 men; *Swiftsure*, 200 men; *Drednought*, 200 men; *Crane*, 100 men; *Quittance*, 100 men; *The Charles*, 50 men; *Moone*, 40 men.

[2] *Ibid.*, vol. xxxiv., f. 34.

[3] *Ibid.*, f. 41.

[4] *Ibid.*, ff. 101, 102.

[5] *Ibid.*, f. 104.

left behind in the enemy's hands.[1] Crozon was now invested by both land and sea. Frobisher landed his heavy guns and gunners from the ships. "I put two culverins," he writes, "a land out of the *Vantgarde* and two demi culverins out of the *Rainebow*, and two culverins out of the Hollenders and two of the ffrenche."[2] On October 23, under cover of the bombardment, Norreys planned and carried out an assault, the point of honour being conceded to the English. But, as the walls of the fort had been insufficiently breached, and incompletely mined, owing to the hard, rocky soil on which it was built, the attack was repulsed with loss. And, to make matters worse, during the height of the attack, ten barrels of gunpowder exploded, burning and maiming some fifty gentlemen and officers.[3] Daumont, who had now rejoined Norreys, was against continuing the assault, and preferred the sap.[4] But the English General was impatient, and organized a second attack. On November 7 it was carried out, this time with complete success.[5] The fort fell. The bulk of the 350 Spaniards who defended it perished, either by the sword or by drowning. Only three or four of those who plunged into the sea were captured alive, more

[1] S.P.F., f. 158: Norreys to Queen.

[2] *Ibid.*, f. 216: Frobisher to Burghley.

[3] *Ibid.*, vol. xxxiv., ff. 208-210: Norreys to Burghley, October 31, 1594; f. 201: Norreys to Burghley, October 23, 1594.

[4] *Ibid.*, f. 216.

[5] *Ibid.*, ff. 228 and 243: Norreys to Burghley, November 8 and 14, 1594.

by accident than by design. Three flags were taken in the fort, and these Norreys despatched as a trophy to Elizabeth against the wishes of the French Commander, who asserted his right to them as the General-in-Chief.[1] On November 23 the English were ordered to return, to be embarked for Ireland, and the guns and siege tackle to be shipped to London.[2] Having expelled the Spaniard from Crozon and liberated Brest, and thus prevented the capitulation of the entire Province, Elizabeth washed her hands for the time being of France and French affairs. To Henry IV., who repined, and sought her help until the affairs of Brittany were finally settled, she wrote that he should now fulfil his part and do as she had done;[3] but she added in a friendly tone that, although she had to withdraw her troops for home defence, she would not withhold help from him if he were in need of it.[4]

§ 9. It is impossible to review the Anglo-French relations between the Conversion of the King and the fall of Crozon without coming to the conclusion that they have descended to a lower plane. The demand for a seaport, whether as a military base or a pledge for the reimbursement of debts incurred by the King, is given a place of startling prominence in all the negotiations. In the

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxxiv., f. 245: Norreys to Burghley, November 18, 1594.

[2] *Ibid.*, ff. 256, 257.

[3] *Ibid.*, vol. xxxv., f. 76: Edmondes to Burghley, February 17, 1595.

[4] *Ibid.*, ff. 99, 100.

earlier period it figures less prominently, and it is difficult to disentangle the motives of the Queen and Council, to say exactly how far the demand was the outcome of a genuine desire to ameliorate the lot of the English " conscript " who served with the French colours, and how far it was directed towards the securing of a concession which might be used in case of need to bludgeon the King into the payment of his debts. But in this later period the facts would seem conclusively to indicate that it was the second motive which bulked largest in the Queen's diplomacy, and to a certain extent shaped it. Else why was Hordell suggested when there was no active campaign in Normandy, and Dieppe had all along served perfectly well as a depot and place of retreat for the English troops operating in that region? On what other ground can we explain the Queen's attempt to take advantage of Sourdeac's extremity to foist Norreys and his men into Brest Castle? And was Sourdeac's protest, that he would rather compound with the Leaguers than admit an Englishman within his walls, based on nothing more substantial than a suspicion? Or, again, how can the letters of Sir Roger Williams to the Council suggesting the seizure of Quelbœuf and Crotoy, and their conversion into a Brille or a Flushing, be explained, save on the supposition that the question was interesting the English Government? Beauvoir's proposal to the Queen, urging her to accept Paimpol and Brehac on the conditions offered, with a view to the later acquisition of wealthier places on the

Breton coast by force of arms, would seem to point in the same direction. He certainly thought that the securing of a pledge for the recovery of the debt was uppermost in the Queen's mind.

But the facts may easily be made to assume a colour which is not quite natural to them. In the first place, it must be remembered that the King had changed his religion, and that he now was, or would soon be, lord of a united France. In such circumstances, no matter how conscientiously he might desire to acquit himself of the debts he had incurred while struggling for his Crown, it was certain to be a moot point whether France itself could be held responsible. And his Catholic councillors, who had always been against the English alliance, would not have much hesitation in advising a complete repudiation of the obligation. Hence the desire of Elizabeth to establish a hold over some seaport was not the outcome of a rapacious longing for the dismemberment of France, but a prudent precaution which, we shall find, was more than justified by the event.

And, in the second place, while Elizabeth pressed for a seaport, she did not forget that the main work was the expulsion of the Spaniard from Brittany. In the end Crozon *was* demolished, and the forward movement of the Spaniards *was* effectually checked. For the moment at least France was saved from dismemberment at the hand of the King of Spain, and Western Europe relieved of the menace of a Spanish Conquest.

III

CALAIS

§ 1. HENRY IV. was thus left to confront his fate alone in the Spring and Summer of 1595, and from every point of view he seemed to be in a much stronger position than ever, and likely to shape his own destiny with considerable success. The great Parma was dead, and his successor in the Netherlands, the Cardinal Archduke of Austria, was a man cast in a much less formidable mould. The leading cities of France were now Royalist, won over by the conversion of the King. And had not Sidney prophesied that by the end of 1594 there would be no enemies save on the frontiers? In other words, the hydra-headed League was slain, and Henry IV. was now, to all appearance, Monarch of a united nation.

Yet, in spite of these manifest advantages, the events of 1595 show that he could not be depended upon to clear his outlying Provinces of the Spaniard, and before a disciplined enemy he was still as weak as water. The explanation is perhaps simple enough. Those on whom the brunt of the shock of battle had fallen, the people of Picardy, were thoroughly sick of the wars, and apathetic as to the issue. And this was crucial, because it meant that if the King suffered a reverse, whole stretches of the

country went over to the Spaniard. Safety lay in taking the side of the conqueror.

Accordingly, when in August, 1595, the town of Dourlens in Picardy fell before the Spanish troops,[1] and the investment of Cambrai was begun,[2] the whole question of the dismemberment of France and the safety of the littoral was forced upon public notice with renewed emphasis. The French King once more appealed to Elizabeth for help.

Now, the Queen, though abstaining from active interference in France during the year, had kept herself duly informed of the movements of the Spaniards, and by way of precaution had both made inquiries regarding the defences of Calais and Dieppe, and raised levies in Kent and Sussex to be transported to strengthen the garrisons should need arise. But, in the meantime, before the French King's messenger arrived, she had learned that Henry IV. had applied to the Dutch for men to garrison Calais. When she replied by Sir Roger Williams to the request for succour, she stipulated that troops would only be sent *if they were received into the garrison of Calais*. The Spaniard, she said, had designs on that town as a place of great renown, and a means wherewith to "break the power of England in the Narrow Seas"; and the English Government could not consent to its forces being used elsewhere in secondary enterprises, and butchered, while

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxxv., f. 198: Edmondes to Burghley, August 6.

[2] *Ibid.*, f. 200.

the Dutch were introduced into the garrison of Calais.[1]

While the parley concerning Calais was running, Cambrai was lost with unexpected suddenness,[2] and Henry IV., in dismay at the loss of two towns in rapid succession, hastened to send an accredited ambassador, M. Lomenie, to represent the urgency of his need.[3]

A worse choice was hardly imaginable. Lomenie was patriotic enough, but no diplomatist: he was too mercurial in temper for the task assigned to him—a man of more heat than light. He came to England evidently predisposed to find fault with an unchivalrous Queen, and he was indiscreet enough to speak his mind without abatement of any kind. His commission was to refuse the request concerning Calais, to propose a Conference, and to explain that if Elizabeth held aloof, the King would be compelled to reach some accommodation with the Spaniard.

Apparently Lomenie overstepped the limits of his injunctions, if not in the letter, at all events in the spirit. He profoundly irritated the Queen, at any rate, by asserting that she might have saved Cambrai if she had cared sufficiently about it, and

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxxvi., ff. 5 and 8: Letters of Elizabeth to French King, September 2 and 4; also f. 1: Instructions to Sir Roger Williams, September 1; ff. 32-34.

[2] The loss of Cambrai caused great consternation in the Low Countries, *vide* Cecil Manuscripts, vol. v., p. 384; Sidney (Governor of Flushing) to Essex, October 12.

[3] Lomenie's Mission, Fonds Brienne, MS. 37, Bibliothèque Nationale; also *Recueil des Lettres Missives*, vol. iv., p. 417: Henry IV. to Elizabeth.

driven the Spaniard out of Brittany too, had she not prematurely withdrawn her army.[1] It is not surprising therefore that M. Lomenie found little favour at the English Court: the Campaigns in Brittany were far from pleasant memories in England. In any case, he returned to France smarting under a sense of ill-treatment, and the personal indignities which he alleged he had received. And, despite the representations of Sir Thomas Edmondes, the English Agent at Paris, the French King was disposed to take the dishonour to his Ambassador as a personal slight. He remarked that, seeing Elizabeth would have nothing to do with him, he would repose himself on God's assistance, and not send the Sieur de Sancy, as he had intended, to arrange about a Conference between the two Governments. He added that, as he could not sustain the unequal struggle much longer, he would regard himself as justified in whatever course he was obliged in his extremity to follow.[2]

The "discourtesy" to Lomenie had thus developed considerable friction between England and France, and it was quite possible that the situation might become much more serious if matters were allowed to drift. Accordingly, Elizabeth re-despatched Sir Henry Unton to throw oil on the troubled waters in the shape of copious explana-

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxxvi., ff. 32-34: Queen to Edmondes, October 8; ff. 52-54: Burghley's Reply to Lomenie in Council.

[2] *Ibid.*, f. 90: Edmondes to Burghley, December 20, 1595.

tions, expostulations, and expressions of goodwill and possible help.[1]

Unton was a personal friend of Henry IV., and did his best to "add dulceness" to the "hard conceipt" of the French King; but his message was received as *un discours du foin*, a rigmarole of words "intended perhaps to do me a scorn." It was, indeed, hard for Henry to grasp the English point of view. The Queen appeared to give with one hand what she withdrew with the other. "Monsieur the Ambassador," said the King, "what shall I say unto you? This letter of the Queen, my sister, is full of sweetness and affection, whereby it appeareth she loveth me which I am apte to believe; and that I do also love her is not to be doubted; but by the late effecte, and by your Commission I fynde the contrarye, which persuadeth me that the ill proceedeth onlie from the ministers: for how else can these obliquities stand with the profession of her love?" Moreover, Unton discovered in the course of his interviews that the coolness of the French Court was not due to a mere passing cloud, such as Lomenie's ill-treatment might give birth to. There were more substantial grievances behind the ambassadorial question. In particular, umbrage was taken to Elizabeth's refusal of a Conference, and also to her demand for Calais—a matter which touched French honour much more closely than the demand for

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxxvi., f. 116: Queen to Henry IV.; ff. 120, 121, and 122-127: Instructions to Sir Henry Unton.

Brest, because of the fact that this famous town had been incorporated in the French Monarchy only a generation before.[1]

In such circumstances he was not able to achieve very much towards establishing a better understanding between England and France. On the contrary, public opinion in France was turning strongly against Elizabeth for her callousness. On January 25 Villeroy, Henry IV.'s secretary, wrote to one of his agents abroad: " Je ne peus vous dire combien toute la France est offencée des froideurs d'Angleterre et sur cela nous sommes pressez de touttes partes d'entendre à quelque accord." If at this juncture the Queen failed or forsook Henry IV., and the Dutch, taking their cue from her, also withdrew their support, all France would rise against the King if he did not make peace.[2] In other letters written by Henry IV. and Villeroy to La Fontaine (the Huguenot pastor in London and agent of France in the absence of an accredited Ambassador) the King still further revealed his mind on crucial points.[3] He did not think it prudent, he said, to wait till his extremity forced him to act. It was more honourable to accept the offers of peace than put himself at the mercy of those—*i.e.*, the English—who showed so little love for him. Nor would he send over another Ambassador to be slighted and dishonoured like Lomenie. "*Finally,*"

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxxvii., ff. 26-29: Unton to Queen, January 17, 1596; ff. 66, 67: Unton to Queen, February 3.

[2] Cecil Manuscripts, 6, pp. 54, 55. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 55.

Villeroy wrote, "*if the Queen thinks to profit by our necessity, and make us receive her people into our places as masters of them, she is much mistaken.*"

From the point of view of Elizabeth, bent as she was, on the recovery of Calais, it was absolutely essential to learn how far the King's account of his position was reliable, how far the bruits of peace had foundation, and to what extent they were likely to eventuate in facts. Now, Unton was easily able to furnish this information. It was, in fact, the valuable part of his mission that he made his correspondence the focus of public opinion, and of the drift of politics in France. Broadly speaking, such information as he was able to report proved to be a startling corroboration of Henry IV.'s own pathetic analysis of his position. He learned, for instance, that the Cardinal de Joyeux was posting to Paris from Rome, to mediate in a general Truce between France and Spain, and that he would be followed by the Cardinal of Aquaviva, who would finish off the peace. Further, he had heard that the Cardinal-Archduke of Austria, in the Low Countries, had power from Spain to conclude a Truce, and that of all the King's Council there were not six who did not violently counsel him to a peace. The only part of the community who preferred war was the Huguenots, who, according to their representative leader, the Duke de Bouillon, were steeled to resist the peace movement to the bitter end, and were anxious on that account for a straighter amity with

Elizabeth in order to brace them.[1] But Unton's own private opinion, which he vouchsafed to Burghley, was that, despite the Huguenots, the French King would be driven to accept the *pis aller* of an accommodation with Spain. His treasury was too waterlogged with debt, and the country still too miserable to give him the financial and general support necessary to meet Spanish armies single-handed. By the infinite taxes and impositions (he wrote) the people were on the verge of a new rebellion, and the Catholic Councillors were taking their stand on this ground to urge Henry IV. towards throwing over English remedies and accepting a settlement with Philip II.[2]

The reports of Unton, conclusive on the weakness of France, acted like a powerful solvent on the *raideur Britannique*. In February (1596) the Queen answered Henry IV. with an extremely conciliatory letter, explaining that she was quite willing to send some of her servitors to confer with him and his ministers on the subject of succours,

[1] They preferred war to peace, because it was only so long as the defence of the country was in jeopardy that they felt their position secure. France needed every available man to meet the Spaniard. If peace were reached, the Huguenots would cease to be indispensable, and disabilities might be laid on them by the Catholic Council, which governed the King.

[2] S.P.F., vol. xxxvii., ff. 26-29: f. 30: Unton to Robert Cecil, January 17; ff. 40-43: Unton to Burghley, January 27; ff. 68-71: Unton to Burghley, February 3; ff. 81 and 91: Unton to Burghley and Cecil, February 13 and 18.

and to strive for a grand union of all the enemies of Spain. But Ireland was troublesome, and she must first deal with it. Further, she pointed out that the French King could not be unaware that if he made peace with Spain he would expose England and Ireland to Spanish aggression, which would scarcely be the policy of a good neighbour.[1]

The French King was in some doubt as to how to take this overture, since his secretary, Villeroy, and the Council, tried to turn him away from it. On March 17 he demanded of Unton, who was ill, " whether on his honour and conscience, and having respect to his illness, he really thought the Queen had a direct meaning to assist him, and the Conference of which he spoke was not merely a device to amuse him." Of course, Unton gave him the most unequivocal assurance of the good intentions of Elizabeth.[2] But the unfortunate Ambassador did not know that, while he strained his conscience to breaking-point for his country's sake, the Queen had issued orders for the withdrawal from the Low Countries of those English troops who served in the pay of the States, in order to equip Essex's expedition to Spain.[3]

Now, of course, the movement of the English veterans from the Netherlands could not take place without an accompanying repercussion on the

[1] Kermaingant, *Mission de Jean de Thumery*, p. 39 (document not now available in Record Office).

[2] Murdin, pp. 730-733: Unton to Burghley, March 17.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 733, 734: Unton to Burghley, March 20.

general posture of affairs. In effect, it threatened disaster to the French King from two directions. It meant, for example, the " breaking " of his army, because the Dutch immediately recalled their troops serving with him in France; and, on the other hand, it liberated the armies of the enemy for an aggressive campaign in Picardy. To Henry IV., preoccupied as he was with his suspicions of the English Government, the new development in the situation seemed to betray what he had all along feared—viz., the essential callousness of Elizabeth as to his fate. At all events, the immediate result of the Queen's act was the investment of Calais by the Spaniards.

In great alarm the French King despatched Sir Thomas Edmondes to explain the danger that threatened,[1] and on the heels of Edmondes came the Sieur de Sancy with definite proposals.[2] Sancy's main purpose was to persuade Elizabeth to turn the armament, assembled under Essex at Dover, against the Spaniards at Calais. It was better, he argued, to break the designs of Spain in the Narrow Seas than to make hazardous strokes on the distant Spanish seaboard. The French King had no faith in naval demonstrations off the Coast of Spain. But, notwithstanding his anxiety for help, Henry IV. was not prepared to cede Calais as the price for the succour he wanted. " Si sa majestie oyoit dire,"

[1] *Recueil des Lettres Missives*, vol. iv., p. 555.

[2] Mission of Sancy, Fonds Français, MS. 3,463, f. 99 *et seq.*, Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, from which the following details have been taken.

ran the instructions of Sancy, " qu'elle (Elizabeth) veuille luy rendre son amitié et assistance à tel poinct elle (Henry IV.) ferroit la paix avec ledict Roy d'Espagne quoy qu'il en puisse arriver et quand elle seroit esconduitte dudict Roy elle endurera plustost qu'il se rende maistre de la dict ville par les armes *que de se laisser aller à une lascheté.*"

Accordingly, when Elizabeth repeated her demand for the grant of the town as solatium for any help she might give, Sancy replied coolly that it was one thing to lose Calais by force to the Spaniard, because by force it could be recovered, but another thing to lose it by cession, because it could not then be recovered by force without making two enemies instead of one.[1] But this argument made no impression on the English Government. The fleet of Essex was kept in Dover Harbour until such time as the French King saw fit to yield.

There is no doubt whatever that, had the Queen been willing to relieve Calais, it could have been done within five or six hours.[2] Essex had been fretting ever since April 3, when he first heard of the siege, to assist the beleaguered townsmen. He had sent Sir Conyers Clifford to reconnoitre the port and talk with the Governor, and Clifford had re-

[1] Poirson, *Le Discours fait par Messire Nicolas de Harlay . . sur l'Occurrence de ses Affaires*, Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, 1868.

[2] The English fleet, with an army of 15,000 or 16,000, was, says Sancy, " à l'ancre et pouvoit en cinq heures faire l'effect que nous desirions d'elle."

ported that he could place as many men as he liked in Calais without the slightest difficulty. Acting on the information received, Essex drew up his plans for relieving the town, prepared for the transport of the succours, and kept a sharp lookout. On the 13th he wrote that he had heard firing in the direction of Calais, and on the 14th that the battery of the Spaniards could be distinctly heard "playing with great fury." Consequently, it was with surprise and dismay that he learned he was not to be allowed to rescue the town. But he had perforce to acquiesce in his Sovereign's will, even although he apprehended "dishonour and danger."[1] Meantime Elizabeth, unwilling to take the speeches of Sancy regarding the cession of Calais as final, sent Sir Robert Sidney to France with new overtures for the surrender of the town to the English.

During Sidney's absence events marched rapidly. The Sieur de Champeron arrived in London on April 21 with a copy of the terms of capitulation of the garrison, showing that the eleventh hour of the siege had arrived. Sancy was hurriedly called to the Council, succours were promised, and Champeron was redespatched to Calais with the news, Essex being commanded at the same time to embark the men. But on the 24th, before these orders were executed, Sidney returned from his mission with a confession of complete failure. He could not, he said, move the King on any con-

[1] These details are from the old Calendar (manuscript) of Record Office, the documents being now lost.

sideration to entrust Calais to the English. And the Queen, irritated at the French obstinacy, countermanded the orders she had issued, and held back the promised succours. The explanation she gave was to the effect that she had so consumed the goods and substance of her subjects without any fruit, that she could not content them unless they were convinced that they would draw some advantage from the expenses they were called to make.[1]

While the contrary orders were taking effect the end suddenly came. On the 26th the news arrived that the Citadel of Calais had capitulated by assault.

It is difficult to understand the attitude of the English Government at this time. On one showing it would appear as if the Queen, in her anxiety to "recover Calais," had simply miscalculated the resisting power of Henry IV., and allowed Calais to be lost through an unstatesmanlike handling of the question. But that is scarcely conceivable. Perhaps one may explain the policy of Elizabeth on the ground that it was presumably her last bid for Calais, and she was resolved to encounter all risks to win the town. Whatever may be the explanation, the loss of the place to the Spaniard roused great indignation in London, and much

[1] See "Discours de la Negociation de MM. de Bouillon et de Sancy en Angleterre pour le fait de la ligue offensive et deffensive Contre le Roy d'Espagne l'an 1596," Fonds Français, MS. 3,463, f. 51 *et seq.*, Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris; also *Recueil des Lettres Missives*, vol. iv., p. 573: Henry IV. to Elizabeth.

criticism was levelled at the heads of those who had delayed the succours. The establishment of the Spaniard *vis-à-vis* with Dover was a serious menace of our shores, and even Elizabeth's policy had to justify itself in terms of public safety.

§ 2. It would be untrue to say that the loss of Calais cemented once more the interests of England and France, but it did inaugurate new pourparlers between the Governments. Henry IV. sent the Duke de Bouillon and the Sieur du Vair to join Sancy in England, and together to negotiate a straight alliance with Elizabeth.[1] All the three were staunch Protestants, and by choosing them the French King showed that he was still resolved on the policy of war with Spain.

Laying aside the old plan of soliciting succours with ruinous bonds as pledges for repayment, the French Agents now contended for a defensive and offensive alliance, and argued on its behalf that a peace between France and Spain must inevitably react disastrously on England and the Low Countries. In this, of course, they merely echoed the accepted dogmas of English diplomacy. But Burghley laid his finger on the weak point of their argument when he asked how England might expect to find help from France in the case of attack from Spain. An alliance must offer reciprocal advantages.

The French Agents then attempted to show the Council how deeply English interests were involved

[1] "Discours de la Negociation," etc., Fonds Français, MS. 3,463, Bibliothèque Nationale.

in the seizure of Calais, and to drive them by force of reason out of their calculating attitude. The capture of Calais, said Bouillon, showed that the design of the Spaniard was to infest the Channel and destroy English commerce[1]; while Sancy urged the equally serious consideration that Calais was the *point d'appui* for an invasion of England, which the Spanish King had been seeking all along to acquire. Both contentions were sound enough, but they failed to make any impression. To the invasion theory Hunsdon, the Lord Chamberlain, gaily replied: "Qu'ils ne craignoient point les descentes et qu'ils combattroient tousjours les Espagnolz quand ilz seroient descenduz et leur battroient fort bien."[2] On the general proposition, Burghley avowed that the real motive for the reluctance of the English Government to conclude a Treaty of Alliance was a fear that the King might reach a better accommodation with Spain if he obtained help from Elizabeth.

The discussions were long and not without some sharpness on both sides.[3] But it was not the intention of the Queen and her Council to turn the French Agents away empty-handed, because that would have driven Henry IV. to despair and an incon-

[1] "On voit bien que son dessein est de troubler et infester le Commerce de toute la mer de Septentrion." *Ibid.*

[2] "Discours," f. 57.

[3] Sancy retorted haughtily: "Messieurs, nous voyons que c'est que nous sommes trop pauvres vous n'estimez pas pouvoir traiter avec nous." For a full and accurate account of the discussions, see Paradol, *Elisabeth et Henri IV.* (Paradol uses a different document).

venient peace with Spain. On the contrary, they were resolved to make a League, as Burghley showed after he had driven the Frenchmen to threaten immediate departure. But the main purpose of the League which he proposed was merely to throw dust in the eyes of Spain, to create the impression that English and French interests were marching as closely together as ever, and to save the face of the claim put forward by the French Calvinists, that Henry IV. still enjoyed the general support of Protestantism. To that end two Treaties were made—one, open and public, the joint work of the three French Agents, and known as the Treaty of Greenwich; the other, secret and private, and known only to Sancy, Henry IV., and Elizabeth.[1]

The open League, concluded on May 24, 1596, and devised to impress the Spaniard, made over to the use of the French King 20,000 crowns, payable in September, and 4,000 men to serve for six months under English pay, in Picardy, Normandy, and the adjacent parts within fifty miles of Boulogne. But the secret Treaty abrogated much of this arrangement. It ran thus: that in consideration of the great affairs which the Queen has at present to support in Ireland and on the sea, the King would be content with 2,000 men and pay for four months; the 2,000 to be employed only in garrison work at

[1] Kermaingant, *Mission de Jean de Thumery*, vol. i., pp. 46-51. For proof of the existence of the two Treaties, see S.P.F., vol. xxxvii., f. 166; and Kermaingant, vol. i., p. 47, notes 1 and 2; and vol. ii., p. 256.

Boulogne and Montreuil, or with the King when he came to Picardy and the sea-coast. By a further agreement the Treaty of Greenwich, with its accompanying secret articles, was held not to invalidate or supersede the League of Amity of 1593 by which Elizabeth and Henry IV. had mutually agreed to fight the Spaniard so long as he was at war with either of them, and not to make peace without mutual consent.[1]

In reality it would appear as if the English Government was more interested in obtaining the ratification of the principle that the two countries must stand together against Spain than in the sending of succours to France; for the Treaty of Greenwich soon became a dead letter. Elizabeth did not despatch the troops till October, on the pretext that the plague was rife in Picardy, and as the six months were then practically past she was not in duty bound to pay them. She also demanded the repayment of the 20,000 crowns in September, and when the King could not meet the demand she declared that he had broken the terms of the Treaty, and could not expect to enjoy its benefits.[2]

Du Vair, in his analysis of the negotiations[3] at

[1] Kermaingant, vol. i., pp. 46-51.

[2] S.P.F., vol. xxxviii., ff. 19, 20, 25, 33, 53, and 63-66: Instructions to Mildmay; ff. 124-127: Queen to Henry IV.; ff. 133, 134. Henry IV. was invested with the Garter at the same time as he signed the Treaty in September. See Kermaingant for a full description (vol. i., pp. 61-63.)

[3] Du Vair, *Advis sur le faict*, etc., Fonds Français, MS. 3,463, Bibliothèque Nationale.

this time, makes the assertion that the lukewarm policy of England was grounded on the assumption that Elizabeth had the whip-hand, and felt conscious of being mistress of the situation. She possessed Flushing, and as the Spaniard was just as eager to obtain this place as she was to recover Calais, might not the Anglo-Dutch town be used as a *quid pro quo* for the Hispano-French port, and the English thus win Calais by a stroke of the pen? Of course, if this exchange were made, and peace negotiated between England and Spain, France was lost. On the other hand, peace could not be concluded between France and Spain without both England and the Low Countries being delivered to the tender mercies of the Spaniard. And this, again, would mean the ultimate victory of the Spanish arms over both the Dutch and Elizabeth, and the final destruction of France by the destruction of its allies. From every point of view, therefore, he concluded that the only party of the three confederates who stood to gain by any eventuality, was England.

But, despite his penetration, Du Vair omitted to take account of at least one important factor in the problem. Even if Elizabeth had been capable of conceiving such double-dyed treachery towards the Dutch and so extraordinary a disregard of the enormous sums she had sunk in the defence of the Low Countries, the surrender of Flushing would have been impossible. The English garrison could not have held the place for a day if the Dutch did not allow it; and any rumour of the exchange

would have been sufficient to justify its resumption by the Government of the States. In other words, one must seek elsewhere for the source of the frigidity of the English Council at this time.

The real explanation appears to lie in the sudden crisis to which Irish affairs had rapidly moved in 1596. Until this date Ireland had stood very much in the position of the Ultima Thule of Europe, cut off from the general religious and political trend of the age. It had taken no part, not even a subsidiary part, in the Reformation or the Counter-Reformation, nor had it figured to any degree in the religious wars which were convulsing European States. But, in 1596 and after, the whole bearing of the Irish question was radically altered. Elizabeth's attempts to protestantize, civilize, and conquer the island had generated in the whole population an undying hatred of everything English. And into this seething caldron of Irish politics had entered two new elements, both dangerous and disturbing—viz., the papal and Spanish intrigues. Hence the Irish question broadened out, and from being provincial and English it became European and International—" one of the foci in the grand struggle between Protestantism and Catholicism for the dogmatic supremacy of the world." The Pope regarded the Irish as his dear children, the hope of the Church, and the possible instruments for the regeneration of England; while Philip of Spain sought to convert the island into a Spanish rampart and advanced base against Elizabeth. Each move

of the English Government in Irish affairs was scrutinized from Rome and Madrid, and every effort made to checkmate the progress of the English arms in the island.[1]

It was with this intention, then, that the Spanish Monarch began to direct his "Armadoes" to Ireland. In the Autumn of 1596, for example, rumours were rife that an armament of 80 ships, with 100 transports and 16,000 men, was on the verge of sailing from the Tagus. It was said that it would sail in two divisions, part being destined to seize the principal Irish ports and co-operate with the discontented Irish under Tyrone, part also to land at Calais and co-operate with the Cardinal of Austria to strengthen the Spanish grasp on Picardy.[2] With the control of the Narrow Seas, which the capture of the littoral of Picardy would insure, and the possession of the leading Irish ports, the Spanish King would be enabled to bring Elizabeth between the upper and the nether millstones, and pulverize England at his pleasure.

In November the Cardinal had sent all his available men forward to the ports of Sluys, Nieuport, Dunkirk, and Calais in daily expectation of the arrival of the ships. All through the month reports came in as to the approach of the Armada. In the Low Countries it was currently believed that the

[1] Moritz Bonn, *Die Kolonisation von Irland*, Stuttgart, 1906.

[2] S.P.F., vol. xxxviii., f. 164: Mildmay to Cecil, November 4; Cecil Manuscripts (H.M.C.), vol. vi., p. 533.

Irish flotilla had landed 10,000 men in that island, that Dublin and Waterford were both captured, and that the remainder of the fleet was coming with 6,000 men to Calais. But there were other and less happy rumours. As early as November 10 it was known at Seville that some accident had overtaken the expedition. And by December 9 definite news reached England from St. Malo that fifty-two of the ships had been lost off Finisterre with more than 4,000 soldiers, and that the expedition was as good as annihilated.[1]

It was largely the fear of this flank attack on Ireland that hardened the heart of Elizabeth against the French King's supplications for help. While Ireland was in peril France must wait. But the purpose of the Spanish armament had also rendered it clear that Calais was to be made a naval base for the extension of the Spanish power over the Narrow Seas, and therefore over the means of approach to England. In short, to quote Sir Walter Raleigh, the King of Spain was interested in Ireland only in order " to make us cast our glance over our shoulders, and while we were so occupied strike us on the brains." Thus the whole situation turned more than ever on Calais and the French littoral.

§ 3. Henry IV. once more therefore approached the Queen through his Ambassador De Reau to take up the offensive with him against Spain. After hearing the proposal, Elizabeth replied that it was

[1] Cecil Manuscripts (H.M.C.), vol. vi., *passim*, pp. 484, 494, 496, 499, 505, 509, 513.

unfair that all the burden of the defence of the coasts was being thrown on her. Nevertheless she was willing to co-operate with the King to secure Calais, and in this way arrest the designs of the Spaniard whether on Picardy, England, or the Low Countries.[1] Mildmay, the English Ambassador at the French Court, urged that if the attack was to take place, it had better be carried out at once while the Spaniard was weak by the loss of the late Armada.[2] And the King said he would require for the enterprise 8,000 men from England in addition to the 2,000 already serving in France under Baskerville. These, together with his own forces and those of the Dutch, would give him an army of 20,000.[3]

But once more the old stumbling-block appeared in the path. Mildmay, instructed by Elizabeth, insisted on the surrender of Calais, after its recapture, to the English, and Henry IV. was equally emphatic in his determination that he would rather see his enemies snatch his towns than his friends.[4] Mildmay went much too far, for he allowed his zeal for the Queen to outstrip his discretion. His demand was apparently so couched as to sound like a threat.[5] The result was that the King was driven to consider the question of a peace with Spain, and Mildmay

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxxviii., ff. 203, 204: Elizabeth to Mildmay, December 8, 1596.

[2] *Ibid.*, f. 237: Mildmay to Cecil, December 30.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] *Ibid.*, f. 238 (same letter).

[5] *Ibid.*, vol. xxxix., f. 21: Mildmay to Cecil, January 25, 1597.

was soon reporting that "peace was greatly practised and much desired."[1] Once more, therefore, the relations between the two countries became clouded over. The English Government refused to give any assistance for the capture of Calais save on the conditions laid down, and repudiated all offers for a Conference.[2] In a fit of pique Elizabeth went further, and disowned being the originator of the enterprise for the recovery of Calais, asserting that the proposal had come from the French King.[3] In point of fact it really mattered little who proposed it when both parties were equally obstinate as to conditions.

Meanwhile, in March, 1597, the world was startled by a dramatic episode. Despite the fact that the Cardinal was weak and contemplated no aggressive step against France, Porto Carrero, the Spanish Governor of Dourlens, by a brilliant personal exploit, suddenly captured Amiens from the Royalists, and with it the King's arsenal.[4] At the time the news arrived, the French Court was plunged in the festivities of Mi-Carême, lulled into a sense of security by the reports of the disorganized condition of the Spanish forces. But the magnitude of the disaster was soon perceived. Paris received the news with

[1] Cecil Manuscripts (H.M.C.), vol. vii., p. 64: Mildmay to Essex, February 16.

[2] Kermaingant, vol. i., p. 82.

[3] Cecil Manuscripts (H.M.C.), vol. vii., p. 52.

[4] *Ibid.*, vol. vi., p. 465: Gilpin to Essex; *ibid.*, pp. 99, 100.

vehement indignation in which the King himself was not spared. So that when he unexpectedly left his capital in haste, " it was impossible to say whether his departure was due to fear or the desire to be revenged."[1] The moral effect, too, of the loss of Amiens was considerable. Ottywell Smyth, writing to Essex from Dieppe, remarked that those Leaguers who still held by the Spanish side rejoiced, and mocked those who were the authors of the alliance between Elizabeth and the French King. They now hoped that the King in his necessity would make peace with Spain even to his great disadvantage—a thing not improbable, thought the writer, because it was his necessity that had already driven him to Mass.[2]

The first act, however, of Henry IV. showed a different spirit. He summoned Mildmay, and proposed the surrender of Calais if the Queen would undertake the recapture of it.[3] On top of this offer he sent over a special messenger in the person of the Sieur de Foucquerolles, on April 2, with ampler proposals anent the surrender of the seaport. It was to be ceded only as a pledge for the repayment of loans and as " belonging to the Crown of France." There were two specific conditions—viz., that Elizabeth would set up again the French inhabitants who had been expelled by the Spaniards, and that she

[1] Cecil Manuscripts (H.M.C.), vol. vii., p. 103: Lylly to Essex, March 9; *ibid.*, p. 149: Lylly to Essex, April 10, 1597.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 105: Ottywell Smyth to Essex.

[3] S.P.F., vol. xxxix., ff. 83 and 85.

would assist the King to recapture Amiens while her own troops were besieging Calais.[1]

At last it appeared as if the ancient Staple town were to be incorporated once more in the English dominion. But although the bait was alluring the conditions were too severe.[2] To undertake the sieges of Calais and Amiens, at the same time as Ireland was draining the country and the Exchequer, was impossible. All the English Government could grant was that the 2,000 troops under Baskerville should remain in France, with the vague promise that their number might be increased to 4,000 if sufficient guarantee were given that they would be properly paid by the King. The question of Calais, on the other hand, would be remitted to be dealt with by Commissioners, when a Conference was arranged between the two Crowns.[3]

It was not what Henry IV. wanted: he had looked for a paid army, because he had no money to spend on auxiliaries or mercenaries. Accordingly he replied that, in the circumstances, he would be compelled to make peace as best he could with the Spaniard, but would strive to provide for Elizabeth in the negotiations.[4]

[1] Fonds Français, MS. 3,464, Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris; "Instruction au Sieur de Foucquerolles envoié par sa Maiesté en Angleterre le deuxiesme Apvril, 1597," ff. 13, 15-17; S.P.F., vol. xxxix., f. 137.

[2] Elizabeth was asked for 4,000 or 6,000 troops paid by her for Amiens, in addition to the army to besiege Calais.

[3] S.P.F., vol. xxxix., ff. 172-174: Reply of the Queen to Mildmay.

[4] *Ibid.*, f. 205: Mildmay to Burghley, April 22.

Edmondes, who furnished the Queen with a report on the situation, asserted that he did not think the King's lamentations as to his position were simulated or insincere. On the contrary, his misfortunes had reached a crisis. The discouragement and apathy of the nation in the war was profound, and peace was much desired. In fact, so far as he could judge, the French Monarchy was a lost cause. "The Cardinal Archduke," he remarked, "was also anxious for a peace and a winding-up of the long war, because he wanted to marry the Infanta and set himself up in the Low Countries as an independent ruler.[1]

These pessimistic prognostications of Edmondes had their effect, for they moved Elizabeth to take up the pen once more and recast her instructions to Mildmay.[2] The new instructions read as if the Queen were trying rather to clear her mind on paper than make proposals. She pointed out, for example, that the succours which Henry IV. wanted for Calais and Amiens could not accomplish much, since the King's army was only 9,000, and if she sent them it would be sending them to butchery, because they had no place of retreat. As to a place of retreat, "*Boulogne,*" she wrote, "would suit her best." Moreover, there were rumours about a *rapprochement* between France and Spain, and before she could take

[1] Edmondes Reports, Kermaingant, vol. i., pp. 102, 103.

[2] S.P.F., vol. xxxix., ff. 246-248: Instructions to Mildmay.

any step towards helping the King she must have assurance that he would not lend his ear to the Spaniard.

Henry IV. took this message as hopeful, and immediately sent over De Reau in June with much the same offers as Foucquerolles had been the bearer of in April.[1] He offered Calais—*i.e.*, when captured—on condition that 2,000 men were sent to help him at Amiens, and rather than lose English support altogether he offered to pay these himself. In order to win over the Queen, De Reau was instructed to say to her that the necessity for help was greater than ever, because she had made an offensive and defensive alliance with him against Spain, and so irritated the Spaniard that it would be difficult for her to save herself from his vengeance. In other words, they must stand or fall together. For the Spanish King was now bent on a Conquest of England on behalf of the Infanta and the Cardinal—he had already "devoured it in hope"—and he would be assisted by the Pope for religion's sake. This, according to common rumour, was Phillip's reason for pressing for a peace with France. He himself (Henry IV.) was, in fact, the only real obstacle to such a peace, or rather his sense of honour towards his allies. The Spanish King, on the other hand, devoutly offered him peace, and the Bishop of Mantua and the General of the Cordeliers, the papal agents,

[1] Fonds Français, M.S. 3,463, f. 71 *et seq.*: "Instruction Baillée au Sieur de Reau allant en Angleterre au mois de Juin, 1597"; S.P.F., vol. xxxix., ff. 269, 270.

were incessantly urging him to accept the offer. He added that he was prepared to discuss the conditions of the surrender of Calais, either by the Ambassador or by deputies. But as to the receiving of English troops in Boulogne, the people would object; it would be better if the troops served with him, or at least that he should put them into the garrison himself.

At the same time, Mildmay wrote home[1] corroborating the King's remarks on the efforts that were being made to break the League between France and England, but his analysis of the situation differed profoundly from that of the French King. According to the Englishman, Philip II. was desirous of peace because his resources were exhausted,[2] not because he was meditating fresh Campaigns against Elizabeth. But the importance of Mildmay's letter lay in the postscript. It was merely a corollary to his analysis, but it ran to this effect: that if English help were given to the King at this juncture it would enable him "*the better to make his peace with Spain.*" The remark was not a surprising one, but it struck out a correspondent note in the brain of Burghley and the Queen. The air was full of suspicion.

It was for this reason that De Reau's mission proved a failure, and the French King was left to attempt the recovery of Amiens in his own strength, supported only by the 2,000 men

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxxix., f. 241: Mildmay to Burghley, May 23.

[2] *Cf.* the continuous reports of the financial crisis in Cecil Manuscripts (H.M.C.), vol. vii., p. 533, and *passim.*

under Baskerville, whom he had taken into his pay.[1]

Nevertheless, the siege prospered, because the Spaniard was too weak to rescue the place, and on September 19 the town capitulated to Henry IV.

§ 4. The siege was no sooner over than the bruits of peace redoubled, this time with unmistakable emphasis. It is important to realize what exactly they covered. Rumours of peace were rife, as has been shown, as far back as February, 1596, but it was not till the following Spring, when Elizabeth refused to assist in the recapture of Calais and Amiens, that Henry IV. took any decisive step towards encouraging the peace-mongers. In April, 1597, he definitely solicited the Pope's assistance, urging him to save him from ruin, because his Protestant allies would not help him on account of his conversion. The Pope, sincerely anxious for peace, acted at once. And although the loss of Amiens was a temporary obstacle—for the King "stopped his ears" till he recovered it—the Papal legate, with the General of the Cordeliers as helper, managed to begin operations immediately after the recapture of the town.[2]

Elizabeth was not left in ignorance of these steps.

[1] S.P.F., vol. xxxix., f. 279: Réponse à l'Ambassadeur de France, June 6, 1597. Elizabeth had at first made up her mind to recall all the English, but afterwards agreed to allow Baskerville's 2,000 to remain if they were needed. *Ibid.*, ff. 287, 296, 306: Thanks of French King, July 2; f. 327; vol. xl., f. 13: The Queen's Consent.

[2] Kermaingant, vol. i., pp. 117 *et seq.*

Henry IV. informed her to what point the pourparlers had reached, and she had ample information from other sources. Mildmay, for instance, commenting on the potentialities of the situation, remarked in a letter to the Queen that " the Peace with Spain standeth uppon too hard conditions to be effected in haste." According to the English Ambassador, Henry IV. was asked to yield Brittany to the Infanta, and to desert his confederates; whereas the French King was determined not to yield an inch of territory, and to stipulate for the inclusion of his allies in the negotiations.[1] But in October the General of the Cordeliers managed to bring together Richardot, the President of the Spanish Netherlands, and Villeroy, the Secretary of the French Council. This Conference was fruitful, because not only were assurances of good faith exchanged between the parties, but it was agreed by Richardot, speaking for the Cardinal and the Spanish Government, that the Treaty of Château Cambresis (1559) should be taken as the starting-point of the negotiations, and that the King's Confederates, Elizabeth and the Dutch, should be comprehended in the peace Conferences. Clearly, then, Henry IV. could not be accused of playing for his own hand or maliciously deserting his friends. But the way to peace was clear.

The next step was undoubtedly to inform the

[1] S.P.F., vol. xl.: Mildmay to Cecil, July 18, 1597; also ff. 203, 204: Phelippes to Mildmay, October 13; and ff. 214-217: Edmondes to Cecil.

English Government, and sound the Queen as to whether she would agree to the conditions proposed. It was for this purpose that Hurault de Maisse was despatched to London in December.[1] He was instructed by Henry IV. not to argue with Elizabeth on any of the outstanding questions between the Governments, but to focus all his attention on the strengthening of their union and good intelligence, which must be the basis of their common action whether in the direction of peace or war.

On several preliminary points the King was particularly anxious to be clear, in order to quieten any scruples that might arise in the mind of the Queen. In the first place, he said, the intervention of the Pope was not calculated to do him a hurt, but sincerely directed to the establishment of his throne and the glory of God. He had nothing but praise for the Legate and the indefatigable General of the Cordeliers. In the second place, before the recapture of Amiens, the enemy had refused to include the English and the Dutch in the peace programme, and he had refused to negotiate on that ground. But now he had obtained the necessary inclusion of both his allies. In the third place, the entire Council and three-fourths of the Realm desired peace in order to give the Country a

[1] "Ambassade de Hurault de Maisse en Angleterre," manuscript in Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris (from which the following details have been taken), including Instructions to De Maisse, with a Journal of his Mission; *Recueil des Lettres Missives*, vol. iv., p. 847.

rest, expel the Spaniard, slacken the ruinous taxation, set up the law, and crush factions and injustices of all kinds. No one, least of all the King himself, desired peace in order to trouble the Huguenots and raise internal war of religion—a thing of the past, and spoken of only by the malicious.[1]

On the other hand, De Maisse was not to talk of peace as if it were finally decided upon. He was to leave the decision in the hands of the Queen. In the words of the Instructions: " Comme Chrestien sa Maiesté ne peut qu'elle ne desire le repos de la Chrestienté et delivrer ses subjects des calamitez de la guerre que sont grandes, mais comme soldat eslevé et nourry dedans les travaux de la guerre elle ne se lassera jamais de la faire audict Roy d'Espagne pourveu qu'elle soit assistée et secondée comme elle doibt estre." But if the Queen were against listening to the proposals for peace, then it was necessary that she should be prepared to interfere decisively in France, facilitate all means to shorten the war, and clear the Provinces of Brittany and Picardy of the Spaniards. Before leaving France, De Maisse asked the King his own private opinion as to what it would be best to procure in order to conform himself to the real wishes of His Majesty.

[1] The Huguenots had sent Chaligny to present complaints to Elizabeth (S.P.F., vol. xl., ff. 194 and 196), and when Edmondes made representations to Henry IV. on the subject he burst out into angry recrimination. S.P.F., vol. xl., ff. 214-217: Edmondes to Cecil, October 19, 1597.

Henry IV., after a few minutes' thought, replied that he was resolved on peace.

The purpose of the Ambassador was clear enough. It was to sound the English Government as to the advisability of peace. But De Maisse found it impossible at first to extract any decisive answer from Elizabeth on the vital point he had come to determine. The Christmas festivities were going on, distracting everyone at Court, and the Council to whom the Queen referred him was the scene of a violent quarrel between Essex and the Admiral, which caused all business to be delayed. No progress, then, was possible.[1] The only conclusion that could be drawn in the circumstances was that the English Government was not particularly interested in the peace settlement, and believed that its own interests could best be served by "driving time."

But a new chemical agent was suddenly thrown into the caldron by the rumours which were daily taking more definite shape regarding the marriage of the Cardinal and the Infanta. On December 20, for example, Henry IV. wrote to De Maisse that the Spanish King was eager before his death to see this marriage consummated, and the Infanta portioned off with the Low Countries as her dowry.[2] He added that this was probable, since the Spaniards were showing less and less inclination to spend

[1] De Maisse to Villeroy, December 31, 1597 (Ambassade); to King, January 4, 1598 (*ibid*).

[2] The King to De Maisse, December 20, 1597 (Ambassade).

their treasure and strength on the Netherlands, which were distant so far from the rest of their monarchy.

Elizabeth made no effort to conceal her pleasure at the news. " La beauté du monde," she remarked, " concistoit en telles mutations." From the Queen's point of view no better settlement could be desired. It meant that a new *Prince particulier* would come into being in the Netherlands, recalling the time when the House of Burgundy, the friend of England, lorded it in those parts. And Elizabeth calculated on being able to knit up the old Burgundian alliance with the Cardinal and the Infanta.

It was distinctly disconcerting to the French King to have this new disturbing factor introduced, because he could not quite gauge its influence on the English Government.[1] Much, of course, depended on the attitude of the Dutch. And in the period before the meeting of the English Council (January 11) efforts were made both by the Queen and De Maisse to sound the Dutch agent in London.

[1] The King to de Maisse December 20, 1597 (Ambassade). " Mettez peine," he wrote, " de descouvrir leurs Intentions." Henry IV. had been put on his guard against Elizabeth by a " letter from Amiens ": " On nous escrit de Rome pour chose certaine que les pais bas doibvent demeurer à l'infante major en espousant le Cardinal. Je ne le puis croire mais si cela estoit la Reine d'Angleterre n'en seroit marie et faudroit bien prendre garde qu'elle ne nous prevint par un accord avecques ledict Sieur Cardinal " (Extraict d'un Advis d'Amiens, Ambassade).

Now, from the very beginning there was no doubt as to the wishes of the Estates.[1] They breathed out fire and slaughter against the Cardinal and his marriage, and urged the continuation of the war, particularly the recovery of Calais, saying that another year's war would bring the Spaniard to his knees. But how far could they be depended upon to act independently of Elizabeth, or, if need be, against her will? Henry IV. was inclined to think that, although the States might object to receiving the Cardinal and the Infanta as their Sovereigns, for fear of falling once more under the domination of Spain, Elizabeth might easily force them to act in accordance with her will by means of the debts which they owed her, and by menacing them with the exchange of Flushing for Calais. In other words, the English Government had the whip-hand, and Du Vair's analysis of the situation in 1596 seemed more than likely to be verified. At all events, what Henry IV. and Villeroy most feared was a settlement between Elizabeth and the Car-

[1] De Maisse to King, January 4, 1598 (Ambassade); Villeroy to De Maisse, December 12, 1598 (*ibid.*); Proposition faict par le Sieur de Buzenval à M.M. des Estatz, November 26, and Reply of the Estates: "Il est plus expedient non seulement pour vostre personne et Royaume de France mais aussy pour le bien de la Cause Commune de toute la Chrestienté que par le maintenment de la dicte ligue generalle nous continuions de commune force et moyens à attacquer et assaillir le Commun Ennemy (Ambassade)"; Lettre de Buzenval à M. de la Fontaine, December, 1597.

dinal by the mutual cession of Flushing and Calais.[1]

Whether this was more feasible in 1597 than 1596, which seems unlikely, it is scarcely worth considering. The important point is that it shows the strength of the suspicion in the minds of French statesmen as to the ultimate designs of the Queen. Villeroy even ventured to say that if Elizabeth knew that there was any chance of the retrocession of Calais to the French by the proposed peace, or even by war, she would hinder them in every way she could. And ugly rumours were current to the effect that she was in touch with the Cardinal concerning the exchange of the towns. Yet, however much the diplomatists might canvass the pros and cons of the problem, nothing positive was ventilated by the English Government till January 11. Till then its policy was one of inertia.

To De Maisse and others, of course, this meant simply that France was to be made to subserve English interests irrespective of its own position. "Ce seroit une loix bien dure," wrote M. Bellièvre from the Low Countries, "et ne se pourroit dire societé mais servitude si je batterés tant qu'il me plaira et vous ne pourrez jamais sortir de guerre si je n'y consent."[2] And De Maisse endeavoured

[1] Villeroy to De Maisse, December 25; King to De Maisse, December 30. The Dutch did not believe the exchange could take place: De Maisse to King, January 4 (Ambassade).

[2] Bellièvre à M. de Maisse, December 21, 1597 (Ambassade).

to explain to Elizabeth that a league, no matter how close and strong, did not imply perpetual war, but was conceived in order to arrive at peace. If the allies differed among themselves as to the conclusion of peace, and two of them desired to leave their companion and ruin him without succour, he had the right to play for his own hand.[1]

When the English Council at last met, De Maisse found that much stress was laid on the binding nature of the League of 1593, and it was generally desired to hold the French to the fulfilment of the letter of the agreement—that is, that they should continue the war until Elizabeth determined otherwise. Apart from this, Burghley was inclined to treat the whole question quite leisurely, and contented himself with submitting two principles—(1) that the Queen must first deal with the States for debts and places in gage;[2] and (2) that there should be a preliminary discussion, in England, if possible, between the three allies. He further asked De Maisse if, seeing the Cardinal proposed to return to the conditions established by the Treaty of Château Cambresis, Henry IV. would restore

[1] De Maisse to the King, January 4, 1598 (*ibid.*). De Maisse corroborated the suspicions of Henry IV. and Villeroy as to the malignant designs of Elizabeth—*e.g.*, "Mais j'ay opinion que cette Princesse . . . voudroit bien veoir l'issue du mariage de l'infante avant que s'en resoudre . . . monstrant en recepvoir plaisir et estimant à mon advis *qu'elle se pourra facilement accorder avecques ces nouveaux mariez et ravoir Calais.*"

[2] Brille, Flushing.

Calais to the English, as it had been agreed in that Treaty.[1] De Maisse gave no answer to this pointed question. He was sadly disappointed with the result of his mission. Writing to the King regarding his interview with the Council, he observed: "La necessité porte vostre maiesté à la paix, la crainte et la deffiance conduict les Estats à la guerre et la Reine ne desire à bon escient ny l'un ny l'autre mais de veoir ses voisins embrouillez."[2]

Doubtless there was colour enough for such sharp criticism of the policy of the English Government, but there is another side to the question, to which, for obvious reasons, the French were largely blind. The Sieur Jeannin, alone of those who gave advice to Henry IV. on the peace proposals, seems to have grasped the fact that the English policy was more than mere unprincipled brigandage. Jeannin wrote: "Quant à la reine d'Angleterre on doit croire qu'elle voudra tousjours pour nous ce qu'elle voudra et doit vouloir par raison d'estat et non plus avant, et dèja l'experience nous a appris qu'elle ne desire non plus nostre accroissement que celuy de l'Espagnol mesme dans les Pais Bas, ainsielle balancera tousjours son interest avec le nostre quand il

[1] De Maisse to the King, January 11 (Ambassade).

[2] *Ibid.* In a despatch of January 4 to Villeroy he wrote to the same effect: "Vous verrez donc, monsieur, cette depesche vous assurerant que ces gens icy n'ont à bon escient envie ny de la guerre ny de la paix mais bien d'entretenir l'escarmouche comme on a faict jusques icy et nous faire languir après nos miseres et après eux" (Ambassade).

faudra nous assister et sera plus on moins affectionnée *non selon qu'il nous sera besoin mais selon qu'il luy sera plus utile et convenable à ses affaires.*" [1]

This is a temperate and reasonable explanation of the grounds of English diplomacy. But the whole question was much bigger. It was nothing less than the settlement of the peace of Europe that was in debate. The issues as between France and Spain were, perhaps, simple enough, and for the sake of France the sooner they were settled the better. But if the peace to be made was to include England and the States, clearly many great and complicated matters would have to be dealt with, which were not susceptible of hurry. The "irresolution" of the English does not therefore show that Elizabeth and the Council were against the peace, or that they were bent on making the French King "flounder in the sea of their uncertainty, natural and artificial," but simply that they were apprehensive, and, on the whole, justifiably, that a thousand difficulties would have to be discussed between the allies themselves before Spain was approached. Solidarity was essential if a durable and satisfactory peace was to be reached.

§ 5. In reality a preliminary discussion of outstanding questions between the confederates was impossible. The Dutch had suddenly signified their intention of sending deputies to France to learn for themselves the precise posture of affairs, and

[1] "Memoire Historique concernant la Negociation de la Paix Traitée à Vervins," Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.

the English Council was led, against its will, to make a similar promise to De Maisse.[1]

The English Commissioners, Sir Robert Cecil, John Herbert, and Thomas Wilks, were duly despatched in February, their instructions being to seek an understanding with the Dutch, and not to treat with the Spaniards unless with their consent. Beyond this, their mission was, as Cecil remarked, mainly "Inquisition."[2] They were to make inquiries and satisfy themselves on two important points—(1) whether the powers of the Cardinal's deputies were properly endorsed by Philip II.: (2) whether Calais would be restored to England, as agreed in the Treaty of Château Cambresis.[3]

Arriving in Paris on March 13, it was not till the 23rd that they obtained an audience of the King, for he was at Angers, a considerable distance away from the capital. While journeying thither, Cecil appears to have been vastly impressed by the general desire of the French for peace, and observed, in one of his despatches, that if Spain would only be reasonable, no consideration, promises, oaths, profits, or obligations of honour would cause them to reject the offers. Even the Huguenots were inclined to peace. "It is firmly stood upon by all here," he wrote, "and not without reason, that by the same

[1] De Maisse left London, January 15; the English Commissioners were to follow in ten days,—La Fontaine to De Maisse, January 16 (Ambassade).

[2] S.P.F., vol. xli., f. 126: Cecil to Burghley, February 12.

[3] *Ibid.*, ff. 57-65: Instructions to Sir Robert Cecil, February 12, 1598.

Repose France of any Contrey in the worlde will soonest flourish uppon laying down of arms." The King, he thought, might stand out, but "the oddes is to be laid rather on the pluraltye than the Unitye." [1]

With his knowledge of the public temper Cecil made a careful and tentative statement to the King at Angers. He pointed out that the Queen had not sent them to dissuade the French King from making peace without comprehending his allies: she relied on his honour and foresight not to follow such a course. Nor, again, had they been sent to contend that the offers of Spain were fraudulent, but merely to find out if there was sufficient authority to "treat." Elizabeth was not against a general peace; she was interested only in conserving her honour and her allies. Finally, they desired to discover on what conditions Henry IV. was prepared to accept peace, and how they were to treat the Dutch.[2]

These were conciliatory overtures, but they showed that the English Government was not ready for an immediate settlement; and Cecil, in his second interview, showed that he was not to be hurried. It seemed strange, he argued, that the King, who, he did not wish to think, was pondering a separate accord for himself with the Spaniard, had engaged himself in the negotiation for peace without knowing

[1] S.P.F., vol. xli., ff. 212-214: Cecil and Herbert to the Lord Treasurer, Earl Marshal, and Lord Admiral of England, March 23, 1598.

[2] *Ibid.*, ff. 358, 359: My speech to the French Council at Angiers, March 27, 1598.

Elizabeth's conditions. Nevertheless, Cecil was able to draw from the King the admission that the Spanish monarch must not be allowed, whether by contract or by conquest, to rule the seventeen provinces of the Netherlands.[1] So far, English and French interests were at one. But when he approached the Dutch he found that they would not listen to peace proposals under any circumstances. Cecil asserted that they could have the conditions they wanted, for example, the banishment of the Spanish soldiers. But Barneveldt replied that there were other questions much more fundamental. They could not, for instance, allow their new democratic Constitution to be tampered with by the Spaniards, lest it might disintegrate. And, besides, the real trouble was not to obtain the expulsion of the Spaniards, but the Spaniolized inhabitants, who were much more numerous. In other words, they would not receive the Cardinal and the Infanta as their Sovereigns, nor amalgamate with the Southern and Spaniolized parts of the Netherlands, because they feared to fall once more under Spanish domination.[2]

At this juncture (March 18) Cecil received a startling communication from Lord Burghley, to

[1] S.P.F., vol. xli., ff. 293-301 : Letter of Cecil and Herbert to the Council, March 23; Cecil's notes of his speech to King, March 21; Kermaingant, vol. i., p. 176; S.P.F., vol. xli., f. 312: My First heads when I had audience in the King's Cabynet, he being in bedd, March 23, 1598.

[2] Kermaingant, vol. i., pp. 189, 190; S.P.F., vol. xli., ff. 348-354: Cecil and Herbert to the Lord Treasurer, Admiral, and Marshal, Angiers, March 27.

the effect that letters of the Cardinal to the King of Spain had been intercepted, and on being deciphered, showed that the Spanish and French deputies who were discussing the peace proposals at Vervins had already come to an agreement, and that the French King would be able to conclude what peace he liked with the King of Spain, irrespective of his allies.[1] On the heels of this despatch came another from Elizabeth, instructing her Commissioners to demand of Henry IV. to what extent his deputies had engaged themselves. If he prevaricated, they were to say that Elizabeth had positive proof that they had reached an agreement without having assured to her by a special clause the faculty of treating in her turn.[2]

When the English Commissioners received the incriminating correspondence, "theyr harts so boyled that they held themselves accursed to treade upon this soyle."[3] Cecil at once charged the King with breaking faith, and handed him an extract from the letters. Henry IV. repudiated the charge, asserting that no power had been delivered to the deputies to conclude anything.

As a matter of fact, both the charge and the denial of the King fail to cover all the facts. As early as February 15 the King had resolved to

[1] S.P.F., vol. xli., f. 254: Burghley to Cecil, March 18.

[2] *Ibid.*, ff. 247, 248: The Queen to . . . Sir Robert Cecil . . . and . . . John Herbert, Esquire, March 17.

[3] *Ibid.*, vol. xlii., ff. 18-25: Cecil and Herbert to the Queen, Nantes, April 5, 1598.

take "God and Reason as his Guides," and both, he said, counselled him not to let slip the occasion by deferring to the selfishness of his confederates.[1] In March Villeroy wrote to the deputies at Vervins: "*Achevez donc votre ouvrage le plustost que vous pourrez*.[2] The negotiations were thus being pushed on rapidly while the audiences between Cecil and the King were taking place at Angers. So far the charge against Henry IV. was sound. But, on the other hand, the King had not deserted his allies. While the articles of agreement between the French and Spanish deputies were being discussed at Vervins, he had asked that the powers of the Cardinal to treat with England should be corroborated from Spain,[3] and he had insisted on a cessation of arms for England and the States,[4] in order to allow them to negotiate a peace with Spain also. The latter request, it is true, had been refused,[5] but the former had been granted,[6] and the King was enabled to

[1] Advis du Roy Henri le Grand, etc., MS. Angleterre, 22, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, lettre du Roy aux Sieurs de Bellièvre et de Sillery, February 15, 1598.

[2] Lettre de Villeroy à MM. de Bellièvre et de Sillery, March, 1598, in *Mémoire Historique concernant la Negociation de la Paix Traitée à Vervins*, Paris, 1667.

[3] Lettre du Roy à MM. de Bellièvre et de Sillery, February 15.

[4] Instructions to MM. de Bellièvre et de Sillery, February 8 (*Mémoire Historique*).

[5] *Mémoire Historique*, vol. i., p. 268, March 24.

[6] The courier arrived with the powers on April 3 : *vide* Lettre des Sieurs de Bellièvre et de Sillery au Roy, April 7, MS. Angleterre, 22, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris.

reply to the charge which Cecil brought against him, not only with a denial that a definite agreement had been reached between France and Spain, but with the retort that England should begin negotiations at once, since the corroboration of the Powers had arrived. If not, then let them make a serious offer that the Queen would assist him to attain their common profit and security in other ways than that of peace, and he would show how little he was bound by the "Treaty."[1]

Cecil thereupon proposed to go to the Conference to inspect the "powers" of the Spanish deputies, but proposed that the Conference be moved from Vervins to somewhere on the coast between Calais and Boulogne. His aim by this proposal was to get rid of the Legate and the General of the Cordeliers, representatives of the Pope—a tender point with Elizabeth. Henry IV. was against this, of course, because the Pope was the most active of all in the promotion of peace and the pledge of a successful termination of the negotiations; and he suspected that the English had proposed the transference of the Conference from Vervins in order to postpone the Peace. On the other hand, it was impossible for the English Commissioners at the moment to urge war and propose new succours, for the reason that they could not come to any agreement with the Dutch as to the proportions of the succours and troops to be undertaken by the respective countries.

[1] S.P.F., vol. xlii., ff. 18-25.

Henry IV. Resolves on Peace

Henry IV. thereupon resolved not to spoil his affairs for either the Dutch or the English, but to see the peace negotiations carried through at once. On April 14, therefore, he wrote to the French deputies at Vervins to draw up the articles as soon as possible. But with the intention particularly of safeguarding the Dutch, who would have to bear the main brunt of the war if peace were established between France and Spain, he ordered his deputies to work hard for a general truce, so that England and the States might procure time to treat for themselves.[1] On the next day after despatching the decisive letter, the King sent to Cecil to ask him to come with him "to Kyll a wolfe and play the good fellow"; but Cecil refused, on the plea that he had serious affairs on hand.[2] The following day the English Commissioners again visited the King, and asked point-blank if he was resolved on peace or war. Henry IV. could only have one answer to such a question—viz., that he could not now think of war, even if the Queen were willing to help him.[3] The die was at length cast. On April 19 there was another meeting, in which the Dutch vainly offered great succours if the King would break off the Treaty, and Cecil blamed him for deserting his allies, saying that he had been commissioned to examine the proposals for peace, and if they were

[1] Le Roy à MM. de Bellièvre et de Sillery, April 14 (*Mémoire Historique*, vol. i., p. 428); Lettre du Roy à MM. de Bellièvre et de Sillery, April 9 (*ibid.*, vol. i., p. 396).

[2] S.P.F., vol. xlii., f. 54: Cecil to the Lords, April 15, 1598.

[3] Kermaingant, vol. i., pp. 202, 203.

unsatisfactory, to offer succours and urge the States to do so also.[1] In other words, he wished to show that Henry IV. had foreclosed the question, resolving on peace before the alternative of war had been properly discussed.

In any case the sudden trend of events made it necessary for the English Commissioners to apply again to Elizabeth for new instructions. Their former Commission permitted them to treat with the Spaniard only with the consent of the Dutch, and the Dutch were immovably set on war.

It was to no purpose that the King received a communication from his deputies at Vervins, dated April 13, to the effect that they had seen and read the dispensation of Philip allowing his representatives to treat with the English and the Dutch.[2] In vain, also, that on April 26 word came that a truce of two months had been accorded by the Cardinal to the two allies of France, and that the Queen and the States would be comprised in the Treaty if they desired it within six months.[3] Cecil and the English Commissioners left for England in a bad temper,[4] and shortly after (May 2) the Treaty was concluded and signed by the French and Spanish

[1] S.P.F., vol. xlii., f. 60: Cecil and Herbert to the Lords, April 19.

[2] De Bellièvre et de Sillery à M. de Villeroy, April 13 (*Mémoire Historique*, vol. i., p. 411).

[3] De Bellièvre and de Sillery to the King, April 26 (*ibid.*, pp. 453, 454).

[4] Villeroy to Bellièvre et Sillery, April 28 (*ibid.*, p. 472).

deputies, and placed in the hands of the Legate. On May 8 the King made it public.[1]

The reply of Elizabeth was a bitter one. On May 9 she wrote to Henry IV.: "Si on voudroit rechercher entre les choses mondaines, chose qui retient la plus grande iniquité et par laquelle ceste machine de terre que nous inhabitons le plus tost se ruyne c'est le manquer de foy, l'incertitude d'amitié et moins d'amour où il y a plus de raison. Quoy considerant je ne suis bien prompt a mal penser de tel de qui je bien merite que j'ose fonder asseurée pensée qu'en vous resideroit un si mortel péché que l'ingratitude lequel entre les hommes se peult justement nommer peccatum in Spiritu Sancto."[2]

§ 5. What is to be said of the remarkable stretch of policy which we have just reviewed in this chapter?

Surely, if the mutual recriminations as to bad faith, which were prolific, be set aside, the most striking characteristic of the whole period is the sharp cleavage in the aims of the two Governments. The "Common Cause" was in ruin: everyone was aware that a crisis had come. France had been marching toward peace, slowly but surely, ever since the conversion of the King. Doubtless it had taken some time for that momentous event to affect policy, but now there could be no question of its influence on the side of peace. By cementing together the

[1] Kermaingant, vol. i., pp. 212, 213.

[2] S.P.F., vol. xlii., f. 109: Copie of Her Majesty's Letter to the French King, May 9.

hitherto divergent interests of King and people, it had roused a new patriotism, and a desire to have done with a war that threatened to corrupt and destroy the nation. Peace, recuperation, and retrenchment thus became the motto of all true patriots. But it is clear English foreign policy cut athwart these manifest tendencies towards peace. Instead of making up her mind on the inevitable winding-up of the war—the cardinal point in the situation—the Queen concentrated her efforts on delaying the peace movement, and pursued the old attempt to extort the concession of a seaport. At no time were effective succours sent to France, but incessant pressure was brought to bear on Henry IV. to yield Calais or Boulogne. In all this, the King and his advisers saw nothing but tortuous Machiavellian diplomacy, bent on beggaring and dismembering France for the benefit of a perfidious ally. No wonder he ignored his Bond of Amity, and sought to save his country from both friend and foe alike by making peace with Philip II. In doing so he took the obvious course open to him at the time; and subsequent events show that in the long run it was the best one for France. The only point on which his action is open to criticism is that, in his anxiety to pluck France like a brand from the burning, he delayed the settlement of a general European peace. English "irresolution" and deliberation might be provoking enough, but a little more consideration on the part of Henry IV. for his confederates, the non-French elements in the problem, and the undoubted

complications of the situation would have been proof at least of a higher statesmanship, if not of a sounder policy.

Broadly speaking, the Peace of Vervins brought the international situation round again to the position in which it was placed by the Treaty of Château Cambresis in 1559. France and Spain were reconciled, the Catholic world had healed its feuds, and England stood in danger of isolation. Of course, the Anglo-French treaties still remained in force, because the King had not sacrificed his allies in his endeavour to reach peace, nor the system of alliances in which he was involved prior to 1598. These remained intact, and both Elizabeth and Henry IV. hoped to maintain them. But there was no disguising the fact that English and French interests were no longer marching together, and that the differences between the two Governments were stretching the Treaties which held them together to the breaking-point. The Peace of Vervins was, in fact, a standing challenge to the existence of the Anglo-French alliance, and although our position in Europe was not immediately jeopardized, the European situation took a decided set against England.

In the period which follows (1598-1603) it will be seen what the differences, just spoken of, really were, and how English statesmanship attempted to recover command of affairs in the interest of England, which had been lost when the French King apostatized from the " common cause " and made peace at Vervins.

IV

MARITIME AND COMMERCIAL DIFFERENCES

§ 1. THE relations between England and France in this period lack the dramatic interest and glamour of the years before the Treaty of Vervins. They are unpunctuated by battles—prosaic, involved, acrimonious. Yet they are not without a peculiar interest, because of the intrinsic value of the subjects over which they range, and the general ideas which they may be made to yield. It is a period, for example, in which the principles of maritime law are being hammered out anew, and it is a period which affords important information on the working of the Court of Admiralty and the practice of international trade. Above all, it is a period in which the fundamental fact on which our foreign policy had rested since 1572, the Anglo-French Alliance, is subjected to sharp criticism and examination.

These are the main lines along which the negotiations now move. But in order clearly to understand their general development it is necessary, in the first place, to separate out the various strands of which they are composed. To begin with, then, there was the maritime difficulty, which was perhaps the central question of the whole period. It certainly ranked first on the programme of the

French Government as a matter to be dealt with, once peace was assured.[1]

England and Holland were still at war with Spain, and France was a friendly Power to all three. What attitude, then, was the French Monarchy to adopt towards the belligerents? A position of neutrality, it might be replied. But the answer was not so easy. Elizabeth, for example, asserted that France, being friendly to England, must abstain from feeding her enemy or supplying it with arms or munitions of war, and proceeded to enforce this decision by claiming to intercept and search all French merchant ships plying to Spanish ports.[2] The procedure was drastic. Ships carrying corn or warlike munitions, or whatever could be construed to be for the prejudice of England, were arrested, declared confiscate and sold, cargo and hull, for what they would fetch in the open market. In other words, the English Government asserted the belligerents' right of prohibiting contraband and of policing the seas in the interests of national safety.[3]

To the Polish Ambassador, who interceded for some ships of his countrymen which had fallen as prizes under the contraband laws, Elizabeth ventured to quote the Law of Nations on the subject:

[1] S.P.F., vol. xlii., ff. 262, 263.

[2] Kermaingant, *Mission de Jean de Thumery*, vol. i., p. 247.

[3] For a general discussion of the 'Contraband' question and the practice of the English Government in this matter, previous to 1598, see Cheney, *History of England from the Defeat of the Armada to the Death of Elizabeth*, vol. i., chap. xxii.

"Hoc scito esse juris natura gentiumque ut cum bellum inter Reges intercedit, liceat alteri alterius bellica subsidia undecumque allata intercipere et ne in damnum suum convertantur præcavere."[1]

Practically the same argument was used toward the French Government. For Sir Henry Neville explained to the Council of Henry IV. that "the greatest Law of all was that of a man's own Preservation; and that he might be assured the Queen would not betray herself and her estate nor suffer her enemie to be armed and strengthened against her when she had Power to Impeach yt."[2] And doubtless this practice was supported by the International Law of the age. Appropriate passages could be pointed to, in the work of Albericus Gentilis,[3] which clearly regarded the safety of the State as a law, higher in reason than the ordinary articles of the *Jus Gentium*, which dealt with commercial liberty. In 1560 the French Government itself had issued an edict, afterwards called by the English the "Code Henry," which put the identical principles in use, for purposes of French security, which Elizabeth in 1598 contended for, on the English

[1] Ambassade de Hurault de Maisse (bound up accidentally with the other papers).

[2] *Memorials of State*, ed. Sawyer, vol. ii., p. 83.

[3] Albericus Gentilis, *De Jure Belli*, libri tres, Oxford, 1588—*e.g.*, "Angli nolunt, quid fieri, quod contra salutem est. Jus commerciorum aequum est; at hoc æquius tuendæ salutis; est illud Gentium Jus; hoc Naturæ est; est illud Privatorum; est hoc regnorum. Cedat igitur regno, mercatura, homo naturæ, pecunia vitæ" (book i., chap. xxi.).

side. So that the position of the English Government was not revolutionary either in theory or practice.

From the point of view of France, as may easily be imagined, the situation was intolerable. The King represented that French agriculture was reviving and corn plentiful, and that he could not inhibit its export without grievously injuring his subjects, because it was the principal way of increasing their wealth. Besides, it was the one traffic which the Peace had made possible on a large scale, and the Spaniards calculated on it as much as the French. To stop it, would irritate Spain, and perhaps cause a serious rupture in the newly harmonized relations. And further, as the King pointed out, the Queen ought not to prohibit the traffic, because her subjects drew many commodities from France, and if the Spaniards should apply the same principle to this Anglo-French traffic as Elizabeth did to the Hispano-French, there would be an end of French commerce altogether.[1]

His hypothesis was more amply fulfilled than he dared think, for both Holland and Spain, during the course of 1599, asserted the same claim to inhibit the traffic of French merchants with their respective enemies. In the pathetic sentence of Henry IV., French commerce became the prey of all nations.[2]

[1] Kermaingant, vol. ii., *Pièces Justificatives*, pp. 19, 20, and 23; *Memorials of State*, vol. ii., p. 35.

[2] King to Boissize, January 12, 1599; Kermaingant, vol. ii., pp. 25-27.

In January, for example, the Dutch policed the Narrow Seas to prevent all traffic with Calais, which had been converted into a depot for victuals and other articles of daily use by the Flemish provinces owning the Spanish allegiance.[1] French ships, of course, suffered, and the French honour was deeply touched by the insolence with which the Dutch pursued the recalcitrant ships under the cannon of the Citadel. In April the Estates issued a Proclamation modelled on those of Elizabeth, prohibiting all traffic with Spain or countries belonging to Spain, and rigorously carried out the letter of their law by preying on the French Channel shipping.[2]

In such circumstances, and with such precedents before it, the Spanish Government could not remain passive. In self-defence, embargoes were laid on all French ships loading cargoes in Spanish ports for either England or Holland, and "cautions" were insisted upon that goods embarked would not be discharged in the ports of Spain's enemies.[3] Naturally the French suffered heavily, because, owing to the peace with Spain, a large carrying trade was falling into the hands of French merchants.

Had the English Edicts against contraband been carried out with any respect to justice, it is possible that the complaints of the French would not have been so bitter. But, in point of fact, the *droit de*

[1] *Memorials of State*, vol. i., p. 151: Neville to Cecil, January 26, 1599.

[2] Kermaingant, vol. i., pp. 268, 269.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 312; and vol. ii., p. 127.

visite often meant the right to plunder, and Henry IV. pled that his poor subjects were *pillez et ravagez* under the English maritime enactments.[1]

The question was also further complicated by the fact that English and French merchants found themselves rivals everywhere—in the Levant, on the Barbary coast, as well as in more northerly seas, and, indeed, throughout the whole civilized world.[2] At Constantinople, for instance, an English Agent, early in 1599, solicited the Porte with presents to withdraw the privileges of the French in the Turkish dominions, and concede that the traffic of the Levant might be conducted under the English flag.[3] His petition has at least the attraction of novelty. According to Breves, the French Ambassador at the Turkish capital, the Englishman said that Henry IV., having abandoned the True Faith of Jesus Christ, had gone over to the service of idols, and, following the behests of the Pope, harboured hostile designs against the Mussulman Empire. Elizabeth, on the other hand, who had never made peace with Spain, and was no servant of the Papacy, was the true friend of the Porte.[4]

English seamen, however, did not wait for the tardy ways of diplomacy. They took the law into their own hands, and converted the whole of the Mediterranean into a condition approaching an-

[1] Kermaingant, vol. i., pp. 245, 246.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 306, 307, and notes.

[3] Fonds Français, MS. 15,980, f. 60, Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.

[4] *Ibid.*

archy. At Rhodes an English ship, named the *Grace*, manned by English Corsairs, plundered and sank the French argosies coming from Alexandretta and Syria. Another pirate centre was the Gulf of Lyons, where, rumour had it, a certain William Aldren, ex-English Consul at Alexandria, who had been thrust out by the influence of the French Consul Coquerel, was plying piracy, and threatening to destroy French trade with Alexandria and Tripoli. At all events, the losses of the Marseillais to the English Mediterranean Corsairs formed a considerable budget of complaints in themselves.[1]

Now, of course, piracy was a long-standing and virtually permanent evil, which eluded all the attempts at suppression which were provided for in the various treaties of the century.[2] But the policy of Elizabeth, making French contraband traffic with Spain legitimate prey, afforded the pirates a valuable pretext for their nefarious trade. It was easy to destroy a ship's papers, maroon the crew, or put them to ransom, and sell the ship and its cargo on the Barbary coast, on the plea that it carried contraband to Spain. In some cases the crew was thrown into the sea along with the ship's papers.[3]

[1] Fonds Français, MS. 15,980, ff. 36, 60, 63, Bibliothèque Nationale.

[2] *Vide* relative passages in Treaties of Château Cambresis, 1558; Treaty of Troyes, 1564; and Treaty of Blois, 1572. Cited in Fonds Français, MS. 15,980, Bibliothèque Nationale. For an account of Elizabethan Piracy and Privateering, see Cheney, *op. cit.*, chaps. xxi. and xxiii.

[3] Fonds Français, MS. 15,980, ff. 36, 53, 60.

The French Propose a Remedy

Such, then, was the maritime problem which confronted the French King once the Peace of Vervins had freed his hands of the amelioration of his country's misery.

In the Autumn of 1598 the French Council drew up[1] a series of Articles for the regulation of maritime grievances, and negotiations were begun between the French Ambassador Boissize and the English Council, with a view to reaching some settlement of the vexed question. The important contentions of the French, as urged in this document, are, broadly speaking, some four in number—(1) that the French flag (*bannière haulte ou arborée*) should cover the merchandise and safeguard it from inspection or confiscation; (2) that the "cautions" exacted from armed vessels leaving port be carefully supervised by the Mayor and officials of the port, and that in the event of the cautions being insufficient, or not forthcoming, the *Corpz de Ville* be held responsible; (3) that special commissioners be appointed to deal with the depredations; and, finally, (4) that in case of the failure of justice or its undue delay, Letters of Marque be issued to the aggrieved party.[2]

Drastic measures of this nature would, if properly carried out, have had a summary effect in ending the piracy and the disagreeable treatment to which

[1] Kermaingant, vol. i., p. 244.

[2] Articles Proposez par l'Ambassadeur de France sur le Rêglement de la Navigation, MS. 15,980, f. 93, cited Kermaingant, vol. ii., pp. 258-260.

French shipping on the high seas was subjected by the English Right of Search. But the reply of the English Council was not at all conciliatory.[1] The crucial demands were directly repudiated. A second communication, however, from the French side, expanding and justifying the claims already put forward,[2] led Cecil to abate somewhat the rigid tone of refusal, with the result that a considerable step was taken towards meeting the French grievances in a new series of Articles, ratified by the English Secretary himself.[3] For example, it was conceded that merchant ships "equipped for war" pay as caution or surety double the value of ship and cargo, and that if the Admiralty officials took less than sufficient caution, they should be held responsible in case of depredation. But even in these highly conciliatory proposals of Cecil it was insisted upon as essential that the traffic between France and Spain in arms and munitions and other things prejudicial to England be prohibited.

Henry IV. agreed to accept the new Articles, and instructed Boissize to press for a definite treaty.[4] But meantime Cecil had changed his mind, and the

[1] Responsa ad Articulos propositos ab illustri Christianissimi Regis legato, January 12, MS. 15,980, Fonds Français, f. 21.

[2] Réplique à la Reponce donnée aux Articles proposez par l'Ambassadeur de France, MS. 15,980, f. 94; Kermaingant, vol. ii., pp. 263-266.

[3] Articles de Traité de Navigation acceptés et signés par Robert Cecil, Kermaingant, vol. ii., pp. 266-268. *Vide* Appendix C.

[4] *Ibid.*, vol. i., p. 279.

Articles were allowed to lapse. The fact is, Elizabeth was averse to a settlement by Treaty of the maritime grievances, and for a reason which will appear shortly.

On the other hand, much as the Queen disliked a settlement by Treaty, which would hamper her freedom, she was quite willing to provide for the suppression of the disorders by Proclamation. And the agitation thus led to the issue, on both sides of the Channel, of Edicts prohibiting the arrest of the ships belonging to either country or its allies.[1] A special Commission to preside over the processes of the Admiralty was set up in England, and later a similar Court was incorporated in Rouen. Henry IV., in deference to the concessions of the Queen, further prohibited the export of munitions of war to Spain, and promised to do the same in regard to corn[2] if he saw that it would be prejudicial to English interests. Thus a working agreement was reached. Elizabeth yielded the principle put forward by the French for the free passage of merchandise under the *bannière haulte*, and promised a better execution of justice than the perfunctory Admiralty officials had hitherto guaranteed. And the French King agreed to prohibit his subjects from smuggling contraband into Spain.[3]

Yet, owing to the fact that sixteenth-century

[1] Kermaingant, vol. i., p. 258; and MS. 15,980, De Par le Roy, 12 Avril, 1599.

[2] Kermaingant, vol. i., p. 238.

[3] King to Boissize, February 11, 1599, Kermaingant, vol. ii., pp. 32-36.

Proclamations were often a dead letter, the success of the arrangement was small. And there was a still more serious objection to the settlement. The English Government, in granting the freedom of traffic to French merchant vessels, had conceded too much. Any cargo might be rendered legal by the hoisting of the French flag; and Spanish ships, it was observed, carried the tricolour in order to cover their cargoes. Further, the French King's promise to prohibit the export of corn from his ports to Spain when it might damage England, left him in a strange quandary in May, 1599, when war-like preparations were being made in Spain. The atmosphere was full of Armadas and rumours of Armadas, and the English Council contended that the preparations were directed against England, and that Henry IV. must therefore fulfil his promise by prohibiting the French corn traffic with Spain. He replied that the preparations were not against England, but to defend the Spanish coast against the Dutch fleet; and, further, that the main corn supplies of Spain came from the Easterlings. Nevertheless, he would stop the export of corn, because he had heard that some French vessels had been arrested in Spain, and the prohibition might therefore be regarded as a just reprisal.[1] It was only by some such casuistical treatment of the situations which might arise that the radically unsatisfactory agreement could be maintained or tolerated.

[1] Kermaingant, vol. i., p. 267.

§ 2. Cecil, for his part, openly averred that the Queen's Proclamation was much too liberal, and proceeded in the Summer of 1599 to develop a new proposal, which would not only provide in a more satisfactory way for the allaying of maritime disorders, but also include the other outstanding grievances which were embittering the relations of the two countries.[1] In order, then, to understand the way in which matters were shaping themselves in the mind of Cecil, it is necessary to consider this other grievance. Nothing is more remarkable in the France of 1598 than the strength and position enjoyed by the English cloth monopoly. This gigantic trade had been slowly built up since 1572, when the Treaty of Blois, which revolutionized our policy by attaching us to France in a straight alliance, opened all French markets to English merchants as a compensation for the loss of the Spanish and "Burgundian" Staples. Since that date, English cloths had won a commanding position in the French market, which they threatened to hold against the new French manufacturers. But the English merchants had committed a serious mistake in not fortifying themselves in their privileged position by establishing a *fondique*, or Staple, as they had done at Antwerp and Bruges.[2] They ought to have done so if the letter of the Treaty of 1572 was to be fulfilled. In the absence of a Staple,

[1] *Memorials of State*, vol. ii., pp. 56, 57: Cecil to Neville, July 2, 1599.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 63.

their unique privileges were not secure, but liable to be trenched upon, whenever French industry might begin to claim the protection of the Crown.

In January, 1599, for instance, important proposals were vented in the French Council for the exclusion of foreign manufacturers, notably cloths of wool and silk.[1] The aim of the reformers was excellent: it was to foster the nascent cloth industry of France, give employment to natives, and multiply the store of bullion in the country. But, of course, these protective measures, if put in vogue, would have shattered the English cloth trade to its foundations. Edmondes, the Agent of Elizabeth in Paris, getting wind of the revolutionary scheme, immediately drew up a memorandum, in which he protested vehemently against the proposed restrictions, urging that it would be both a breach of Treaties and an evil turn to England, since Elizabeth was embroiled in a war with Spain, and all ports and marts in the control of Spain and Austria were closed to English goods.[2] Edmondes' arguments had apparently considerable influence with the King, for no further steps were taken at this time towards a general prohibition of woollen cloths.[3]

[1] Kermaingant, vol. ii., pp. 25-27: King to Boissize, January 12.

[2] Requeste presentée au Roy par Edmond, Agent de la Reine d'Angleterre, sur le Defense que sa Maiesté avoit faict d'apporter aucunes Manufactures Etrangères dans ce Royaume, MS. 15,980, Fonds Français, f. 172.

[3] King to Boissize, January 12, Kermaingant, vol. ii., pp. 25-27.

The English Cloth Market in Jeopardy

On the other hand, short of a prohibition, much was done to hamper the English merchant. The Bailly of Rouen emitted a declaration in 1598 regulating the conditions under which English cloth might henceforth be imported and sold in Rouen. This was the result of an agitation by the Rouen clothiers, who complained that their "fine" cloths could not hold the market against the coarser and adulterated cloths of England. By request, therefore, of the "masters and guards" of the clothiers of Rouen, it was decreed by the Bailly that no English merchant should import or expose for sale at Rouen any kind of cloths which were not "bons, loyaux et bien conditionnés, appareillés, mouillés, et retraits, de la longueur et laize qu'ils devaient avoir," under the penalty of confiscation. And strict injunctions were given to the effect that English goods should be carefully inspected before being licensed to be sold.[1] It was principally these attacks and threatened attacks on the English cloth interest that moved Cecil to give up the attempt to provide for the maritime grievances by special Articles. If the French were to be satisfied in respect to the depredations, the English must be satisfied with regard to their overseas cloth market. Henceforth the two matters must march together.

But there was a third source of difference between the two Governments, which Cecil was anxious to

[1] Kermaingant, vol. i., pp. 451, 452.

provide for. It must be remembered that Elizabeth had spent in the French King's Cause the enormous sum of 1,339,116 crowns, or £401,734 16s. 6d.,[1] and this debt was, after all, only a debt of honour. The Queen had struggled hard to obtain a better surety by seeking the cession of a town on the littoral of France, but had completely failed. The question of reimbursement, therefore, became one of the prime questions of this later period. The French pled that their country was weak and impoverished, and needed time to recuperate.[2] And, doubtless, to deplete the country of so much treasure in order to cancel the obligation to Elizabeth would be seriously to handicap the accumulation of capital, and arrest the enterprise and industry which were once more lifting their heads in France.

But the disinclination of the French to honour their debt rested, in the last resort, on much less arguable grounds. The English alliance had never found much favour with the leading Councillors, who now shaped the policy of Henry IV., and it is

[1] Schedule of Debts, MS. 15,980, Fonds Français, f. 103, Bibliothèque Nationale: Mémoire des Sommes de Deniers que la Royne d'Angleterre à presté ou desboursa pour le Roy très Chrestien; *Memorials of State*, vol. ii., p. 29.

[2] Fonds Français, MS. 15,970, ff. 101, 102: Neville to Villeroy, June 6; *ibid.*, ff. 114, 115: Reponse de M. de Villeroy, June 8; *ibid.*, ff. 117, 118: Proposition de l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, July 19; *ibid.*, ff. 123, 124: Reponse du Roy, Avril, 1600.

also clear that the "bonds," though ratified by the King and the Chambre des Comptes, were not respected by the nation as a whole. In all probability, therefore, it was not felt to be morally incumbent on the Government to discharge them. Villeroy, the Secretary of State, went so far as to say that as Elizabeth herself had profited by the expenditure,[1] it could not be regarded as altogether a French debt.

All this was pure casuistry. It was common knowledge that Henry IV. was repaying his loans to the Dutch and the Swiss, so that his alleged poverty was only relative.[2] To all appearance he was consciously doing a dishonour to England. As Cecil remarked: "These things which we should receave in gratitude from them are yealded to us as yf we were in their debt for them."[3] It was particularly galling to Elizabeth, since the English Exchequer was finding it hard to meet the heavy expenditure connected with the pacification of Ireland.

In any case it was a source of no small concern to the English Government to find ways and means to force a more substantial acknowledgment from the French of their monetary obligations.

In the Summer of 1599, then, Cecil proposed a confirmation of Treaties, observing that there was need for "a strong civil contract" between

[1] Fonds Français, MS. 15,970, ff. 114, 115.
[2] *Memorials of State, passim.*
[3] *Ibid.*, vol. ii., pp. 56, 57.

France and England, because no Treaty was at present in full vigour."[1] Of this, the French Government signified its approval. But Cecil's main idea in proposing the ratification of the Treaties was, first of all, to procure the re-establishment of the English merchant in his old privileged position; and, in the second place, to bind the French King anew by a definite treaty stipulation to the repayment of his English loans. He therefore proposed to take the Treaty of Blois, which, as it stood, was a veritable Palladium of liberties to the English merchant, and, by adding clauses, stretch it so as to cover the new relations which had sprung up between England and France.[2]

As Cecil's plan unfolded, it became clear that the advantages were to be all on the side of England. At all events, the concessions to the French were restricted to a minimum, and none of their vital contentions was provided for. The ill-balanced nature of the proposed settlement is particularly noticeable in the matter of the "marine articles," which naturally formed an important part of the addenda. Although willing to embody many of the French *gravamina*, the English Government still maintained the right to search ships and examine passports.[3] To the French, this was a denial of the very keystone of the arch of maritime liberty. Without it the other concessions were of relatively small value.

[1] *Memorials of State*, vol. ii., pp. 56, 57.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 46.
[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 69, 70, and 74.

The same spirit is noticeable in the treatment of the commercial clauses. In the Treaty of Blois there was a provision which forbade the augmentation of taxes on English merchants—a provision, doubtless, more honoured in the breach than the observance. But if it were strictly interpreted and adhered to, as the English Government now desired it should be, it would involve the repeal of a great part of the fiscal changes, necessitated by the wars and introduced by Henry IV. and his predecessors. In itself this was an impossible demand; it was rendered intolerable by the fact that Cecil would not concede any reciprocal advantages to the French merchants trading in England, nor would he consent to revise the English tariff.[1]

But the rock on which the negotiations were wrecked was the terrible question of the re-imbursement of the loans. The French refused to bind themselves by Treaty to pay over the debt, or even a specified part of it.[2] And as this was one of the matters on which Elizabeth was especially touchy, and for which Cecil had proposed the confirmation of the Treaties, no other part of the negotiations could go forward without it.[3] "Autrement," said Boissize in a letter to Henry IV., "il ny a raison,

[1] *Memorials of State*, vol. ii., p. 64; also p. 74: Cecil to Neville, August 7.

[2] Kermaingant, vol. i., p. 287.

[3] *Memorials of State*, vol. ii., p. 179: Neville to Cecil, May 9, 1600; *ibid.*, p. 184.

remonstrance ny demonstration d'amitye qui puisse contanter la dite dame." [1]

§ 3. At the same time as Elizabeth was conducting negotiations with the French Government on the different subjects which have just been mentioned, she was seeking an understanding with Philip III. and the Archduke on the general question of an Anglo-Spanish "entente." Ever since the peace had been made at Vervins there had been motions in this direction. And it was quite natural, since provision had been made by the Spaniards, shortly after the conclusion of the Peace, for Elizabeth to treat with Spain, "when it shall seem good to her." [2] But there is more in this than would appear.

There is no doubt that a peace with Spain was devoutly desired by a large and influential party in England, pre-eminently by Cecil. It had been the hope of Lord Burghley before he died to see some such settlement accomplished. Elizabeth, too, was ageing, and inclined to draw to the ancient Burgundian alliance as the sheet-anchor of English foreign policy, as if, to quote Boissize, there was no safety elsewhere.[3] The general drift of opinion may be gathered from the fact that in December, 1599, Cecil wrote to Neville, instructing him to approach the Spanish Ambassador in Paris with the following proposition: "The amity of Burgundy hath ever bin formerly more firme and sollide than the Frenche, and that so we may be dealt withall

[1] Kermaingant, vol. i., p. 402.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 225. [3] *Ibid.*, vol. ii., p. 117.

as we shall esteeme yt above any Frenche in the world."[1] Evidently the English Secretary of State had balanced the Anglo-French alliance against an Anglo-Spanish, and made up his mind for the latter.

There were, indeed, abundant signs that the Anglo-French alliance was played out. The differences were growing to be too numerous and profound to be spanned by any treaty. Also, Elizabeth had now no "party" in France, not even the Huguenots. Everyone was afraid to be seen in correspondence with her Ambassador. And, further, behind all the cleavage in interests, there arose in Englishmen's minds the spectre of a regenerated France, head of the Catholic party in Europe, with its King perhaps seated on the Imperial throne.[2]

But the movements for a settlement with Spain and a separation from France was not merely the result of a reaction against the lines along which our foreign policy had moved since 1572. It had its roots in the real needs of both Elizabeth and Philip III. Elizabeth desired to handle the Irish question more drastically, and so long as there was open hostility with Spain this was difficult, because the Irish rebels received their main help from the Spaniard. The Spanish King's needs were no less obvious. It is true Philip III.'s motives were difficult to calculate upon. He was swayed by bragga-

[1] *Memorials of State*, vol. ii., p. 138: Cecil to Neville, December 7.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 107, 108: Neville to Cecil, September 24, 1599; *ibid.*, p. 111: Neville to Cecil, September 24, 1599.

docios, and moved by the desire to revenge himself on England for past injuries. But his true interests, as he came to see, lay in the direction of peace with Elizabeth. He must establish a concord with England if his Indian fleets were to be safe, and if he was to grapple successfully with the Dutch.[1]

Finally, if we are to understand the feeling against France, it must be remembered that the conclusion of peace at Vervins was regarded by Elizabeth as the work of an apostate. Henry IV. had "basely sacrificed his friends and made common cause with the enemy." We had entered into the European war in our own interests—that is, with a view to maintaining the integrity of the French Monarchy as a bulwark of our own freedom. Yet by the irony of fate, or, as the Elizabethans said, by the infidelity of Henry IV., we had clearly succeeded only in extricating the French and transforming ourselves into principals in the war. This was an untoward and disconcerting result, not merely because it was a blow to our honour, but because it was a result contrary to all the canons of English diplomacy. By the "desertion" of Henry, Elizabeth had lost the fulcrum by which she had hitherto moved her world, and maintained her position of independence and command in Europe. And not only so; she also found herself in danger of being committed, to all appearance irremediably, to an interminable Continental war as a subordinate ally

[1] Kermaingant, vol. ii., pp. 122-126: King to Boissize, March 11, 1600.

of the Dutch. For the Dutch were actuated by so fanatical a hatred of Spain that it seemed exceedingly unlikely they would end the war until they had re-incorporated the lost Walloon Provinces.

Here, then, is the broad problem to the solution of which English statesmanship addressed itself at this time. It was to recover command of the European situation in the interests of England. And as that could only be done in either of two ways—either by reaching an accommodation with Spain, and allowing the Dutch to suffer, or, by tearing up the Treaty of Vervins and embroiling France and Spain in a war once more—French interests were bound to be deeply affected.

This is the explanation of the keen attention which Henry IV. paid to the " clandestine " comings and goings between Madrid, Brussels, and London. Half of his correspondence is directed to analysis of the issues at stake in these secret conferences. He had learned a good deal of the trend of affairs from outside sources, and he became alarmed, not so much because he expected a successful issue of the Anglo-Spanish conversations,[1] as because of his own insecurity. Philip III. had not ratified the Treaty of Vervins made by his father, and showed no desire to do so. In addition, there was the question of the Marquisate of Saluces—an open sore in the relations with Savoy, which might at any moment fester into

[1] " Toutesfois, J'estime qu'il me sera difficile que les Espagnolz et les Anglois s'accord . . . ces deux nations du naturel qu'elles sont " (Kermaingant, vol. ii., p. 130).

a mortal disease, and throw France back into the position from which it had been rescued by the Peace just concluded. For it was to be expected that the Spanish monarch, who was the patron of Savoy, would interfere if war broke out between Henry IV. and the Duke, over the Marquisate.[1]

To the French King the critical matter was the attitude which Elizabeth might be led to assume towards the Dutch. From the French point of view the Anglo-Dutch alliance against Spain was the prop and stay of the present equilibrium of Europe. If the Dutch stood firm in their implacable hostility to the Spaniard, and managed to keep England by their side, an Anglo-Spanish agreement was impossible. But, on the other hand, Henry IV. was suspicious lest the "irresolute" Queen might be enticed by the allurements of the Burgundian connection to sacrifice the Dutch,[2] and then the equilibrium in which France found safety would be dissolved. This, in fact, was just the precise point which English statesmen were at the moment attempting to resolve. During 1599, while the negotiations with France were proceeding, efforts were being made to move the Dutch to entertain the idea of a settlement with Spain conjointly with England.[3]

With this trend of policy Henry IV. could not interfere: he was doomed to be a spectator. Yet,

[1] Kermaingant, vol. i., p. 342, and pp. 313-316.

[2] *Ibid.*, vol. ii., pp. 134, 135-136: King to Boissize, April 14, 1600.

[3] *Ibid.*, vol. i., p. 366.

while Elizabeth wrestled with the States, he attempted to instil into her mind that the desertion of the Dutch for the sake of a visionary and chimeric Burgundy would be a capital misfortune to England.[1] She was riding, in his expressive phrase, "les yeux bandez et la bride abbattue." Even if a new Burgundy were reconstituted under the Archduke and the Infanta, it could not possibly resemble the old Duchy. One of two things, he said, would certainly happen. *Either* Spain would recover control of the entire Netherlands by the childlessness of Philip III. and the succession to the Spanish throne of the Archduke and the Infanta, or by the preference of the Infanta for residence in Spain; *or* the Archduke would re-enact the tragedies already perpetrated by the Spaniard in the Low Countries. In either case the danger to England in the long run would be the same, for the wealth and resources of Holland would be absorbed by the enemy of England.[2]

These terrors, however, did not appeal to Elizabeth; she was resolved to go forward with the negotiations.[3] In December, 1599, when the Dutch definitely refused to take part in any Conference, Neville was instructed to solicit Henry IV. for Boulogne as a meeting place for the use of the English and Spanish deputies.[4] It was granted on

[1] Kermaingant, vol. ii., pp. 134, 135-136: King to Boissize, April 14, 1600.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 122-126: King to Boissize, March 11, 1600.

[3] *Ibid.*, vol. i., p. 369.

[4] *Memorials of State*, vol. ii., p. 139: Cecil to Neville, December 28, 1599.

February 17, 1600, and preparations were made for the Assembly to meet in May.[1] What effect had this threatened *rapprochement* between England and Spain on the relations between Elizabeth and Henry IV. ?

In the first place, it impeded the negotiations for an understanding with France, and had the effect of hardening the heart of the French King against the repayment of his loans, and the amelioration of the position of English merchants in France.[2] In the second place, it led him to have recourse to strong measures. For example, on April 21, 1600, irritated at the delays of justice in the English Admiralty, he confirmed the sentence of the Bailly of Rouen, and issued an Edict[3] regulating the importation of English cloths, which was tantamount to a prohibition of a large proportion of them. Fear, he thought, might operate better than love in conserving the amity of Elizabeth. " C'est tousjours imprudence de se confier d'une personne qui dit estre offensée de nous et monstrer mespriser nostre amityé principallement quand nous cognoissons qu'elle a moyen de nous nuire."[4] In his desire to terrorize the Queen, he would rehabilitate the Franco-Scottish alliance, dormant since 1586, but always ready to spring into existence because of

[1] *Memorials of State*, vol. ii., p. 152.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 169.

[3] Extraict des Registres du Conseil Privé du Roy, MS. 15,980, Fonds Français, f. 123, 21 Avril, 1600.

[4] Kermaingant, vol. ii., p. 115: King to Boissize; and also p. 172.

the hatred of Elizabeth towards James VI. He would strike a mortal blow at English Commerce by a sweeping prohibition of all English woollen cloths. He would suspend the prohibition against the traffic in arms and warlike munitions between French and Spanish ports. And, finally, he would issue letters of marque and reprisal against English merchants and shipping.[1]

Boissize, whose advice he sought on such matters, counselled patience. He knew better what was happening at Boulogne, and advised the King to wait until he saw the issue of that negotiation before taking any forcible steps.[2] And this was the wiser plan. Such measures as Henry IV. meditated must inevitably have provoked a war with England, and France was not yet strong enough to coerce with any hope of success. Besides, matters were not going smoothly at Boulogne. The Conference broke up in September (1600) without achieving any agreement. The deputies had devoted their time to the discussion of the difficult point of "precedence," and as this was insoluble, save by humiliating the pride of either Elizabeth or Philip III., nothing could be said on the substance of the disagreements between the two countries.[3]

§ 4. The main result of the failure of the Boulogne Assembly—so far, at least, as Anglo-French relations were concerned—was to induce both the French

[1] Kermaingant, vol. ii., p. 159: King to Boissize, July 2, 1600; p. 163: *ibid.*

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 165.

[3] *Ibid.*, vol. i., pp. 438, 439.

King and Elizabeth to take up more seriously than ever the question of the settlement of their outstanding differences.

In December Henry IV. wrote to Boissize to offer the unqualified confirmation of the Treaty of 1572, on condition that Elizabeth fulfilled the purpose for which that Treaty was designed.[1] In the first place, she should give up Spain and Burgundy, and enter whole-heartedly into a close amity with France. And, in the second place, she must agree to effect, jointly with the French Government, a settlement of the disorders of the sea. The reply of Elizabeth was to accept the first part of the proposal and to reject the second, in the form, at least, in which it was presented. She suggested that a veil be drawn over the past "injustices" of the English Admiralty, and a new beginning made with the Articles which Cecil had drawn up.[2] In February (1601) Boissize refused to accept so manifestly unfair a solution, and when the Queen, ignoring him, sent over Neville to deal directly with the King, the Ambassador wrote to Henry IV. advising him to have nothing to do with the proposal for Confirmation of the Treaty unless he was conceded freedom of trade for French merchants in England. On the score of the maritime disagreements, Boissize, who had now given up hope of any alleviation of the sufferings of French merchants and shippers, urged the use of force.[3]

[1] Kermaingant, vol. ii., p. 188. [2] See Appendix C.
[3] *Ibid.*, vol. i., pp. 522, 523.

The King took the advice of his Ambassador, and met the English proposals with a refusal.[1] Indeed, it was not possible for him to do anything else. The public temper had been rising in France, and it was generally felt that the time had come for a firm stand against the demands of Elizabeth. In June, 1601, a grand Council was held in Paris, to study and advise upon the whole question of maritime disorders, letters of marque, naval armaments, and the commercial *impasse*.[2] And Boissize, who, perhaps, more than any man, understood the situation and knew the bearings of the dispute, addressed a letter to this assembly, in which he outlined a solution which is both valuable and striking.

On the assumption that the English predominance rested on its navy, he urged that French warships be constructed and armed to patrol the trade routes and safeguard commerce. The necessary funds could be provided by levying increased taxes (both export and import) on foreign merchants trading in France. Part of the proceeds of these impositions, he pointed out, might be devoted to the indemnification of Frenchmen who had been 'spoiled' by the English and failed to obtain justice. If this course were followed, the dangerous policy of issuing letters of marque and reprisal, and also the equally dangerous course of totally prohibiting English commerce in France, would be avoided. Should more drastic measures be necessary, recourse might be had to a general embargo on English

[1] Kermaingant, vol. i., p. 524. [2] *Ibid.*

shipping and goods in French ports, which was a recognized legal weapon. Lastly, he counselled the appointment of Consuls in Algeria and Morocco, in order to protest against the sale of stolen goods in Barbary by the renegade English pirates, who defied the Admiralty and the Queen's Proclamations.[1]

The scheme outlined by Boissize, though eminently statesmanlike, does not appear to have had much weight at the moment with the French Government. On the other hand, his reiterated assertions that no justice was being done to aggrieved Frenchmen by the English Admiralty,[2] and that none ever would be done under the present conditions, had a profound effect on both the King and Villeroy, the Secretary of State. When Sir Ralph Winwood, for example, approached the latter in June (1601) with a lengthy Memorial, having the Admiralty Seal attached, containing a list of the French to whom satisfaction had been made in England, he refused to read it. "He would not," says Winwood, "vouchsafe once to behold yt, saying he was sufficiently enformed what our justice was, and whatsoever this attestation did containe was but *des contes*."[3] The King, for his part, made up his mind to answer the injustices which his subjects suffered by issuing letters of marque to all aggrieved

[1] Letter of Boissize, *Memorials of State*, vol. iv., pp. 319-321.

[2] *E.g.*, Kermaingant, vol. i., p. 528.

[3] *Memorials of State*, vol. iv., p. 333: Neville to Cecil, June 3, 1601.

Frenchmen who could prove that they could not obtain justice from the English Admiralty. And if Elizabeth answered in kind, he was prepared to break off all commercial relations, and make himself strong enough on the sea to uphold his decision.

The apparent crisis into which the relations between England and France had drifted was characterized by acrimonious recrimination between Boissize and the English Council. The French Ambassador, according to Cecil, was "a Picquant Spirite cladd with externall Formalitie." He was cordially disliked in England at this time, because it was felt that he was traversing the proposals made by Elizabeth at all points, and that he was at the root of the forcible measures of the French Government. The ill-feeling culminated during a purely chance discussion between him and Cecil at a Council meeting on June 27 (1601).[1] Calais was accidentally mentioned in the course of the talk. Cecil said, with heat, that all the evil that affected England came from Calais, that it was a gateway through which Jesuits and traitors entered this country. Boissize replied that the towns of his master were free to all the world. Thereupon the English Secretary somewhat wildly retorted that he hoped they would have Calais sooner than Henry IV. would be master of London. The Frenchman answered that this was strange language, that His Majesty did not make any pretensions to London, but that Calais was not for the English.

[1] Kermaingant, vol. i., pp. 531, 532, *in extenso*.

Cecil added the finishing touch to this edifying conversation by saying that they had more rights to Calais than the French King to London.

The discussion is unimportant in itself: it merely indicates the fact that the position of Boissize was becoming untenable. He was a disappointed man. After three years' earnest endeavour he had failed to win any of the vital contentions with which he had set out. His three years' laborious service was almost over, and perhaps he is to be pardoned for importing heat and acrimony. At all events, Elizabeth felt that he was a hindrance in the way of a settlement, and accordingly made efforts to transfer the negotiations to Paris, thus taking the conduct of affairs out of his hands. In pursuance of this plan, Edmondes was despatched from London to Paris in July with a comprehensive commission, and began conversations on all the subjects of difference with De Maisse (formerly French Ambassador in England), whom Henry IV. appointed for this purpose. These discussions were conducted in a temper far removed from the heated and acidulated vituperation of Westminster; and in the end they produced some important results.[1]

In the matter of the disabilities of English merchants in France it was contended by the King that he could not usefully suspend the Edict of April, 1600, which regulated the conditions on which English cloths might be imported into France. If he did so, he would be putting a premium on bad

[1] Kermaingant, vol. i., p. 534.

cloths, for there would be an immediate increase in defectively manufactured goods.[1] But he conceded that for the future the inspection of the English Cloths should be in the hands of a disinterested third party, and that the Cloths declared "vitieux" would not be confiscated, but returned to England.

The navigation question was more difficult to handle. Edmondes insisted that the past should be obliterated, on the ground that the English losses by French piracy were as numerous as the French losses by English piracy. Further, he remonstrated against the issuing of letters of marque by the French Government. As Henry IV. was convinced that this was the sole means of securing anything like justice to his aggrieved and spoliated subjects, he clung obstinately to the principle, but agreed to suspend the execution of those he had issued, for three months. Meanwhile, he asked that a Conference be arranged to settle the vexed question of the sea, saying that he would send M. Beaumont to join Boissize in London for that purpose.[2]

As to the reimbursement of moneys lent, he found a pretext in the friction between him and the Spanish King to postpone the matter for the present.[3]

These were only provisional pronouncements. The final settling up was to take place at the projected Conference in London. It was some little time before that meeting took place. But, as the

[1] Kermaingant, vol. i., p. 539. [2] *Ibid.*, pp. 540, 541.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 541.

intervening events belong elsewhere, it is necessary to take a step from the summer of 1601 to February, 1602, when the new French Ambassador and deputy, M. Beaumont, arrived in England to concert measures with Boissize.

The great Conference began on February 9.[1] On the English side were the Admiral; the Chancellor; Sir John Herbert, Secretary of State; Sir Thomas Parry, Ambassador-designate to France and Lieutenant of the Admiralty; Dr. Julius Cæsar, Judge of the Court of Admiralty; Sir Thomas Edmondes; and Sir Robert Cecil. On the French side were MM. Beaumont and Boissize.

The basis of discussion was, as in 1599, the Articles drawn up by Cecil.[2] And, as might be expected, the debate gathered round the two or three points which had proved to be storm centres on the previous occasion. In the first place, Article II. was discussed, which regulated the cautions to be exacted from ships leaving port, in order to guarantee against piracy. The French Commissioners contended that the cautionary system was imperfect, because the Captains and shipmasters were ordinarily insolvent. In lieu, however, of demanding the responsibility of the Corpz de Ville, which had been insisted on, in 1599 and

[1] Letter from Beaumont to the King, February 20, in "Depesches de Messire Christofle de Harlay, Comte de Beaumont," etc., Fonds Français, 3,499-3,501, Bibliothèque Nationale, from which the following details have been taken.

[2] See Appendix C for the Document.

refused, they proposed that Captains, masters, and proprietors of ships should produce two *fidejussores*, or pledges, who would stand good at law for their misdeeds. After some lengthy discussion, the point was conceded as reasonable by the English Commissioners.

The next point raised was the still more crucial one of the *bannière haulte*, embodied in Article VI. The French deputies, as before, demanded that their commerce under the French flag should be free. But to mitigate the exorbitance of the demand, they suggested that if the Queen feared a descent on her shores, she might advise Henry IV., and he would see that the traffic of his subjects would do her no harm. But as this had worked ill before, it only succeeded in drawing forth on the English side the assertion of the Right to Search. To this Boissize and Beaumont replied by raising the general question of the freedom of the seas. "Nous respondismes," writes Beaumont, " que la mer estoit libre à tout le monde et ne pouvoit cette liberté estre retranchée sans une grande et notable injustice."[1]

Article X. was also traversed, the French asserting that the responsibility acknowledged by the Queen for damage done by her ships in the course of searching suspected vessels was too general. They demanded that the article be so couched as to make the Queen liable in person for the damage done.

These were the main points in the first discussion.

[1] Beaumont to the King, February 20, 1602, Depesches, MS. 3,499, Fonds Français.

The English deputies took some time to deliberate, and consulted the Council. When the next meeting took place on February 18, they intimated the fact that Elizabeth could not yield either on the Sixth or the Tenth Article. No ship must be allowed to carry arms or munitions to the enemy nor convert the liberty of commerce to the prejudice of either Prince (*sub pœna mortis et confiscationis*). Nor could the Queen give up the right of search which was implied in this Article. And, of course, maintaining, as she did, the right of search, she could not hamper herself by promising satisfaction for the damage done in the exercise of that right. She would provide for any such damage in a general way, but could not incur a definite liability.[1]

Beaumont was irritated at the uncompromising attitude of the English, and he vented his feeling in an interesting letter to Villeroy:[2] "En verité, Monsieur, ilz sont plus fort desraisonnables et avec lesquelz il faict fort mauvais traitter et me suis bien apperceu qu'ilz ont outre cela de la maligneté et beaucoup de cette antienne inimityé contre nous par un mot que lieutenant de l'admirauté me dict sans y penser en divisant à part que s'ilz nous accordoient tant de liberté sur la mer nous y mettrions tant da vaisseaux en deux ans qu'ils n y ont. C'est le secret, à mon advis, ilz se veulent conserver

[1] Beaumont to the King, February 20, 1602, Depesches, MS. 3,499, Fonds Français.

[2] Beaumont to Villeroy, February 20, 1602, MS. 3,499, Fonds Français.

l'Empire de cette mer au dommage de leurs amis comme de leurs ennemis que le droict de la force leur donne et ne pense pas à leur facon de proceder que jamais nous ne puissions avoir raison d'eux qu'ayant des vaisseaux de guerre qui gardent nos costes. Car quoy qu'ils n'en tiendront rien tant que nous serons foibles sur la mer. . . ."

The discussions of the Articles, however, were not closed till March 12, when a final pronouncement was made. In this settlement the chief feature is the concessions made by the English Commissioners on the two vital points which they had refused in the earlier stages of the debate. To Article VI., which insisted on the prohibition of contraband and involved the right of search, it was added that no subject of either Prince should (*sub pœna mortis et confiscationis*) take or spoil the ships of the other, which bore their country's banner (*vexilla erecta gerentes*); and as a corollary to this concession, Article X. was altered by the English to read that the Queen would indemnify for damage done by her ships.[1]

So far, then, considerable steps had been taken to meet and satisfy the French grievances.

It is difficult, however, to see how the rearrangement would work out in practice, for the concession that the flag should cover the cargo would seem to guarantee French shipping not merely against spoliation, but against inspection. Yet it is quite

[1] Letter of Beaumont to King, March 12, MS. 3,499, Fonds Français.

clear that nothing was further from the Queen's thoughts than to yield up the right of search and of intercepting contraband. In all probability the concessions were only intended to mean an alleviation of the illicit confiscation and interruptions of French merchandise by nondescript English ships.

In any case the Articles were drafted and stereotyped in this form,[1] and the discussion moved on to deal with the English grievances. On March 21 an accord was made in which these were amply met and satisfied. Four Articles were accorded:[2]

I. That no action should be taken in regard to the "captures" before the accession of Henry IV.

II. That the part of the Edict of April, 1600, (regulating the importation of English Cloths), which commanded the confiscation of defective cloths be revoked.

III. That letters of marque henceforth do not apply to the land.

IV. That proper provision be made for the execution *throughout France* of the judgments of the maritime commissioners at Rouen and elsewhere.

[1] Propositiones Ultimo loco inter dominos Commissarios hinc inde agitatæ, MS. 3,499, Fonds Français, f. 99; *Memorials of State*, vol. iv., pp. 392-394.

[2] After much discussion, *vide Memorials of State*, vol. iv., pp. 389-391. "Accord faict par les Ambassadeurs de France avec les Commissaires de la Royne le 21 Mars, 1602," MS. 3,499, Fonds Français, Bib. Nat.

French Grievances Wreck the Conference

The last work of the Conference was to discuss the special French grievances connected with the treatment of French merchants in England. Beaumont and Boissize had a heavy budget of grievances and demands on this score, and pleaded forcibly for the placing of French merchants trading in England on the same footing as English merchants in France.[1] But this was a matter which the Queen would never consent to, and as it turned out, it really prevented the Conference issuing in anything positive. On May 9 the English Commissioners proposed a prorogation of the Commercial question till a more convenient time. To this, however, the French would not agree. They insisted that the whole series of questions should be settled together and dealt with as one. Their obstinacy on the point produced a deadlock in the negotiations and the postponement of everything *sine die*.[2]

Clearly English and French interests were irreconcilable. It is difficult not to sympathize with the efforts of French merchants to win a secure status in England. But they were in the end fighting against, not merely a close-fisted Queen bent on the protection of the home merchant and the amassing of bullion in the country, but the whole system of ideas of the century. The foreign mer-

[1] MS. 3,499, Fonds Français: "Articles proposez ... touchant le traffic des françois en Angleterre." See Appendices B and D.

[2] Suspensio et Prorogatio Colloquii, MS. 15,980, f. 107 Bibliothèque Nationale; also *Memorials of State*, vol. iv. p. 394.

chant with his overseas goods, however much a necessary element in the social world, was cordially disliked, because he depleted the country of wealth. The French Government would have taken precisely the same line as Elizabeth, had French Commerce had the status in England that English Commerce had in France.

The result of the failure to conclude an agreement over the field of differences threw back the relations of England and France on to the old footing. In the "Prorogatio" it was mutually agreed that while nothing could be done for the present in the matter of regulating the various differences, nevertheless the Proclamation which had been recently issued by the Queen for dealing with navigation should be observed, and the King should issue a similar one in France. Commerce should continue in *statu quo ante*.[1]

Of course, the deduction of M. Beaumont was rapid and logical. The English were in possession of the sea, and might, if they so desired, plunder all the nations of the world with impunity. France could never hope to guard against the injuries practised on her merchants and shipping, nor safeguard her trade routes until she had a navy.[2] The solution of the whole matter was therefore simply the increase of naval armaments, and the application of force and menace to England. Arbitration and diplomacy, without national prestige behind them,

[1] Fonds Français, MS. 15,980, f. 107.

[2] *Ibid.*, MS. 3,499: Beaumont to King, June 26, 1602.

were as helpless in the Sixteenth Century as a newborn babe; the only way to win recognition was to build.

In the second place, Beaumont counselled retaliation by the general prohibition of English goods in France.[1]

Henry IV. took to heart the first advice, and set himself to construct a proper navy, but he refused to take the drastic step of totally prohibiting the import of English goods, because he did not think it would lessen the piracies, but merely complicate matters in another direction. He preferred *douce dissimulation* for the present, but would lie in wait for an opportunity of extorting justice or of exacting revenge. His Ambassador, however, should continue in season and out of season to seek reform of the abuses.[2]

There are continuous grumblings in the letters which passed between Henry IV. and Beaumont during the year, regarding the ill-usage of the French merchants, the slowness of English justice, and the peculiar difficulties in the way of recovering Frenchmen's goods which had once been sold, and were therefore beyond the control of the Admiralty.[3] One particular grievance gave considerable annoyance to the French—viz., the fact if an English

[1] Beaumont to King, July 4, Fonds Français, MS. 3,500; Villeroy to Beaumont, July 12, *ibid.*

[2] King to Beaumont, July 12, *ibid.*

[3] *Ibid.*, August 29, 1602, Fonds Français, MS. 3,500; *ibid.*, Beaumont to Villeroy, November 26; *ibid.*, Beaumont to King, January 23, 1603.

pirate were criminally convicted, his goods and chattels, inclusive of the stolen property, were forfeited to the crown. So that French merchants would rather make *compositions aimable* with the pirates than "pursue them to death." But for answer to the complaints, the Queen took her stand immovably on the principle that there had been no depredations since the Proclamations had been published, only "searchings."[1]

This, however, was scarcely true. If any faith can be placed on the French complaints, it would appear that there was very little abatement, if any, in the disorders of the sea.[2] Villeroy remarked in a letter to Beaumont that the Court was besieged with aggrieved merchants clamouring for revenge.[3] On the other hand, it would be fallacious to suppose that Elizabeth was callous in the matter of piracies and spoliation of French ships. The long debate had acted as an educator of public opinion, and one has only to peruse the "Proclamation to Represse all Piracies and Depredations upon the Sea," issued at Richmond on March 20, 1601, to see that elaborate and stringent measures were taken by the English Government to put down all disorders on

[1] Articles Proposez par l'Ambassadeur au Conseil sur le faict des Depredations, January, 1603, Fonds Français, MS. 3,501; Beaumont to King, January 7, *ibid.*; King to Beaumont, January 8, *ibid.*; Beaumont to King, January 23, *ibid.*

[2] King to Beaumont, February 23, 1603.

[3] Fonds Français, MS. 3,501, Villeroy to Beaumont, December 5, 1602.

the sea. A careful registry was kept of the movements of armed vessels. Severe penalties were incurred by anyone who ventured to sell stolen goods in Tunis, Algiers, or any place in Barbary, Italy, or Greece. That the Queen was in earnest may be seen from the fact that she went to the expense of stationing a pinnace in the Straits to search for offenders against the Proclamation.[1]

But the right to intercept the shipping plying to Spanish ports, to examine papers, and to confiscate cargoes of ships whose papers were not in order as contraband, was still maintained in all its rigour.[2] It was the legal and undoubted right of the belligerent.

§ 5. In the last phase of the Relations of England and France, the interests involved are few and often trivial. The correspondence between Beaumont and Henry IV. is voluminous enough, but the stream seems to be dissipating itself in a stagnant marsh. This diminishing velocity and interest of events is perhaps traceable to the fact that the dynastic revolution which was pending in England dwarfed other matters, and yet in itself was not a subject on which anything could be said or done openly.

But there are two central facts round which almost everything else in the period circulates, and in the light of which, what would appear to be a very confused and aimless sequence of events, may be made to develop both clearness and interest.

[1] Fonds Français, MS. 15,980, f. 91. For document see Appendix E.

[2] King to Beaumont, February 26, 1603.

The failure of the Conference of Boulogne in 1600 had shown conclusively that no settlement with Spain was possible. The collapse of the project, however, did not mean that all negotiations between Brussels and London were broken off. On the contrary, they were continued. They run like a monotonous undertone through the whole period. But their main use, so far at least as Elizabeth was concerned, was to mask and veil the real intention of the English Government.[1]

That intention would seem to be nothing less than to recover command of the European situation lost to England at the Peace of Vervins, and to establish national security, *by embroiling France in a new war with Spain*. As has already been pointed out, the Queen had failed to win her end by peace with Spain; she would now attempt to do so by tearing up the Treaty of Vervins. This is the broad principle which underlies the policy of Elizabeth from 1600 till 1603.

But there is no doubt that the Queen herself counted for very little in the last year of her reign. As Beaumont remarked,[2] she believed anything Cecil told her. Now Cecil was mainly concerned in fortifying himself against the day of Elizabeth's decease. And once he had made up his mind to set all his safety on the accession of James VI., the

[1] Fonds Français, MS. 3,499, Beaumont to King, April 8; *ibid.*, Beaumont to King, February 20, 1602.

[2] Fonds Français, Beaumont to Villeroy, March 6, 1603, MS. 3,501.

one wise course to follow was to strengthen that safety by entangling France in a war with Spain, and so deflecting the Continental Powers from any designs they might have in England.

On both shewings, therefore, the policy of the English Government was one of unprincipled incendiarism.

In pursuance of the plan Elizabeth had attempted, in the Autumn of 1601, to entrap Henry IV. into giving assistance to the beleaguered garrison of Ostend, by representing to the Dutch through her agent, that he had promised her to send succours.[1] It was an absolute misconstruction of what the King had said, for he could not afford to break the neutrality incumbent on him by the Treaty of Vervins. "Ilz desguisent," he wrote, "et veulent me faire croire que j'ay dit et promis ce que je n'ay jamais pensé, esperans m'engager ou surprendre par leurs inventions."[2] His penetration of the design was accurate enough, and it provides incidentally the clue to the period.

In December, 1601, the Spaniards landed at Kinsale, and threatened to co-operate with Tyrone to drive the English out of Ireland. Here was indeed a colourable cause for an attack on Spanish dominions. And, accordingly, after the danger was over, Henry IV. was approached by Elizabeth with proposals for a joint attack on the Spanish Netherlands. The purpose of the expedition was

[1] Kermaingant, vol. ii., pp. 242, 244.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 249: King to Boissize, October 25, 1601.

explained to be the expulsion of an "obnoxious neighbour." It need not require more than 15,000 men, and of these Elizabeth promised 10,000. The base should be Calais, as being the nearest and most convenient town. As a recompense the Queen proposed to annex the seaport towns of Gravelines, Nieuport, Ostend, Sluys. The French King might defalk the cost of his contingent from the debt he owed to the English Crown.[1]

There was a show of great preparations in England at carrying out the scheme. The fleet was under orders to sail for the Spanish coast in order to intercept any help the Spaniard might desire to give, and Sir Francis Vere left England for the Netherlands to make plans.[2]

But Henry IV. was slow to move. The English, he said, must speak *hors de dents*. So the proposals were repeated in the Summer with renewed emphasis by both Elizabeth and Cecil. The latter was particularly enthusiastic and insistent. He desired to lay down two conditions: (1) That neither party make peace without consent of the other, and (2) that the war be commenced while negotiations were going on.[3]

Towards the end of the year the situation almost

[1] Fonds Français, MS. 3,499, King to Beaumont; and *Memorials of State*, vol. iv., p. 386.

[2] *Ibid.*, Beaumont to King, March 12; *ibid.*, March 26.

[3] Cecil to Winwood, March 14, 1602; *Memorials of State*, vol. iv., p. 395; Beaumont to King, August 3, Fonds Français, MS. 3,500.

played into Elizabeth's hands, for there took place the discovery of the conspiracy of Biron against the French King—a conspiracy in which the Spanish King was the *agent provocateur*. And the French Government was almost forced willy-nilly into a war to save the nobles from corruption. Both Elizabeth and Beaumont urged Henry IV. to purge his country of its evil humours by the projected foreign war.[1]

Now, it is clear beyond all doubt, if we turn to the private correspondence of Cecil and Winwood, that the bellicose tone of the English Government towards Spain, and the attempt to enlist the French in a joint campaign against Flanders, was devised to bring about a rupture between France and the Escorial. Winwood, writing to Cecil of his efforts at this time in France, observes:[2] "I thought it my duety in diligence to advertize this, whereby your Honour may perceave how easy it is *to engage the King in a perpetual war*, for no sooner shall his armies appear in Flaunders but the King of Spain and the Duke of Savoy will fall upon Provence."

Both Beaumont and Villeroy, thanks to their inbred suspicion of Elizabeth, suspected the English design from the very start, and Henry IV. had the fear before his mind throughout the period[3] that he was being played upon unscrupulously. But it

[1] Fonds Français, MS. 3,500, Beaumont to King, December 28, 1602; also Beaumont to King, December 5, 1602.

[2] *Memorials of State*, vol. iv., p. 386: Winwood to Cecil.

[3] Beaumont to King, March 12, 1602, Fonds Français, MS. 3,499.

was not this that stayed his hand. There were more substantial reasons against his entrance into a war against Spain. These may be gathered partly from the letters of the King to Beaumont, and partly from the correspondence of Winwood.

In the first place, France was not ready for a war. Time was required to put the outlying Provinces in a proper condition of defence, for the Spanish attack would naturally fall on such parts as Brittany, Guienne, Provence, Languedoc.[1] In the second place, to make war against Spain, involving, as it would, a straighter alliance with England and Holland, would mean the upsetting of the equilibrium of France. It would mean alienation from Rome, the King would be led to serve himself by his Protestant subjects, and he would stand in danger of losing the support of the bulk of his people.[2] In other words, it would virtually mean a return to the divided France of the days when Henry IV. was seeking to rebuild his fortunes by a Protestant *contre-ligue*. There were, in fact, only two possible cases in which the French King could embark on a war with any confidence. Either it must be in self-defence, or if the Provinces of the Spanish Netherlands, long coveted by France, should, in their misery, submit themselves to a French Protectorate and drive out the Archduke.[3] But as

[1] King to Beaumont, August 29, 1602, Fonds Français, MS. 3,500.

[2] Winwood to Cecil, September 27, 1602, *Memorials of State*, vol. iv., p. 437.

[3] *Ibid.*

neither of the two conditions were obtainable at the time, no attempt of Elizabeth to induce Henry IV. to break the Treaty of Vervins could possibly succeed. Accordingly, even in the face of the conspiracy of the Duke de Biron, the King preserved an enigmatic attitude, willing to consider war, but never attempting to counsel Elizabeth against making a peace with Spain if she could have it.[1]

Further, Henry IV. was keenly alive to the folly of entering upon a war in partnership with an aged Queen, whose "uncertain" successor being of a different dynasty, might not feel himself bound to continue the agreement.[2]

The succession question in England had now clearly become a factor in the European situation. "C'est une des choses de ce siècle," remarked Henry IV. It raised profound questions concerning the balance of power in Europe, because if James VI. succeeded, the Union of the Crowns would give an increased power to England. Hence the French King, like everyone else, was engaged in fumbling about among the growing confusion of English politics for some firm ground on which policy could be built. He thought he might seek support from the Catholics and pose as their protector, but they were a feeble body, without a leader.

[1] King to Beaumont, October 29, 1602, Fonds Français, MS. 3,500.

[2] Beaumont to Villeroy, December 28, 1602, *ibid.*

James VI., again, was fickle and treating with the Pope and Philip of Spain.[1] He could not think of Arabella. In the end he was taken by surprise, for James succeeded without a murmur.

Thus, the problems which had arisen between England and France in the period consequent upon the Peace of Vervins, the maritime and commercial difficulties, were passed on unsolved to the new reign; and the great question of the readjustment of the bases on which England's foreign policy rested, was left to the care of Elizabeth's successor. But the main work of the Queen, the arrestment of the Spanish ambition, had been achieved.

[1] King to Beaumont, March 13, 1603, Fonds Français, MS. 3,501; Beaumont to King, March 19, *ibid.*; King to Beaumont, March 27, *ibid.*; also King to Beaumont, September 28, 1602, Fonds Français, MS. 3,500; King to Beaumont, October 2, *ibid.*; and Beaumont to Villeroy, February 1 and 2, 1603, Fonds Français, MS. 3,501.

APPENDIX A

GRIEVANCES OF THE ENGLISH MERCHANTS IN FRANCE

THE movement for the exclusion of English Cloths from the French market was, in large measure, actuated by the writings of the mercantilist reformer, Laffemas. He argued that the unemployment in France was due to the fact that the Cloth trade was in the hands of the foreigner, and he put forward the other mercantilist doctrine that the bullion of the country was being depleted for the same reason. He was supported by the French merchants, who made bitter complaints to the Council that they were *mangez et pincez*,[1] the English traders having drawn all the navigation and traffic of Rouen into their hands. So that it seemed to the French that they were bound hand and foot to the foreigner. The Bailly of Rouen was not slow to take action on behalf of his distressed countrymen. In June, 1600, he issued a second pronunciamento, which was deliberately devised to exclude the English merchant altogether from the market at Rouen.[2] No one who had not the *droit de bourgeoisie* should be permitted to buy and sell merchandise in Rouen. The King, however, though supporting the first decision of the Bailly, did not

[1] MS. 15,980, f. 22, Bibliothèque Nationale.
[2] *Ibid.*, f. 124, Bibliothèque Nationale.

give currency to this second and more drastic pronouncement.

But there was another aspect to the question. The King himself always pleaded that he had no hostile intentions against the English merchant—that he meant nothing more by his Edict of April, 1600, than the safeguarding of the buyer against inferior articles.[1] There was considerable point in the plea, for the English Cloths, not being subject to any censorship or examination, were undoubtedly not so well made as formerly. The merchants themselves admitted so much quite frankly.[2] But the prohibition of those which were not *bien conditionnés* by the Edict of April, 1600, caused some alarm lest the bulk of the Cloths might be confiscated as fraudulent. And they contended that the Royal Arrêt was tantamount to the exclusion of English Cloths altogether.[3] They therefore drew up a careful statement of their grievances,[4] basing their case on the finding of the Parlement of Orleans in 1560, which had hitherto regulated the traffic. The stress of the criticism fell on the words *bien conditionnés*, which, it was held, were *très captieux* and subject to many interpretations, " Chacun d'iceux estans suffisant pour fondre de grandz proces et faire confisquer les merchandises de draps desquels Anglois." They desired that a distinction should be drawn between cloths that were *vitieux et deloyaux* and those that were of pure wool, albeit *fautifs*. The latter should be marked as defective, and sold subject to a reduction in the price. On the other hand, if goods that were really defective were sold as perfect, they were willing to incur a fine of forty sous, which might be

[1] Kermaingant, vol. i., p. 457. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 529.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 461.
[4] MS. 15,980, f. 120, Bibliothèque Nationale.

paid into the poor man's box. Further, they objected to the confiscation of cloths that were *barrez, rayez, ribottez*—words used to describe the adulteration of cloths by admixture. For if this were rigidly carried out, all the friezes, cottons, and cloths of small price which served to make linings, would suffer confiscation, because they were made with various wools; and it could not be said whether this was due to defective manufacture or to a mixture of wools. Finally, they raised objection to the French demand that the cloths should not be dyed—a proviso intended to make the discovery of flaws easier. The English merchants contended that the art of dyeing was not practised much in those parts of France where the cloths were sold—Brittany, Gascony, and Guienne,—and that in consequence the sale would be greatly hindered. Nevertheless, they were willing to concede the point if necessary.

In the settlement reached[1] it was agreed that the goods of English merchants in the Halle at present, and for the following four weeks be duly *mouillés* and inspected by the *gardes;* that which passed the test being marked as guaranteed. After the four weeks were over, no merchandise was to be allowed to be brought into Rouen which had not been wetted and dried, and the mark placed on it describing its contents. In case of fraud, they agreed that no confiscation should take place, but a fine should be laid on the offender such as the merchants assembled might determine. This done, no demand for reduction in price was to be allowed. But in case of discord the matter should be settled by a committee of two English and two French merchants. If these were insufficient, another merchant was to be called in—not a clothier, but a citizen of Rouen.

[1] MS. 15,980, f. 138, Bibliothèque Nationale.

Lastly, an English merchant was to act as superviser to prevent the importation of bad cloths, and to notify the cases as they occurred to the *gardes*, in order that the fines might be levied on the offender.

This arrangement did not cover all grievances, of course, but it eased the situation very considerably.

Droit d'Aubaine.

This was a right exercised by the French Crown to possess itself of the goods and personal property of deceased English merchants in France. Winwood explains it thus:[1] "I remonstrated that there was no one abuse whereby the Amity of the two Crowns was more wronged then by the pretext of the *Droit d'aubaine;* under collour whereof upon decease of any English merchant the books of Accounts of the deceased are searched, and often embezeled; his Chambers Coffers, and Countinghouses ryfled; and by reason of the intercourse of Commerce which is between merchants of the same trade, Fellows and Co-partners, the goods of the survivers are often seazed and sequestered and either are to be quitted or with charge redeemed."

The complaint was the more bitter inasmuch as the French Government had relaxed the right in the case of the Scots merchants and the Dutch. But it does not appear that the grievance was removed at this time.

[1] *Memorials of State*, vol. iv., p. 401.

APPENDIX B

GRIEVANCES OF THE FRENCH MERCHANTS TRAFFICKING IN ENGLAND

The disabilities of the French merchant in England were indeed numerous. It was forbidden him to buy in the open market: he might buy only from the retailer in London. This was felt to be a great hardship, because the English merchants were at liberty to purchase from the peasant at first hand. The export tax laid on the French was double that which the English had to pay. And whereas the latter could have their goods wrapped up by anyone they chose, the French were compelled by law to have theirs wrapped up by a Government wrapper, who charged dearly for his services. Further, many French articles of commerce were prohibited under penalty of corporal punishment. And the import tax for such merchandise as was allowed, was much higher when the party in question was a Frenchman than when he was an Englishman. The French again suffered from the operation of the law which compelled them to spend the proceeds of their traffic on English goods within the year. Finally, when the Queen imposed a subsidy, the share of it which fell on the shoulders of the Frenchmen was double of that paid by the English merchant. "Pourquoy," they write, "il est assez aysé à juger qu'il est presques impossible aux marchants de la nation française de pouvoir avoir aucun commerce en Angleterre pour en remporter quelque utilité de profit."[1]

[1] *Griefs des Marchants Français Negotians en Angleterre*, MS. 15,980, ff. 19, 22, Bibliothèque Nationale.

APPENDIX C

CECIL'S ARTICLES[1]

1. Æquum videtur ut omnes et singuli subditi et mercatores utriusque principis in mutuam protectionem suscipiantur, quo libere ac secure licitam mercaturam exercere possint; quod commodissime fiet secundum conventiones in prioribus tractatibus inter utriusque regni principes initas.

2. Quo melius obvietur deprædationibus aliisque latrociniis piraticis, æquitati consonum videtur ut bona et sufficens cautio ab admirallo, viceadmirallo seu illorum loca tenentibus capiatur, vidilicet pro navibus mercatorum et aliorum subditorum posthac cum bellico apparatu et reprisaliis emittendis in duplici navis, apparatus et victualium valore et de aliis quæ tantum mercaturæ causa sine reprisaliis et apparatu bellico emittuntur in simplici, secundum antiquos tractatus; et si dicti admirallus, viceadmirallus seu eorum loca tenentes nullam vel minus idoneam acceperint cautionem, culpa eorum interveniente, de injuriis illatis ipsi respondere teneantur quemadmodum in antiquis tractatibus cautum est.

3. Quo impensis mercatorum qui lites intenturi sunt melius prospiciatur, conventum est ut eorum causæ inter sex menses expediantur, si commode fieri possit, idque per commissarios a Christianissimo Rege in Gallia constitutos, gratis et sine sumptibus partium, quemadmodum jam in Anglia a Serenissima Regina constitutum est.

4. Sententiæ seu condemnationes in actionibus civiliter intentatis in eos qui piraticum exercent

[1] Reprinted from Kermaingant, vol. ii., "Pièces Justificatives," pp. 266-268.

latæ in singulos delinquentes imposterum in solidum fiant. Fidejussores vero pœnam stipulatam præstabunt tantummodo, quoad injuriam passo seu spoliato satisfiat.

5. Post tres menses elapsos a tempore traditionis litterarum principis utriusque regni vel a requisitione oratoris residentis si denegata justitia fuerit, represaliæ hinc inde concedi possunt.

6. Cum Serenissima Angliæ Regina, ex relatione magnifici domini Regis Christianissimi legati, intellexisset Regem jam statuisse se suis subditis sub pœna mortis inhibiturum ne ulla armorum vel munitionum bellicarum genera in Hispaniam transportarent neve, sub prætextu liberi commercii nunc conventi, quicquam perpetrarent in Suæ Majestatis præjudicium ac ea de causa mota in omnibus regni sui portubus edicto publico denuntiari fecerit, ne quis subditorum suorum, sub pœna mortis et confiscationis bonorum, quascunque subditorum Christianissimi Regis naves spoliaret, ita vicissim Majestas Sua expectat ut Rex Christianissimus, pari honoris intuitu, sub eisdem pœnis publico edicto reciproce inhibeat ne ulla armorum aut bellicarum munitionum genera terrestria sive maritima a suis subditis in Hispaniam aliave regis illius dominia transportentur, neve sui subditi concessa commercii libertate in præjudicium Suæ Majestatis quovis modo abutantur.

7. Nostris receptis moribus minime convenit ut ad singularum rerum quæ in Suæ Majestatis usus a ministris capiuntur testationem faciendam, magnum regni sigillum adhibeatur, multoque minus ut ob dilatam solutionem represaliæ concedantur; sed, si quid antehac a regiis ministris captum seu detentum fuerit, pretio non soluto, ab utraque Majestate sedula cura adhibeatur, ut re cognita congruo et opportuno tempore, debita solutio præstetur.

8. Conceditur, prout in priori responso nostro scilicet ut qui tam barbaram crudelitatem exercent, debitis et legitimis pœnis puniantur.

9. Represalias non modo suspendendas sed penitus utrinque revocandas existimamus.

10. Naves omnes immediato principum mandato emissæ vel a regiæ classis præfectis in usus publicos adscitæ et matriculis inscriptæ pro regiis navibus habeantur, et, si quid ab iisdem commissum fuerit, ut justitia administretur ipsi principes prospicient.

11. Edicta publica fiant ne ulla bonorum mari captorum divisio, transportatio seu alienatio permittatur, neve quis eadem spolia emat, receptet seu celet, nisi judicis admirallitatis sententia seu decreto justæ et legitimæ prædæ loco habenda definiantur. Neve maritimarum civitatum seu villarum alterutrius regni magistratus piratas secundum alterutrius regni leges proscriptos et publice denuntiatos in portus seu infra dictarum civitatum seu villarum limites recipiant, seu stationem facere permittant; neve dictarum civitatum seu villarum incolæ dictos proscriptos hospitio excipiant, aut iisdem victualia, auxilium favoremve ullum præstent, sed detineri illos ac judicio sisti faciant, idque sub pœnis jure debitis cum reparatione damnorum et interesse.

Protestatio.

Quæ superius proponuntur non aliter accipiantur quam sub hac protestatione, vidilicet ut, si quid in iis pristinis fœderum tractatibus repugnans fuerit, nihil inde ab antiquis fœderibus derogatum intelligatur, sed ut pro horum temporum injuria piraticis deprædationibus melius provideri possit, hoc ipsum per viam provisionis solummodo accipiatur, donec amplior tractatus pro utriusque principis commoditate de singulis haberi possit.

APPENDIX D

ARTICLES PROPOSEZ PAR LES SIEURS AMBASSADEURS AUX COMMISSAIRES DE LA ROYNE TOUCHANT LE TRAFFIC DES FRANÇOIS EN ANGLETERRE.[1]

(1) Que l'entrecours de marchandise et trafficq sera libre entre les deux Royaumes et permis aux françois d'amener en Angleterre toutes sortes de marchandises les vendre et trocquer ainsy que bon leur semblera.

(2) Que toutes gabelles, daces, peages, impostz et autres droictz quelconques les françois ny payeront plus que les Anglois ainsy qu'il est accoustumé en France.

(3) Que les françois ne seront contraintz de remployer en marchandise les deniers provenans de celles qu'ils auront vendues en Angleterre ains leur sera seulement deffendu de transporter leurs ditz deniers hors le Royaume.

(4) Qu'il sera donné aux françois terme raisonnable pour payer les debuoirs (duties) des marchandises qu'ilz auront apportées en baillant par eux bonne et suffisante caution.

(5) Qu'en toutes les marchandises grabellables (garbled) le grabel soit rabattu par les coustumiers ou permis aux marchanz de rendre ledit grabel.

(6) Qu'il soit permis aux françois d'achepter toutes marchandises aux halles et lieux publicques ou elles s'apportent et vendre ainsy qu'en France il est permis aux Anglois d'achepter toutes sortes de marchandises de telles personnes que bon leur semble.

[1] *From MS.* 3,499, *Fonds Français, Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.*

Other important points raised were as follows:

(7) Ne seront enlevées des navires et magasins des françois aucunes marchandises si non à prix raisonnable attendu qu'il se leve sur eux le droit de composition pour estre exempt du taux de la Royne.

(8) Sera permis aux françois faire charger leurs marchandises en tels navires ou batteaux que bon leur semblera soient françois Anglois, ou autres.

(9) Les françois entrans ou sortans le pais d'Angleterre ne seront tenus de payer aucune chose sy non pour le vaisseau dans lequel ils passeront.

(10) Ne payeront les françois pour le droict de . . . bottelage, et pacqueage sinon pour les marchandises subjectes à estre battelées et empacquetées.

APPENDIX E

A PROCLAMATION TO REPRESSE ALL PIRACIES AND DEPREDATIONS UPON THE SEA[1]

(1) That no man of warre be furnished or set out to sea without licence under the great seale of the Admiraltie, upon sufficient bonds with sureties first given to the Judge of the High Court of the Admiraltie or to his Deputie for the good behaviour of themselves and Company towards her Majesty's friends and allies, according to the purport and limitation of the said bonds with their Conditions and the true meaning of them, under paine of Death and Confiscation of lands and goods not only to the Captaine and mariners, but to the owners and victuallers; besides the satisfying of the partie

[1] *MS.* 15,980, *fol.* 91, *Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.*

damnified of all his losses, costes, and damages, if the Company of the said ship shall Commit any piracie, depredation or murther at the sea upon any of her Majesty's friends.

(2) *Item*, that if any person, whatsoever, shall upon the Seas, take any ship that doth belong to any of her Majesty's friends, doth not forbeare to stay the same, unless it shall be laden with goods of her Majesty's enemies, or with marchandizes of such nature or qualitie, as may serve to furnish the King of Spaine his armies or navies and going into the Kingdom of Spaine and Portugall, or shall take out of it any goods belonging to her said friends except goods of the aforesaid nature or qualitie, bound for Spaine or Portugall, he or they so offending shall suffer death with Confiscation of lands and goods according to the law in that Case provided.

(3) *Item*, that all Admirall Causes (except the Causes now depending before the Commissioners for Causes of Depredation) shall be summarily heard by the Judge of the High Court of the Admiraltie without admitting any unnecessary delay.

(4) *Item*, that no appeale from him be admitted to the defendant or defendants, in Causes of Depredation either against the offenders, or their accessaries, before or after the offence committed, or those in whose possession the goods spoyled are found: unlesse first by way of provision, the summe adjudged be paid to the plaintiff upon sureties to repay it if the sentence shall be reversed.

(5) *Item*, that no prizes taken shall be disposed of till adjudication given by the saide Judge and order given by him for the disposing thereof, under paine of Confiscation of ship and goods: and the partie who shall buy, take or receive any part thereof so disposed before sentence, to be fined to

her Majesty's use, and their bodies imprisoned during her Majesty's pleasure.

(6) *Item*, that the vice-admirals or mayors, Bailies, or other Chiefe officers of every port, Admirals of themselves, shall not suffer any man of warre to put to sea without such licence from the Judge of the Admiraltie as aforesayd, neither suffer any man of warre to dispose of or unlade (without urgent necessity, and in that case to be safely kept and cellared) any goods taken at sea till such judgment and order by the sayd Judge as aforesayd, under paine to every vice-admiral or other such officer transgressing this article to forfeit to her Majesty one hundred pounds for a fine, for every such offence besides the satisfying to the party damnified of all his losses, costs, and damages.

(7) *Item*, that no bond be taken of any man of warre but by the sayd Judge of the Admiraltie, that the same may be always foorthcomming in the office, to answere all Complaints: and the sayd bondes to be taken to the use of the Lord Admirall, which he is to assigne over to the parties damnified, upon juste Complaint.

(8) *Item*, that no ship or goods taken from any of her Majesty's friends, shalbe delivered by any other order, than upon proofe made in the sayd Court of the Admiraltie, before the sayd Judge of the Admiraltie or his Deputie, to the end that a record may be kept of all such restitutions made to strangers, to serve when occasion shall require.

(9) *Item*, that the sayd Judge of the Admiraltie upon sufficient notice given to him in the office of the Admiraltie of any man of warre gone to sea without licence from him under the Great Seale of the Admiraltie first obtained: or of any who have disposed, solde, or alienated any ship or goods

whatsoever, taken at sea, before such judgment as aforesayd given by the sayd Judge, shall proceed agaynst the said ship goods or partie, according to the law in that Case provided, within the space of three months next following, upon paine to incur her Majesty's heavy displeasure.

(10) *Item*, that for the better information of the sayd Judge every vice-admiral is enjoyned by this Proclamation (whereof he shall take notice at his peril) to certifie into the sayd Court of the Admiraltie, every quarter of a yeere, what man of warre hath gone to the sea, or returned home, with any goods taken at sea, or the procedure thereof, upon paine to lose to her Majesty (by way of fine) for every such default, twenty pounds of English money, to be answered into her Majesty's Receit of the Exchequer, by Certificate from the sayd Judge of the Admiraltie under the Great Seale of that office, to be directed to the Lord Treasurer and Barons of the Exchequer.

(11) *Item*, that no ship or vessel furnished to sea in warlike manner, shall enter into the Straits or Mediterranean Sea, upon paine to the offenders of Confiscation of goods and lands and of whatsoever there taken and further to suffer as in case of piracy.

(12) Lastly, it is strictly prohibited to all English men of warre that shall go to the seas, that they, nor any of them (under paine of death to the offenders as in cases of piracie and to the owners, confiscation of their ship or ships of war) shall sell, alienate or dispose of any goods taken at sea either in Argier, Tunis, Zant, Petrasse or any other place in Barbarie, Greece, or Italie, or elsewhere, but in the Kingdom of England only: neither shall any of her Majesty's subjects residing for the time in Barbarie

or places adjoyning or any other place out of England, dare to buy, receive directly or indirectly, any such goods taken at the seas, under paine of Confiscation of his owne proper goods, chattels, and lands here in England, and such other punishment as by the law may be inflicted upon a contemner of her Majesty's Edicts and Proclamations.

RICHMOND,
March 20, 1601.

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